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Dissertation abstract
The central focus of my dissertation has been on the investigation of devel-
opments towards more competitive and innovative firm behaviour in the global
automobile markets. The automobile companies meet each other in many prod-
uct and geographical markets worldwide. A large proportion of their production
is outside of their ”home” country. In my work I focus on international most
important car markets, namely US, European and German as the most im-
portant single European car market and a very innovative one. The increased
competition in the automobile markets coexists with a trend towards more inter-
firm relationships (both equity and contractual, horizontal and vertical), which
results in the complicated dynamic structure of the ownership and firm interac-
tions in the automobile industry. The automotive manufacturers put also a lot
of emphasis on innovation and new products introduction to preserve and/or
increase their market shares (especially in the satiated triad traditional mar-
kets of Western Europe, United States and Japan). They try to win consumer
loyalty already in the entry car market segments.
In addition to the automobile industry focus of my dissertation, this work
has been also aimed to be a contribution to the growing literature on the new
empirical approaches in the IO, namely the estimation of structural oligopoly
models for differentiated products. I study market conduct, the extent of com-
petition and the effects of new products introduction, which actually have not
been investigated so much empirically, in general and for the automobile indus-
try in particular. The major focus of the first two papers is on the investigation
of the firms’ strategic behaviour interdependence across the markets and test-
ing of the mutual forbearance hypothesis for the automobile markets. I use
both menu and conjectural variation approaches to determine the equilibrium
patterns of the firm behaviour in the automobile markets. Under the menu
approach the firm equilibrium behaviour is identified with the help of statistical
tests, which also have not been applied extensively in the past for the structural
oligopoly models for differentiated products. The reliability of the results of
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such tests is addressed. Under the conjectural variation approach I construct
the market conduct parameters and investigate the factors that may impact
those firms’ conjectures. In the third paper I focus on the investigation of the
effects from the introduction of new car models in the automobile industry. The
impact of new products and brand-name reputation on the market shares and
the importance of such principle of differentiation as old versus new car models
are investigated.
Demand side is derived from discrete choice models: depending on the
data available, different specifications on the demand side are estimated. The
product-level data on quantities, prices and product characteristics are used.
Given the absence of individual-level data on consumer car purchases, some con-
sumer heterogeneity is introduced into the models through using age sales data
for the German car market and the information on the empirical income distrib-
ution in the US and in the European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy
and the UK) to derive reasonable substitution patterns. Both cross-sectional
and panel data are used in the estimations.
The structure of my dissertation is as follows. The first essay of my dis-
sertation investigates the mutual forbearance hypothesis and firm equilibrium
interactions in the US automobile market. The second essay focuses on the im-
pact of the degree of geographical and multiproduct market linkages on the firm
behaviour in the European car market. The third paper looks at the innovation
and competition patterns in the German automobile market.
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Center for European Economic Research (ZEW)
April 14, 2008
1 Structural models
Competition policy has exhibited growing interest in empirical oligopoly models
to quantify the competitive effects of mergers, study market conduct, estimate
the welfare effects of the introduction of new products, investigate deregula-
tion effects, etc. In this part I would like to give a brief overview of structural
oligopoly models for differentiated products, their general features and estima-
tion challenges as well as I would like to discuss the use of such models to
investigate market conduct and new products introduction in the differentiated
products industries in my studies. The objective of this section is to make an
introduction into the empirical methods that I am using in my dissertation,
whereas their concrete application is discussed in more detail in my papers.
1.1 General features
Structural oligopoly models for differentiated products industries have some gen-
eral features, which have to be paid attention to while estimating such models,
in particular when aggregate-level data are used1.
Both models of demand and supply are estimated in equilibrium. The model
is derived from economic primitives such as utility and cost, unobserved factors
are explicitly discussed, in this sense these models are considered to be ”struc-
tural” models2 . This allows conducting different simulations to derive policy
implications. Cost and demand effects can be separated out because of the use
of economic primitives. Estimation strategies depend on the properties of the
”unobservables” in the model (Berry, Carnall, and Spiller, 1997).
1As compared to the aggregate-level data (i.e., market/product level data), the individual-
level data are those data where the actual purchasing decisions of consumers, and, thus, their
individual characteristics and characteristics of the products that they purchase are observed.
2The framework for structural econometric models has been in detail discussed by Reiss and
Wolak (2005). These models incorporate economic structure and statistical assumptions. The
models for differentiated products markets need more structure and assumptions as compared
to the structural models for homogenous products.
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Using discrete choice framework, demand is estimated using market-level
data on prices, quantities and product characteristics. The seminal references
are Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995). Consumer preferences
are projected onto a set of observed and unobserved product characteristics.
The number of characteristics and not the number of products determine the
parameter space in these models, thus, the dimensionality of estimating demand
parameters is addressed3.
Different assumptions on the consumer utility specification result in different
demand models, the most widely used of which are simple logit, multinominal
nested logit, and random coefficients/mixed logit models. These models imply
different substitution patterns. The simple logit, although widely used because
of its computational simplicity, yields the most unplausible substitution pat-
terns (irrelevance of independent alternatives (IIA) property). The nested logit,
also computationally easily tractable, as compared to the simple logit, solves
the problem of the unreasonable substitution patterns to some extent through
interacting product characteristics with an apriori grouping of product charac-
teristics. The imposed groupings choice still restricts the correlation between
the product attributes. The random coefficients model yields the most plausible
substitution patterns through incorporating consumer heterogeneity, however,
it is known for its computational complexity. The major challenge is that the
product market share integral has no explicit form, so that the market share
has to be simulated (the aggregation procedure has been suggested by Pakes
(1986)). The second challenge is the inversion of the market share function to
get the mean utility level of a product, which allows the use of standard instru-
mental variables techniques to estimate the demand parameters (the inversion
routine for the mean utility has been suggested by Berry (1994)).
The choice of the relevant market equilibrium depends on the estimation
of the demand systems. The sources for identification in the demand model
may be differences in choice sets over time and markets, functional form, differ-
ences in the consumer characteristics (e.g., income) distribution across markets
(Asker, 2004). Price equations are often used for the demand identification (e.g.,
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995). An additional source of identification could
be adding data, e.g., micro data on consumer characteristics to the aggregate
product-level data (e.g., Petrin, 2002, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 2004).
The price endogeneity (as well as market share endogeneity in nested logit
models) needs to be solved in such models through finding an appropriate set
of instruments, which will be discussed more in detail in the papers later.
Costs play an important role but are difficult to observe from the usual
market-level data. Thus, some assumptions are needed to recover them. Usu-
ally static Bertrand-price competition is assumed as well as that the first-order
conditions hold to recover the marginal costs. Constant marginal cost is usually
assumed, first of all because of the data limitations as it is difficult to collect
the data on the worldwide output across all models as in case of the automotive
3 In a linear demand system with J products, J2 parameters have to be estimated to capture
the substitution patterns.
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industry (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1999). In case of data availability the
marginal costs equations can be estimated allowing for increasing/decreasing
returns to scale. The price-setting assumption is in general consistent with
automotive industry wisdom.
The retailers’ pricing decisions are usually assumed away. Usually only the
manufacturer side is taken into account, i.e., it is assumed that the manufac-
turers set prices and the retailers get some exogenous constant margins, or
the retailers are assumed to be neutral pass-through intermediaries. There
are some papers around that incorporate the distribution side into the profit-
maximization task, or perform some policy simulations with it (e.g., Besanko et
al., 2002, Bonnet et al., 2005, Villas-Boas et al., 2005, Brenkers and Verboven,
2006, Villas-Boas, 2006).
In general, on the technical (estimation) side, the structural oligopoly models
for differentiated products are very sensitive to the choice of variables, functional
forms, the choice of instruments, and different technical details (e.g., scaling of
variables). The estimation of these models is very time-consuming, the use of
the numerical methods is often accompanied by convergence problems.
1.2 Empirical analysis of market conduct
Structural oligopoly models for product differentiated markets have become
more frequently used to evaluate market power, firm behaviour, merger effects,
etc. Two major approaches towards identifying the firm behaviour are used in
the empirical IO literature: the estimation and interpretation of conduct, or
”conjectural variation” parameters and the use of the so-called ’menu’ approach
to identify the pattern of the firm behaviour. In my dissertation I use both these
approaches. The idea behind them is discussed below whereas their concrete
application is discussed in more detail in my essays.
The ”conjectural variation” approach has been the first econometric appli-
cation of firms’ equilibrium interactions in oligopolistic markets (e.g., Iwata,
1974, Slade, 1987). The ”conjectural variations” are defined as reactions of the
competitors’ to the firm’s action. They are used to characterize the degree of
competition in oligopoly markets4. Behaviour changes have been analyzed by
Bresnahan (1981, 1987, 19895), Porter (1983), etc. Nevo (1998) discusses the
estimation of ”conjectural variation” parameters in a differentiated products in-
dustry and argues that these parameters could be in principle identified but it
is hard to satisfy the exclusion restrictions that are necessary for identification.
Later the menu approach has become used to study market conduct and
different behavioural assumptions, following Gasmi, Laffont, and Vuong (1992).
The problem of the interpretation of the values of the ”conjectural variation”
4Nevo (1998) gives the following definition of the conjectural variation parameters: ”By
a conjectural variation I mean a continuous parameter that measures the degree of market
power in an industry. This parameter can be interpreted as measuring, in some quantitative
sense, how close the equilibrium outcome is to theoretical predictions, or as measuring the
conjectures firms have regarding the competition”.
5Bresnahan (1989) summarizes the early studies on market power.
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parameters is solved within this approach. Gasmi, Laffont, and Vuong (1990)
discuss a methodology to empirically analyze cooperative/non-cooperative be-
haviour of firms. A structural econometric approach foresees the simultaneous,
or step-by-step estimation of demand and supply parameters and the specifi-
cation of hypotheses about firms’ strategic interactions (market conduct), after
which the relative likelihood of each selected market structure (or relative per-
formance) should be assessed.
The absence of real industry markups and marginal costs that could be
used to assess the likelihood of different firm behaviours and, thus, could allow
the precise identification of the firms’ behaviour pattern has involved the need
to develop statistical tests to evaluate the likelihood/relative performance of
each firm behaviour scenario, and to find the market conduct, which is best
supported by the data. Since the market structures are competing non-nested
econometric models, the test for non-nested hypotheses should be used. Several
approaches to selecting a model among non-nested hypotheses can be found in
the literature. Below I describe the intuition and most important references for
those tests that I use later in my papers: Vuong-type and Cox-type tests6.
The model selection tests (e.g., Vuong, 1989, Rivers and Vuong, 2002) are of-
ten applied in the literature to choose among competing non-nested econometric
models. The idea behind the Vuong-type tests is first of all to derive equilibrium
conditions under different assumptions. Demand parameters and cost shifters
(assuming a particular form for a cost function) determine the price-cost mar-
gins. The demand parameters are estimated in the first stage. In the second
stage the pricing equation is estimated. Two competing models are compared:
the null hypothesis is that the models are asymptotically equivalent, while the
alternative hypothesis is that one model performs better than the other. The
test is applied to different pairs of non-nested models, some of these models can
be rejected, so that at the end of the day some preferred supply-side specifi-
cation could be selected. Rivers and Vuong (2002) develop the generalization
of the Vuong (1989) tests, which are applied in case of maximum likelihood
estimation, to the broader class of estimations (in particular, GMM).
Another method to test among non-nested hypotheses follows the tradition of
Cox (1961) and Mizon and Richard (1986). These are the so-called specification
tests. The intuition behind the Cox-type tests (e.g., Davidson and MacKinnon,
1981) is that if the price-cost margin from a given model has a statistically
significant impact on the price-cost margin from another model, that means
that the latter model should be rejected. This test is very easy to implement
in practice. Within this approach, the two non-nested models are embedded
into a more general artificial model. MacKinnon, Davidson, and White (1983)
extend the results of Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) paper, in particular to
the cases when there are lagged dependent variables, or when the dependent
variables in the non-nested models are different transformations of each other.
As compared to the Vuong-type tests, under the Cox-type tests one of the tested
6There are also some ’omnibus’ specifications tests (e.g., Hausman, 1978, White, 1982),
under which that model is preferred, which is not rejected by any such tests (Gasmi et al.,
1990). I do not apply these tests in my estimations.
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models needs to be correctly specified, while the competing models might only
approximate what happened in reality in the best case.
The major problem with the tests for non-nested hypotheses is that several
hypotheses can be accepted or rejected. Other approaches to choose between
non-nested models are fit measures, e.g., R-squared, adjusted R-squared, in-
formation criteria (Akaike information criterion, Schwartz criterion) (Greene,
2000).
Notwithstanding the variety of tests in the theoretical econometrics liter-
ature, the tests have not been so extensively used in the new empirical IO
studies. Some examples include Bresnahan (1987, Cox (1961) test), Feenstra
and Levinsohn (1995, Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) test), Jaumandreu and
Lorences (2002, Rivers and Vuong (2002) test), etc. Many authors just consider
and discuss the effects of alternative firm behavioural specifications (e.g., Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes, 1999, Jaumandreu and Moral, 2006).
1.3 Empirical analysis of new products introduction
Characteristics-based models have become an important tool in the empirical
analysis of differentiated products. Utility functions are defined on product
characteristics instead of products per se. The distribution of utility and cost
functions, together with an equilibrium assumption, determine the relationship
between prices and characteristics (Pakes, 2004).
The use of differentiated products models to study welfare implications from
new goods introduction depends on the advances in the discrete choice literature
(in particular, the use of aggregate market-level data). Demand estimation is a
very crucial component in the studies about the introduction of new products
in the differentiated products industries. Consumer preferences, which depend
on consumers’ characteristics and products’ attributes, are explicitly aggregated
in these models to get the demand function. On the supply side, it is assumed
that firms set their prices to maximize single-period profits. Characteristics
define preferences in these models, that is why, the change in utility due to
the change in the product choice set can be evaluated. Discrete choice models,
thus, accomodate entry and exit of products. Consequently, these models are
attractive to use for studying the implications from new goods introduction
(Pakes et al., 1993).
The actual choice of the characteristics of the models marketed is not endo-
genized. Even within existing models of dynamic industry equilibrium this is
rather challenging to do (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995).
There have been a few studies that study the impact of the introduction
of new goods, and subsequent product placement decisions in the automotive
industry (e.g., Petrin, 2002, Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 2004). The differ-
entiated products models allow approximating the likely returns to potential
products (through performing counterfactuals, or simulations) and returns to
the introduced new products through calculating their markups (and calculat-
ing producer variable profits). Producer and consumer surplus from the new
products launching can be estimated. The producer profits from new products
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could be compared with product development costs to get the estimate of the
returns on investment.
Besides, the products can be also nested into groups on the basis of certain
principles of differentiation, in particular, into new and old products classes.
Inter-group and intra-group competition could be then investigated, in particu-
lar to see whether the new products constitute a separate market niche, or they
compete with the old products as well. This approach has been pioneered by
Bresnahan et al. (1997) to study the impact of new products and brand-name
reputation on the market shares in the PC market, however, it seems not to be
applied afterwards in the empirical research of new products.
2 Overview of the three essays
2.1 Essay 1. Market power, multimarket contact and pric-
ing: some evidence from the US automobile market
Multimarket contact is perceived to be one of those factors, which can facilitate
and sustain implicit collusive (cooperative) arrangements. This paper attempts
to develop new approaches to study the interdependence of firm behaviour across
markets, especially in the context of differentiated products industries. I ask
how to conduct a test of the mutual forbearance hypothesis in principle, and
how to apply it using particular data. The multimarket contact effects are
studied within a structural oligopoly model for differentiated products for the
US automobile market on the basis of the aggregate product-level data for 2001-
2003.
Some support has been found that multimarket contact may influence com-
petition in the automobile market and increase the firms’ strategic interdepen-
dence. This effect is, however, difficult to disentangle from the effect of the
market concentration in the US automobile market (dominance of the market
by the American Big Three) on the firm behaviour, which could also facilitate
collusion. In other words, it is difficult to argue whether coordination is due to
market concentration, or due to multimarket contact, or it can be attributed to
both. Concentration is argued to foster the slack, which is transferred through
the multimarket contact.
2.2 Essay 2. Geographical and multi-product linkages
of markets: impact on firm equilibrium interactions
(some evidence from the European car market)
This paper aims to study geographical and multi-product linkages of markets
(multiple market presence) and firm behaviour interdependence as a result of
such linkages existence. In particular, it attempts to answer whether the multi-
market linkages lead to more cooperative behaviour among the firms, which re-
sults in higher prices and profits, and whether the degree of collusive/cooperative
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behaviour varies across markets. These issues are investigated within a struc-
tural oligopoly model for differentiated products for the European automobile
market on the basis of the aggregate product-level data for 1970-1999. The
results of the study reveal weak (quantitative) effect of multimarket contact on
market conduct/pricing in the European car market as well as provide some
evidence on the redistribution of the market power from the more collusive to
the more competitive markets due to multimarket contact.
2.3 Essay 3. Private incentives to innovate: interplay of
new products and brand-name reputation
This paper studies the introduction of new products (increase in product variety)
in the automobile industry. The focus is on the two sources of market power
that may allow the firms to get higher profits (and, thus, recoup investments):
new products and brand-name reputation. The effects of new products on the
private incentives to innovate are investigated on the basis of the dataset for the
German car industry for 2003. The dataset is rather unique in the sense that it
contains detailed information on the technical characteristics of cars, prices and
sales as well as information on the introduction of new car models (including new
variants and versions) into the German car market at a very disaggregate level.
It has been found that both a new model and brand-name reputation may allow
the innovative firms to get some market power and recoup their investments.
Competition is, however, not localized within a market segment and the class of
new, or old models, i.e., products from different market segments, new and old
products compete with each other (coexisting and not eliminating each other)
and do not constitute separate market niches. On the other hand, new (old)
models are perceived to be closer substitutes than old (new) models. Consumer
preferences towards brand and new products vary depending on their age.
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Abstract
Multimarket contact is perceived to be one of those factors, which can
facilitate and sustain implicit collusive (cooperative) arrangements. This
paper attempts to develop new approaches to study the interdependence
of firm behaviour across markets, especially in the context of differentiated
products industries. I ask how to conduct a test of the mutual forbear-
ance hypothesis in principle, and how to apply it using particular data.
The multimarket contact effects are studied within a structural oligopoly
model for differentiated products for the US automobile market on the
basis of the aggregate product-level data for 2001-2003.
Some support has been found that multimarket contact may influence
competition in the automobile market and increase the firms’ strategic
interdependence. This effect is, however, difficult to disentangle from the
effect of the market concentration in the US automobile market (domi-
nance of the market by the American Big Three) on the firm behaviour,
which could also facilitate collusion. In other words, it is difficult to argue
whether coordination is due to market concentration, or due to multimar-
ket contact, or it can be attributed to both. Concentration is argued to
foster the slack, which is transferred through the multimarket contact.
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1 Introduction
Multiple competition, or multimarket contact rivalry, has become very impor-
tant in the contemporary competitive strategy literature. Multimarket contact
is perceived to be one of those factors, which can facilitate and sustain implicit
collusion. This multimarket contact effect has got relatively little attention in
the previous literature, although the theoretical and empirical discussion has
somehow revived in the 1990s after the seminal paper by Bernheim and Whin-
ston (1990).
The major objective of this paper has been to verify the existence and sig-
nificance of the effect of the multimarket contact on the tacit collusion, through
developing a new methodology, or approaches. The paper addresses two major
issues: how to conduct the test of the mutual forbearance hypothesis in princi-
ple (to try to solve the problem of the previous inconclusive empirical evidence
and address the weaknesses of the previous empirical studies), and how to im-
plement a test using particular data (especially when some multimarket contact
measure may not be readily available, or when the desirable situation for observ-
ing the multimarket contact effects on cooperative behaviour is not observable,
however, the multimarket contact is present in an industry of interest).
Competition policy has exhibited growing interest in empirical oligopoly
models to quantify the competitive effects of mergers, study market conduct,
estimate the welfare effects of the introduction of new products, investigate
deregulation effects, etc. In this paper, the multimarket contact effects on col-
lusion are tested on the basis of the structural oligopoly model for differenti-
ated products and estimated on the basis of the market-level data on prices,
quantities, and product characteristics. The differentiated products demand is
derived from the discrete choice framework. With a complete specification of
the demand and cost conditions, the hypothesis of the mutual forbearance and
of the traditional view of no interdependence of the firm behaviour across the
markets can be tested directly. Different hypotheses on the firms’ equilibrium
interactions, including the hypothesis of collusive behaviour due to multimar-
ket contact, are developed and tested in this paper through imposing specific
assumptions on the firms’ equilibrium interactions. Non-nested procedures and
goodness-of-fit criteria are then applied to choose between different models of
the firm behaviour.
Given the absence of the publicly available information on price-cost margins,
it is important to look at the results of several tests or goodness-of-fit criteria
(conduct robustness checks) to choose the most preferred specification for the
supply side (i.e., the model that best fits the data). Non-nested procedures
(MacKinnon, White, and Davidson, 1983, and Rivers and Vuong, 2002) are in
particular applied in this paper to choose between different models of the firm
behaviour.
The multimarket contact effects on oligopolistic coordination are tested for
the automotive industry, on the basis of the product-level data for the US light
vehicles market for 2001-2003. The automotive industry appears to be an in-
teresting case for studying the above mentioned effects as it is characterized by
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extensive multimarket contact both across the product and geographical mar-
kets dimensions. The industry has undergone a significant consolidation process,
which resulted in about 13 major independent OEMs, which are present in vir-
tually all market segments and across different geographic regions. In this paper
the multimarket contact is defined on a product segment level in the light vehi-
cles market within one geographical market, namely the US car market.
The automotive industry has become a subject of empirical studies at the
product level starting with Bresnahan (1981)1, and later a number of studies
appearing after Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) papers,
relying on the advances in the discrete choice literature. Some automotive in-
dustry papers study the equilibrium firm interactions (e.g., Bresnahan, 1981,
1987, Feenstra and Levinsohn, 1995, Verboven, 1996, 1999, Berry, Levinsohn,
and Pakes, 19992, Sudhir, 2001, Goldberg and Verboven, 2001, Brenkers and
Verboven, 2006), but only a few of them study (directly, or indirectly) collu-
sive behaviour (e.g., Bresnahan, 1981, 19873, Verboven, 1996, Sudhir, 2001,
Goldberg and Verboven, 2001)4. In the automotive industry studies, which are
based upon the estimation of the structural oligopoly models, Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium is usually assumed, which may be not quite correct as the repeated
interaction among the automotive firms may destroy the Bertrand outcome as
well as the concentrated structure of the industry could foster cooperative be-
haviour. In some studies, Cournot equilibrium, or some ”mixed” equilibrium
is estimated (e.g., Feenstra and Levinsohn, 1995, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes,
1999).
The literature on the firm behaviour pattern in different automotive market
segments is scarce, the only exception is the paper by Sudhir (1991)5. The
author studies the competitive pricing behaviour in the US automobile mar-
ket in 1981-1990 and competitive interactions in each segment of the market
using the conjectural variation approach (this is different to the other papers,
which estimate the average competitive interactions across all automobile mar-
ket segments). Cooperative, or aggressive behaviour is measured based on the
degree of deviation from the Bertrand prices. The author finds the following
firm behaviour patterns: aggressive behaviour in the minicompact and subcom-
pact segments, cooperative behaviour in the compact and mid-size segments,
1There exists, however, some earlier studies that construct hedonic price indexes for the
automobile industry (e.g., Court, 1939, Griliches, 1961, Ohta and Griliches, 1983).
2Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1999) try to distinguish between three alternative equilibria
for the American car market: Bertrand, Cournot, and some ”mixed” equilibrium (i.e., price
and quantity competition for different sets of firms).
3Bresnahan (1981) studies the firm behaviour in the American car market in 1977 and
1978 and estimates the price-cost margins during this period of time, as well as looks at the
impact of import competition on the margins. Bresnahan (1987) investigates a supply-side
shock in the American automobile market in 1995 and attributes this shock to the price war,
while in the neighbouring years the firm behaviour could be characterized as collusive.
4Verboven (1996) and Goldberg and Verboven (2001) study the European car market.
5Brenkers and Verboven (2006) estimate correlation parameters (two-level nested logit)
across the market segments for the European car market and make some inferences about
the competition pattern in each market segment on the basis of those estimated correlation
parameters.
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which is consistent with prior expectations, and Bertrand pricing behaviour in
the full-size segment. As it is mentioned by Bernheim and Whinston (1990),
in case of heterogenous products, there may be different degrees of collusion in
different markets due to the multimarket contact based on the demand and cost
conditions.
In this paper I have found that multimarket contact may influence competi-
tion in the automobile market and increase the firms’ strategic interdependence.
This effect is, however, difficult to disentangle from the effect of the market
concentration in the US automobile market (dominance of the market by the
American Big Three) on the firm behaviour. In other words, it is difficult to
argue whether coordination is due to market concentration, or due to multimar-
ket contact, or it can be attributed to both. Concentration is argued to foster
the slack, which is transferred through the multimarket contact.
The paper is organized in the following way. First I discuss theoretical and
empirical literature related to multimarket contact effects on firm behaviour.
After an overview of multimarket and multi-firm (multi-brand) linkages in the
US automobile market, I move to the description of the empirical oligopoly
model, multimarket contact test methodology, and estimation procedure. The
paper concludes with the presentation and discussion of the results.
2 Multimarket contact theory and empirics
2.1 Theory
Multimarket contact (alternatively, multimarket/multiple competition, multi-
point rivalry) can be observed in a number of situations: a firm can produce
multiple products, or a single-product firm can operate in a number of geo-
graphical markets, a conglomerate may be represented along several business
lines (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990). It is perceived to be one of those fac-
tors, which can facilitate and sustain implicit collusion, or facilitate oligopolistic
consensus among firms engaged in noncooperative rivalry. From the theoretical
point of view, there have been opposing opinions on the impact of the multi-
market contact on collusion. On the one hand, there is a mutual forbearance
hypothesis by Edwards (1955), defined as the situation when the multimarket
contact leads to more cooperation in all the markets that are common to the
rivals (i.e., strong interdependence across the markets). Besides, there is a view
similar to the mutual forbearance hypothesis, ”linked oligopoly theory”, devel-
oped for the banking industry by Solomon (1970). According to this theory, the
degree of linkage across the (adjacent) markets, or the presence of a firm in the
multiple markets, is one of the important determinants of performance in the
oligopolistic environment. Oligopolistic coordination can be strengthened as a
result of the multimarket contact.
On the contrary to Edwards (1955) and Solomon (1970), according to the
more traditional point of view, coordination is due to market concentration (in-
ternal factor, structure of the market/technology), and not due to multimarket
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contact (external factor, firm behaviour) (Scherer and Ross, 1990). The in-
creased concentration in the market creates barriers to entry and expands the
possibilities for the interfirm coordination, thus, lowering the rates of entry and
exit from the market. According to the strongest form of this approach, the mul-
timarket firms behave like independent firms in each market, where competition
is determined only by those market factors.
In general, this aspect of multiple competition, namely the relationship be-
tween the multimarket contact and firm behaviour, in particular, reduction in
the firm competition intensity/facilitation of the mutual forbearance6, or in-
creasing in general the firms’ strategic interdependence (multiplicity of prod-
ucts and markets leading to strategic behaviour that otherwise would not be
present) has got relatively little attention in the previous literature, although
the theoretical and empirical discussion has somehow revived in the 1990s.
The more recent theoretical literature on the mutual forbearance hypothesis
is represented by the contributions by Bernheim andWhinston (1990), Verboven
(1998), Spagnolo (1999), and Matsushima (2001). Bernheim and Whinston
(1990) state that the multimarket contact may lessen the degree of the compe-
tition between the rivals, as the multiple competitors are more likely to recognize
their mutual dependence, and to sustain collusion across the range of markets,
in which they meet. The firms can distribute their market power through pool-
ing the incentive constraints across the markets (the so-called strategic effects):
they can decrease prices and give up profits in the more collusive markets in
order to facilitate collusion, raise prices and increase profits in the more com-
petitive markets, as long as their total profits are maximized.
Bulow, Geanokoplos and Klemperer (1985) study the strategic interaction of
firms due to cost- and demand-based linkages across markets. They just state
that demand- and cost-related linkages lead to linkages in strategic interaction,
however, they do not analyze whether multimarket contact may facilitate col-
lusive outcomes. Bernheim and Whinston (1990) assume away these linkages
to highlight the strategic linkages across markets. They point out several con-
ditions that lead to multimarket contact fostering collusion: different firms,
different markets, and scale economies. ”Spheres of influence” could be de-
veloped when there are production costs differences across firms, or there are
scale economies, which would allow the firms to have higher prices and profits.
The maintenance of collusive prices may be facilitated in case of geographically-
based reciprocal trade of output. There is an incentive towards multimarket
diversification when the markets could be subjected to random shocks that are
imperfectly correlated.
Verboven (1998) looks at the relationship between localized competition,
multimarket operation and collusive behaviour. In case of localized competi-
tion, firms meet with different sets of rivals. As a result, there are problems of
private information concerning the past actions of the firms. Strategies with suf-
ficiently lenient punishments should be adopted by firms because of the resulting
6The terms ”mutual forbearance hypothesis”, ”multimarket contact hypothesis”, ”linked
oligopoly theory” are synonyms in this paper as they are used by different authors to explain
essentially the same phenomenon.
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communication problems. Spagnolo (1999) gives the more general conditions for
the effect of the multimarket contact on collusion, and argues that multimarket
contact always leads to collusion, independently from asymmetries between mar-
kets and firms, when a firm’s static objective function is strictly concave, which
makes the market supergames to be interdependent: a firm’s payoff in each
market is dependent upon how it is doing in the other markets. Matsushima
(2001) investigates the issue of the multimarket contact under imperfect moni-
toring, and finds support for the existence of the multimarket contact effect on
collusion as well7.
2.2 Empirical evidence
There have been several experimental studies on the effects of the multimarket
contact on collusion. For example, Phillips and Mason (1992) find the experi-
mental support for the game-theoretic predictions by Bernheim and Whinston
(1990). In another study, Phillips and Mason (1996) state that due to the mul-
timarket contact, some regulatory action in one market will impact the other
market. These studies are based upon the comparison of the firm behaviour
under single-market and multi-market situations. In particular, Phillips and
Mason (1992) first have a distinct duopoly setting without any multimarket
contact, and then they observe the behaviour of the subject pairs in the two
experimental markets.
The existing empirical studies (e.g., Heggestand and Rhoades, 1978, Scott,
1982, Evans and Kessides, 1994, Parker and Röller, 1997), which are mostly done
for airlines and banking industry, have failed to give conclusive evidence about
the existence, sign and significance of the multimarket contact effect on collu-
sion. These are mainly the cross-sectional studies. They concentrate on testing
the multimarket contact effect, based on the construction of some multimar-
ket contact measure, on the firm’s performance (i.e., the so-called reduced-form
approach), while there have been virtually no studies done on the multimar-
ket contact effect on collusion within a structural model of firm behaviour (the
only exceptions are the papers by Jans and Rosenbaum (1996) and Parker and
Röller (1997) for the homogenous products8). A few studies concentrate on
the estimation of the ”conjectures” as a way to study the mutual forbearance
hypothesis, i.e., the reactions of the other firms to the actions of the given firm
(e.g., Gelfand and Spiller, 19879). The existing empirical studies have a major
problem to distinguish between internal (e.g., concentration, demand conditions,
7Recently there has been some emerging theoretical literature stating that multimarket
contact may not always facilitate collusion (e.g., Thomas and Willig, 2006). This may be
attributed to the imperfect monitoring of adherence to cooperation, which is observed in the
situation of asymmetric information about rivals’ actions.
8These papers also involve the construction of the multimarket contact measures.
9Although the authors argue that they study the mutual forbearance hypothesis in such a
way, it seems as if their methodology were more applicable to study the firms’ strategic inter-
dependence in the sense of Bulow et al. (1985), or to study generally the firms’ oligopolistic
interactions. Bresnahan (1989) also advises not to use the ”mutual forbearance language” in
case of the ”conjectures” estimation.
6
barriers to entry) and external effects (e.g., multimarket contact) upon the firm
performance (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990).
Longitudinal data surrounding deregulatory episodes are sometimes used to
study the effect of multimarket contact on collusion (e.g., Gelfand and Spiller,
1987, Parker and Röller, 1997). Gelfand and Spiller (1987) study the impact
of the relaxation of legal entry restrictions in the Uruguayan banking sector
on the development of multiproduct oligopolistic practices. Parker and Röller
(1997) use the deregulation in the US telecommunications industry to study
the multimarket contact effects: they investigate the impact of the movement
from monopoly to duopoly situation (e.g., movement to multimarket contact
situation) on the market conduct.
3 Multi-market andmulti-firm (multi-brand) link-
ages in the US automobile market
3.1 Market definition
Market definition is very important in the multimarket contact effects studies:
markets should be strictly defined (it is also a crucial question in many antitrust
investigations). In general, market boundaries could be outlined on the basis
of several approaches. For example, the market boundaries could be delineated
by the low cross-price elasticity of demand (on the basis of the econometric
estimation of price elasticities). Another important empirical method of the
market boundaries delineation is price correlation analysis. Other less frequently
used methods are consumer interviews, shock analysis, Granger causality and
cointegration tests, etc. (Bishop and Baldauf, 2006).
Given the industry wisdom about automotive market segmentation and that
usually the cross-price elasticities of demand for cars in a given market segment
with respect to the cars in a different market segment are found to be low in
the empirical studies, the definition of market segments seems to be suitable for
the definition of markets, across which the multimarket contact effects could be
investigated for the automobile industry. Brenkers and Verboven (2006b) study
the market definition in the European car market and find that the segments
are the relevant markets for all car classes (subcompact, compact, intermediate,
standard/luxury, and sports), except for minivans, for which the relevant market
definition should be the aggregate country level, i.e., all new cars. They recom-
mend the competition authorities to investigate the impact of their policies for
each car market segment separately. Sudhir (2001) finds a different competition
pattern across market segments in the US car market10 . Consumers within each
10Sudhir (2001) argues that the greater concentration in the larger-car segments leads to
more cooperation in these segments. The smaller-car segments are characterized by greater
uncertainty in consumer demand. The customers are more loyal and less price-sensitive in
the segments targeted to older or repeat customers, where the gains from the new customers
could be more than offset by the profit margins losses from the existing customer base. The
presence of the Bertrand price competition for the full-size segment is contrary to the prior
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market segment are expected to be internally homogenous and externally het-
erogenous. They may be similar within a market segment on the basis of age,
income, lifestyle, brand loyalty, readiness to buy, etc. To sum up, industry ana-
lysts and academic researchers support the view that the car market segments
constitute distinct sub-markets, which differ in consumer demand, technology
and competitors’ type (Requena-Silvente and Walker, 2005).
With respect to demand linkages in the automobile market, the question
is to what extent cars from different market segments substitutes are. As it
has been mentioned above, the cross-price elasticities with respect to the cars
from the other market segments are usually found to be low. Car customers
are younger, with lower incomes, and, thus, more price-sensitive in the smaller
car market segments and older, with higher incomes, and less price-sensitive in
the premium car market segments. Thus, it is unlikely that consumers from a
luxury car market segment will switch to a small car/mini car segment when
there is a price increase in the luxury car segment, and vice versa. The product
substitution between the adjacent markets (e.g., compact and subcompact cars)
is more plausible. In addition, the diversity in the price dispersion for different
market segments could be some support for the existence of distinct markets.
On the supply side, there are likely to be economies of scale and scope across
market segments for the automotive manufacturers, which rely a lot on the
minimum efficiency scale (MES) to be profitable.
3.2 Multimarket presence in the US automobile market
As it has been mentioned above, the automobile market offers a nice possibility
to study the multimarket contact effects on mutual forbearance across product
lines and across geographical dimensions (i.e., the so-called geographic-product
markets). The industry consolidation has resulted in a few major independent
producers (see Table 1), which operate across a number of geographical markets
(US, Western Europe, Japan, etc.)11 . On the other hand, the development of
the light trucks market has increased a number of product markets, across which
the automotive firms interact.
Table 1. Interdependence of automotive manufacturers
expectations of cooperative behaviour. The author attributes this effect to the high volatility
in this segment, which prevents from cooperation. This volatility is addressed to the declining
market share of this segment, so that to preserve the market shares, the firms price aggressively,
and the firm behaviour is close to the Bertrand short-run equilibrium. More empirical evidence
on this issue and, in particular, more studies on the firm behaviour across different market
segments could be necessary.
11 In recent years there have been continuous changes in the corporate ownership of auto-
mobile companies. One of the recent most important changes has been the disengagement
of Daimler from Chrysler: the private equity company Cerberus Capital Management L.P.
has concluded the deal of purchasing 80.1% of the Chrysler Group from DaimlerChrysler in
August 2007 for USD 7.4 bn. However, the picture of the ownership in Table 1 is relevant for
the period of my estimations, i.e., 2001-2003, and I conduct my analysis on the basis of the
ownership observed at that time.
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Manufacturer group Companies and share Further ownerships
GM Group Opel/Vauxhall (100%)
Saab (100%)
Isuzu (12%)
Suzuki (20%) Maruti (54%)
Fuji Heavy (20%)
Daewoo (42%)
Fiat (10%)
Ford Group Aston Martin (100%)
Jaguar (100%)
Mazda (33%)
Volvo (100%)
Land Rover (100%)
DaimlerChrysler Group Mercedes-Benz (100%)
Chrysler (100%)
Smart (100%)
Maybach (100%)
Mitsubishi (24.7%)
Fiat Group Fiat Auto (90%) Alfa (100%)
Lancia (100%)
Ferrari (90%) Maserati (100%)
Renault/Nissan Group Dacia (100%)
Nissan (44%)
Samsung (70.1%)
VW Group Audi (100%) Lamborghini (100%)
Seat (100%)
Skoda (100%)
Bugatti (100%)
Bentley (100%)
Toyota Daihatsu (52%)
BMW Rolls Royce (100%)
Mini (100%)
PSA Peugeot (100%)
Citroen (100%)
Hyundai Kia (60%)
Asia (100%)
Honda
Porsche
Rover MG
Triumph, etc.
Source: Deutsche Bank (2004)
The development of the light vehicles market is, in particular, a peculiar
feature of the US automotive industry. At present, the light trucks sales make
up about half of the total vehicles market sales in the US, increasing from about
32% in 1990. The most important market segments in the US are midrange
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(24.7% in 2003), pickup (18.1%) and sports-utility vehicles (SUVs) (26.7%).
The mid-size segment share decreased from 28.3% in 1999 to 24.7% in 2003
of the total market sales, which may be to a certain degree attributed to the
increased competition from the SUVs. During 2000-2003 there has been an
especially vivid trend in the growth of the SUVs market share, and the market
segments developments have been rather volatile as reflected by the observed
growth rates (see Table 2). The SUVs market was the only growing market
during 2000-2003, with the total light trucks showing positive growth rates.
The shares of the mid-range, traditional, pickup, and van segments declined,
and the shares of the small, upscale, and sporty market segments remained
stable during 1999-200312.
Table 2. US light vehicles market: shares of segment sales in total light
vehicles sales, and % change to the previous year
12 Some studies have considered the impact of multimarket contact on current market growth
rates (e.g., Haveman and Nonnemaker, 2000). The authors argue that the firms’ interdepen-
dence is strengthened by the growth in the current markets if the firms are present in multiple
markets, so that the negative relationship between multimarket contact and the current mar-
kets growth rates will be then observed. Evans and Kessides (1994) argue that if the demand
growth rates differ across markets, the firms may shift their punishment power from the rapidly
to the slowly growing industries.
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1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Small
share 10.4 10.8 10.9 10.3 10.3
% change 7.3 -1.0 -7.3 -1.0
Mid-range
share 28.3 27.6 27.1 27.0 24.7
% change 0.1 -3.2 -2.1 -9.4
Traditional
share 3.6 3.5 3.1 2.6 2.3
% change -0.6 -13.1 -17.3 -11.5
Upscale
share 6.4 6.6 6.1 6.2 6.3
% change 5.8 -9.4 -0.8 1.7
Sporty
share 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.0
% change 11.0 -0.3 -2.3 -5.1
Total cars
share 51.6 51.7 50.4 49.4 46.8
% change 2.9 -3.9 -3.9 -6.1
Pickup
share 19.3 18.7 18.6 17.6 18.1
% change -0.7 -1.6 -7.5 1.7
Van
share 10.4 10.2 8.9 8.7 8.4
% change 1.4 -14.0 -4.2 -4.9
SUV
share 18.7 19.3 22.0 24.3 26.7
% change 6.1 12.6 8.3 8.7
Total light trucks
share 48.4 48.3 49.6 50.6 53.2
% change 2.4 1.4 0.1 3.9
Total light vehicles
% change 2.7 -1.3 -1.9 -1.0
Source: Automotive News Market Data Book, own calculations
The picture of the multimarket contact presence in the automobile market
can be, to a certain degree, inferred from Table 3. As it can be seen, the car
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manufacturer groups are present in almost all market segments. The product
lines of many automotive manufacturers have become rather similar and their
product markets, therefore, overlap. The US traditional car market segment is
especially concentrated and is characterized by the high presence of the domestic
automotive producers, only Toyota having a 13.2% market share in 2003. C-4
concentration ratio for individual market segments ranges from 65.4% in the
sporty market segment, where the largest number of producers is present, to
100% in the traditional market segment, with only four producers being present.
Table 3. US light vehicles market: shares in segments, %, 2003
Group Small Mid- Tradi Up Sporty Pick Van SUV
range tion scale up
Honda 17.2 6.6 6.4 11.0 8.4
GM 26.9 32.5 36.3 18.4 6.1 35.2 24.3 32.0
Daimler/ 7.2 9.2 7.4 16.1 9.6 18.6 28.4 14.3
Chrysler
Hyundai/ 16.8 3.3 4.2 3.6 3.3
Kia
VW 8.0 2.7 1.7 0.3 0.4
Ford 19.4 10.8 43.0 21.3 36.7 35.5 23.2 22.2
Toyota 21.2 9.9 13.2 11.0 5.5 8.5 7.5 11.6
Renault/ 5.6 7.3 6.8 7.3 2.2 1.7 4.5
Nissan
Mitsubishi 2.9 1.8 7.7 2.1
BMW 17.0 11.3 0.9
Fiat 0.1 0.3
Porsche 3.1 0.3
No. firms 7 9 4 9 12 5 8 11
C-1 26.9 32.5 43.0 21.3 36.7 35.5 28.4 32.0
C-4 84.3 70.5 100 72.8 65.4 97.8 86.8 80.1
Domination GM GM Ford Ford Ford GM, Chrysler, GM
of a market Ford GM
segment
(C-1 ratio)
Source: Automotive News Market Data Book, own calculations
The firms occupy different market shares/have different strengths in different
market segments (”based on market share dominance”), which may be found
due to the difference in the production costs between the firms, or due to the
presence of the economies of scale, ”home” brand loyalty, first-mover advantage,
etc. American Big Three dominate different product markets. GM dominates
(occupies the highest share of the market segment) small, midrange, pickup and
SUVs market segments. Ford has the largest market shares in the traditional,
upscale, sporty and pickup market segments, while Chrysler dominates the van
market segment. Toyota, although, not dominating any market segment, has the
highest market share in the small car market segment. Honda, Hyundai/Kia,
VW, Renault/Nissan, Mitsubishi and BMW have a large market share in the
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mid-range market segment, in the small car market segment, in the midrange
car market segment, in the midrange and sporty market segments, in the sporty
market segment, and in the upscale market segment, respectively. Thus, it
can be argued that producers occupy rather different positions of strengths in
different markets, notwithstanding the obvious dominance of the automobile
market by the American Big Three.
Table 4 gives an overview of the ”most important” and ”less important”
markets for the automobile manufacturers as defined by the shares of the firm’s
market segment sales in the firm’s total sales. The ”importance” of the mar-
ket, or ”market share dependence” can be also measured by the percentage of
the firm’s total revenue/sales represented by the market. As for the American
Big Three, Ford has the highest firm’s shares in the pickup and SUVs market
segments and has been known for its competitive advantage in the SUV mar-
ket. For GM, the SUVs and midrange market segments are the most important
market segments in the sales of a firm. Chrysler has high market shares in the
pickup and SUVs market segments and is known to have a competitive advan-
tage in the van segment, where it has the highest share among all the firms. For
all American Big Three the SUVs is a very important market segment. As for
the other car producers, for example, for Honda the midrange market segment
is the most important market, while BMW gets most of its profits from selling
cars in the upscale market, and for both firms the SUVs market is important.
Table 4. US light vehicles market: shares in a firm’s total sales, %, 2003
Small Mid- Tradi Up Sporty Pick Van SUV Share in
range tion scale up total US
sales
Honda 53.1 5.2 2.4 11.4 27.9 8.1
GM 9.4 28.2 2.9 4.0 0.6 22.1 7.1 29.6 30.0
Daimler/ 5.1 16.4 1.2 7.2 2.1 23.9 16.9 27.2 14.1
Chrysler
Hyundai 44.2 21.4 3.3 7.9 23.2 3.8
VW 85.2 7.2 2.1 1.2 4.2 2.3
Ford 8.7 12.0 4.4 6.0 5.0 28.6 8.7 26.5 22.4
Toyota 19.3 22.4 2.8 6.3 1.5 13.9 5.7 28.0 11.1
Renault/ 11.9 38.0 9.1 4.6 8.5 2.9 25.0 4.8
Nissan
Mitsubishi 18.8 28.9 15.1 37.1 1.5
BMW 64.8 20.5 14.7 1.7
Fiat 41.6 58.4
Porsche 54.5 45.5 0.2
Share of
segment
sales in total
sales 10.1 25.0 2.3 6.3 3.0 18.1 8.4 26.8
Source: Automotive News Market Data Book, own calculations
To sum up, the US light vehicles market is a very concentrated market, with
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car manufacturers being present in almost all market segments. The market
segments are, however, characterized by different competition intensity and are
dominated by different car producers. These and other above described factors
should be taken into account while performing a multimarket contact effects
test.
3.3 Multi-firm (multi-brand) linkages in the US automo-
bile market
Automobile firms do not only meet in multiple markets (both product and geo-
graphical). The global automobile market is characterized by the presence of a
number of global automotive manufacturer groups owning several brands that
dominate the market (see Table 1 above), several horizontal partial ownership
arrangements (in particular, a number of European and American automobile
companies have become share-holders in several Japanese automobile manufac-
turers) and different interfirm relationships13. This builds up a very complex
picture of interrelationships and ownership structure in the global automotive
industry, which certainly influences the firm behaviour. During the last few
decades there has been an increasing number of mergers-acquisitions and al-
liances between the three automotive poles (Europe, US and Japan), as it has
been reflected in the declining number of independent automotive manufactur-
ers. The picture of firms’ ownership and interactions is a very dynamic one, as it
is reflected by the constant changes in the firm ownership and corporate struc-
ture. Some most recent examples from 2007 are DaimlerChrysler de-merger,
although Daimler will retain about 20% share in Chrysler, or Ford’s intention
to sell financially troubled Jaguar and Land Rover brands.
Collusive behaviour may be facilitated and the independence of firm strate-
gies across markets may be reduced the more firms behave on a corporate basis
as opposed to a market-by-market basis14. Corporate groups (no brands) may
develop products to compete with rival firms, or they may suffer from ”canni-
balization”.
Table 5 gives an example of a product policy for VW Group, which includes
VW, Skoda, Bentley, Bugatti, Audi, Seat, and Lamborghini. This illustrates
the complex picture of multiple market presence and ownership structure in the
13Under interfirm relationships I mean both equity and contractual arrangements among
the automotive manufacturers themselves and between the OEMs and their suppliers (e.g.,
strategic alliances, joint ventures).
14A number of empirical studies, which do not take into account the effects of partial
ownership arrangements (POAs), find some evidence that the degree of collusion is very similar
in both Japanese, where POAs are common, and American car markets (e.g., Odagiri and
Yamawaki, 1986, Yamawaki, 1989). Some automobile market studies look at the impact
of the POAs on market competition. In particular, Alley (1997) finds on the basis of a
conjectural variation model, which takes into account POAs and foreign trade, that the degree
of collusion due to the POAs in the American car market is even higher than that in the
Japanese car market. The author studies the effect of cross-shareholdings between Japanese
and US automobile manufacturers and between Japanese automobile manufacturers during
1979-1994. It has been generally found that cross-ownership leads to a more collusive outcome
(e.g., Reynolds and Snapp, 1986, Farrell and Shapiro, 1990).
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automotive industry. In particular, the VWGroup comprises brands with differ-
ent reputation, both premium and volume brands. The question arises whether
the brands within a manufacturer group compete with each other (especially
those only premium or volume brands), i.e., whether they suffer from ”canni-
balization”, or the profits are jointly maximized for the whole manufacturer
group.
Table 5. Product policy of an independent automotive producer: an example
of Volkswagen
Hatch Notch Station MPV Pickup/SUV Sport Limous. Conver Road
del.van coupe coupe tible ster
Luxury Bentley Lambor Lambor
ghini ghini
Bugatti
Upper VW Bentley Bentley
Audi Lambor
ghini
Upper Audi Audi VW VW
middle
Middle VW VW VW Audi Audi Audi
Skoda Audi Seat
Audi
Com Audi Skoda VW VW VW VW
pact VW Seat Audi Seat
Seat Skoda Audi
Small VW VW Skoda
Skoda Seat
Seat Skoda
Mini VW
Seat
Source: Volkswagen AG
As related to the presence of global automotive groups in the US automobile
market and interbrand competition in those groups, Mercedes and Chrysler15
do not compete with each other (relatively weak competition between premium
and volume brands is usually expected). Saab’s presence in the US automobile
market is not that significant, so that one could seriously talk about competition
between GM and Saab models16. Similar is true for Ford and Volvo, especially
that Volvo is rather treated to be a premium brand in the US automobile mar-
ket17.
15Mercedes and Chrysler belong to DaimlerChrysler Group: they are present together in
the upscale and sporty market segments.
16 Saab belongs to the GM Group: it has insignificant shares in the midrange and upscale
car market segments.
17Volvo belongs to Ford Group: it has insignificant market shares in the midrange and SUVs
market segments, and 4.5% market share in the upscale car market segment. Land Rover and
Aston Martin also belong to Ford Premier Automotive Group and have very low shares in the
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The cases of cross-ownership arrangements, all of them between volume
brands, as it can be inferred from Table 1 above are Ford (Mazda), GM (Sub-
aru, Suzuki, Isuzu), RenaultNissan, Toyota (Daihatsu), Chrysler (Mitsubishi),
GM (Fiat), Hyundai (Kia). Ford and Mazda compete directly in several market
segments (small, midrange, sporty, pickup, van and SUVs). As for GM Group,
Subaru is present in the midrange market segment, Suzuki is present in the
small and SUVs market segments, and Isuzu is present in the SUVs market seg-
ment. The overlap of the markets between Chrysler and Mitsubishi are small,
midrange, sporty and SUVs market segments. Hyundai and Kia overlap in the
small, midrange, and SUVs market segments.
In this paper the multimarket contact effects are investigated at the level of
manufacturer groups taking into account also cross-ownership arrangements in
the other firms18. In addition, I distinguish between multiproduct (brand) and
multiproduct (manufacturer group) assumptions.
4 Empirical structural framework for the US au-
tomobile market
4.1 Demand
4.1.1 Utility (McFadden’s (1978) utility specification)
Assume that consumer i, i = 1, ..., n has utility uij = u
¡
xj , ξj , pj ; θ
¢
from
consuming product j, j = 1, ..., J , where j = 0 is an outside good, xj and ξj
are observed (e.g., horsepower, engine size) and unobserved (e.g., style, image)
product characteristics, pj is the price of product j, and θ = (α, β) are the
parameters to be estimated.
The linear version of the random indirect utility is given by:
uij = δj + /ij , i = 1, ..., n, j = 0, ..., J (1)
where /ij is assumed to be identically and independently distributed across
consumers and products.
The mean valuation for product j common to all consumers is:
δj ≡ xjβ − αpj + ξj (2)
It is assumed that a consumer purchases one unit of good that brings him
the highest utility. Therefore, consumer i purchases one unit of product j if and
only if
uij > uik, 0 ≤ k ≤ J, k 6= j (3)
SUVs and sporty market segments, respectively.
18Parker and Roller (1997) is the only paper that investigates the impact of cross-ownership
and multimarket contact on the firm behaviour in the mobile phone industry. The more
detailed investigation of the interfirm relationships in the automobile industry could be an
interesting subject for future research.
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Consequently, the probability sij that the consumer i purchases the product
j is:
sij = Pr {δj + /ij > δk + /ik, j 6= k} =
= Pr {/ik < /ij + δj − δk, j 6= k} =Z ∞
−∞
Fj (/ij + δj − δ0, ..., /ij , ..., /ij + δj − δJ) (4)
where Fj are the partial derivatives of the joint cumulative distribution func-
tion F of (/i0, ..., /iJ) with respect to its jth argument.
In this paper I present the empirical framework and tests for the mutual
forbearance hypothesis on the basis of the one-level nested multinominal logit19 .
4.1.2 Nested multinominal logit: one nest
Utility uij of household i for product j in group g is given by20:
uij = xjβ − αpj + ξj + ζig + (1− δ) /ij , j = 1, ..., Ig
where ζig + (1− σ) /ij is an extreme value random variable.
The I brands (products) are partitioned into G groups: g = 0, 1, ...,G, the
outside group is group 021. Let the set (number) of products in a group g be
Ig : I0, ..., IG.
The market share of product j in the group g is given by:
sj/g (δ, σ) =
µ
eδj/(1−σ)
Dg
¶
(5)
where Dg =
P
j∈Ig
eδj/(1−σ), 0 ≤ σ < 1.
The probability of choosing group g among all groups is given by:
sg (δ, σ) =
D1−σg"P
g
D1−σg
# (6)
This gives a market share for product j that belongs to group g:
sj (δ, σ) = sj/g (δ, σ) sg (δ, σ) =
eδj/(1−σ)
Dg
D1−σgP
g
D1−σg
=
eδj/(1−σ)
Dσg
P
g
D1−σg
(7)
19 It should be noted that simple logit and nested logit models have been used extensively
by economists for merger evaluation (e.g., Werden and Froeb, 1994, Werden, 1999, Jayaratne
and Shapiro, 2000, Ivaldi and Verboven, 2005).
20 In the exposition below, I follow Berry (1994).
21 ”Outside good” does not compete with other goods in the industry, its price or quantity
is set exogenously. If there were not for the outside good, everyone would have been forced to
purchase an ”inside” good (Pakes lectures).
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where σ ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of the degree of substitution, or the within-
group correlation of the utility levels. The lower σ means the lower correlation
of preferences. σ = 0 implies no correlation of preferences, and consumers, thus,
may switch to the products in another group, which means the standard logit
model. σ = 1 implies perfect correlation of preferences for products within the
same group, i.e., perfect substitutes. E.g., if a new compact car is introduced,
the demand for the other subcompact cars will go down rather than the demand
for the cars in the other segments (Ivaldi and Verboven, 2002).
The group 0 has only one outside good, with δ0 ≡ 0 (i.e., the utility from
consuming the outside good is normalized to zero) and D0 = 1 and with the
market share of:
s0 (δ, σ) =
1"P
g
D1−σg
# (8)
The inversion procedure for the mean utility level has been suggested by
Berry (1994).
Consequently, the following demand equation may be derived by inverting
the market share equation:
ln (sj) = ln (s0) + xjβ − αpj + σ ln
¡
sj/g
¢
+ ξj (9)
where sj/g is the share of product j in group g (within-group share), sj is the
share of product j in the total market, and s0 is the proportion of the consumers
who choose the outside good.
The own price elasticity Esj/pj of the market share sj of product j is:
Esj/pj =
∂sj
∂pj
pj
sj
(10)
with
∂sj
∂pj
=
∂sj
∂δj
∂δj
∂pj
(11)
∂sj
∂δj
= sj
1
1− σ
£
1− σsj/g − (1− σ) sj
¤
(12)
Thus, the own-price elasticity can be written down as:
Esj/pj = −αpj
1
1− σ
£
1− σsj/g − (1− σ) sj
¤
(13)
The cross-price elasticity Esj/pm of the market share of product j with re-
spect to the price of product m pm is given by:
Esj/pm =
∂sj
∂pm
pm
sj
(14)
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with
∂sj
∂pm
=
∂sj
∂δm
∂δm
∂pm
(15)
∂sj
∂δm
= −sj
µ
σ
1− σsm/g + sm
¶
(16)
Therefore, the cross-price elasticity is:
Esj/pm = αpm
µ
σ
1− σsm/g + sm
¶
(17)
if j and m belong to the same market segment, and
Esj/pk = αpksk (18)
if j and k belong to different market segments.
4.2 Costs and firm behaviour
4.2.1 Price competition
The log-linear marginal cost function is assumed:
ln(cj) = wjγ + ωj (19)
where wj and ωj are observed and unobserved product characteristics, re-
spectively, and γ are the parameters to be estimated22.
Assume F sellers of a differentiated product23 .
Firm f produces Jf of F total differentiated products. The demand for
product j is given by Msj (p,X; θ), where M is the market size.
Let PJf be the set of prices that the player f sets. Product characteristics
for any year are assumed to be exogenous.
Assume that the outside good is competitively supplied.
The firm f chooses PJf to maximize its profits, for given J and pj with
j ∈ Jf :
max
pJf
πf =
X
j∈Jf
(pj − cj)Msj (p)−
X
j∈Jf
Fj (20)
where cj is the constant marginal cost of brand j, sj (p) is the market share
of brand j, being a function of all brands’ prices, and Fj is fixed cost for a
product j.
22The quantity variable Qj may be included to allow for increasing/decreasing returns to
scale.
23 In the exposition below, I follow Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995).
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The first-order conditions for the manufacturer f ’s profit maximization prob-
lem are (assuming that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in prices exists and
that prices are strictly positive)24 :
sj (p) +
X
r∈Jf
(pr − cr)
∂sr (p)
∂pj
= 0 (21)
Let firm f have k (f) products, which are indexed by j = Jf1 , ..., J
f
k(f), with
J11 = 1 and J
F
k(F ) = J .
Define matrix ∆f as:
4f =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
∂s(Jf1 )
∂p(Jf1 )
...
∂s
?
Jfk(f)
?
∂p(Jf1 )
... ... ...
∂s(Jf1 )
∂p
?
Jfk(f)
? ...
∂s
?
Jfk(f)
?
∂p
?
Jfk(f)
?
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(22)
In vector notation, the first-order conditions for J total products simultane-
ously can be written down as:
⎛
⎝
s1
...
sJ
⎞
⎠
s
+
⎛
⎝
41 0
...
0 4F
⎞
⎠
Ω
⎛
⎝
p1 − c1
...
pj − cj
⎞
⎠
p−c
= 0 (23)
Assume thatΩ is a non-singular matrix. Therefore, the first-order conditions
can be expressed as:
p = c+Ω−1s (24)
with the marginal cost equation taking up the following form:
ln(p−Ω−1s) = wγ + ω (25)
Within the last equation, the following scenarios can be tested: Bertrand
behaviour with single-product firms, Bertrand behaviour with multi-product
firms25, perfectly collusive (total industry) behaviour, market-segment collu-
sive behaviour, and assumption concerning multimarket contact firm behav-
24Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) have shown that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists in
case of single-product firms, using a rather general demand model. Anderson and de Palma
(1992) have shown the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in case of multi-product
firms using the nested logit demand model.
25 If only products of a firm in the same market segment are considered by the firm in the
profit maximization task, the explicit expression for the mark-up can be derived. If other
products of the firm in the different market segments are considered as well, the whole matrix
of market share derivatives with respect to the price has to be inverted to get the markups.
The derivatives of products with respect to products in the other market segments are usually
found to be low anyway, so that the markups may be not influenced significantly (Verboven,
1996). Verboven (1996) also tests for the presence of market segment-specific collusion. Sudhir
(2001) finds a different competition pattern across market segments.
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iour. This can be done within the menu, or conjectural variations parameters
approaches that are discussed below.
Studying different price equilibrium assumptions can be done at the market
segment level (i.e., case of myopic firms, each firm considers in its profit maxi-
mization task only the products of a particular market segment), in this case,
the market segments are treated to be independent, or at the firm level (i.e.,
case of firms that behave strategically, the firm takes into account the cross-
price elasticities of all its products), in this case the market segments are not
independent and the substitution between them is possible. Both scenarios are
tested in this paper to choose the pattern of the firm behaviour that best fits
the data.
4.2.2 Menu approach
The menu approach is discussed in Bresnahan (1987), Gasmi et al. (1990, 1992)
and advocated, in particular, by Nevo (1998). Under this approach, different
models of competition may be tested through setting different elements of the
ownership matrix to one. The choice among the different models of conduct,
which constitute a finite set (defined by a researcher based on his understand-
ing), is done on the basis of ”fit” of different models, formally by performing a
test of nonnested hypothesis (e.g., Vuong, 1979).
Consequently, the matrix Ω−1 may be written as θ ∗4−1, where 4−1 is the
matrix of own- and cross-price elasticities, and θ is an ownership matrix, with
θij = 1 if i and j are produced by the same firm, and 0 otherwise. This is an
element-by-element multiplication of matrices of the same dimension.
4.2.3 Conjectural variations approach
The conjectural variations approach has been criticized for the problem of the
interpretation of the conjectural variations parameters and the problem of iden-
tification, especially in case of differentiated products26. The detailed discussion
of this approach can be found in Bresnahan (1989) and Nevo (1998). The con-
jectural variations approach may allow testing for the degree of collusiveness, or
competitiveness of a particular market segment/industry, or distinguishing be-
tween the more collusive and more competitive markets, not necessarily finding
perfect market segment collusion as based on the menu approach. In this paper
I pursue the menu approach, while the paper dealing with the investigation of
the mutual forbearance hypothesis in the European car market (Leheyda, 2007)
uses a conjectural variation approach, in addition to the menu approach.
26Conjectural variations for the market segments in the automobile industry have been
estimated by Sudhir (2001) and constructed for the market segments at the country level by
Brenkers and Verboven (2006).
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5 Methodological framework for testing the mul-
timarket contact effects
5.1 Test for the mutual forbearance hypothesis: idea
The ”ideal” test for identifying the multimarket contact effects on collusive be-
haviour would be to contrast the pricing behaviour in a single-market (e.g., two
firms meet each other in one market M1) and a multi-market context (e.g., these
two firms move together to another market M1+M2) to test for incremental ef-
fects on the firm behaviour. In addition, one could take some period of time
and compare the break-down of collusive prices in M1 world and M1+M2 world,
and if this period of break-downs under the latter scenario is shorter, then this
could be a hard test for showing that the multimarket contact presence leads to
more collusion.
The automobile industry, although characterized by extensive multimarket
contact presence, offers no such ”optimal” situations to test for the mutual
forbearance hypothesis, and, thus, necessiates the search for other approaches
to study the behaviour of the multimarket contact firms. I test for multimar-
ket contact firm coalitions and perform simulations as a way to investigate the
multimarket contact effects on the firm behaviour. The idea behind these ap-
proaches, which have not been applied before in the multimarket contact studies,
is discussed in the next two sections 5.2 and 5.3.
5.2 Test for the mutual forbearance hypothesis (1): test-
ing collusive assumption among the multimarket con-
tact firms
As it has been mentioned above, Bernheim and Whinston (1990) state that the
multimarket contact may lessen the degree of competition between the rivals as
the multiple competitors are more likely to recognize their mutual dependence
and to sustain collusion across the range of markets in which they meet. The
advantage of fierce competition in one market is weighted against the costs of
potential retaliations by the competitors in the other markets where they meet
each other.
The idea behind the test for the mutual forbearance hypothesis (1) is to
test different assumptions/hypotheses concerning the firm behaviour through
adjusting in an appropriate way the ownership matrix θ (see Section 4.2.2)
in order to derive the competition pattern in the industry and across market
segments, including the possibility of the mutual forbearance hypothesis. The
test under this approach can be conducted in two steps:
Step 1. Derive the pricing equation under the multimarket contact assump-
tion using the menu approach, i.e., by specifying a particular ownership matrix.
Taking into account the above theoretical insights about the mutual forbear-
ance hypothesis, the formal test for testing the multimarket effects on prices
would be to see whether the multimarket contact firm takes into account the
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cross-price reactions of the other multimarket contact firms across the markets
in its profit-maximization task:
max
pJMMC,f∈MMC
πf =
X
j∈JMMC ,f∈MMC
(pj − cj)Msj (p) (26)
where JMMC are all products of multimarket contact firms, including the
multimarket contact firm f . That is, the joint profit maximization over the
products of the multimarket contact firms coalition is assumed (a firm f belongs
to the set of the multimarket contact firms MMC).
The first-order conditions for a multimarket contact firm f that internalizes
the cross-price effects with its competitors can be written down as follows:
sj (p) +
X
r∈JMMC,f∈MMC
(pr − cr)
∂sr (p)
∂pj
= 0 (27)
This expression can be written down as market segment-specific (market
segments are independent), or industry-specific (market segments are interre-
lated).
In addition to the multimarket contact specification, the Bertrand-Nash
multi-product price specification can be written down not only for the car
manufacturers (brand level, e.g., a Mercedes car) but also for the car man-
ufacturer groups (i.e., corporate group, e.g., Mercedes and Chrysler cars of
DaimlerChrysler Group) and those car manufacturers that hold shares in the
other automotive firms (i.e., cross-ownership arrangements).
Step 2. Test different assumptions about the equilibrium interactions of firms
(i.e., single-product, multi-product, collusion, collusion due to the multimarket
contact), and choose the best supply model among the competing supply-side
models on the basis of the goodness-of-fit of the model (most often R-squared,
adjusted R-squared, some information, or prediction criterion), or the test of
nonnested hypotheses (e.g., Vuong, 1989). In the absence of publicly available
information on marginal costs and price-cost margins27 , this has been a way
that has been pursued in a number of empirical studies as well.
The goodness-of-fit of the model as measured by the R-squared may be
not the best criterion for selecting the best model, especially when the model
specifications appear similarly good (in terms of the estimated coefficients and
standard errors). The estimated coefficients in different models could be also
investigated and assessed concerning which ones are the most plausible ones
(e.g., Verboven, 2002, Bonnet et al., 2005).
As it has been mentioned, models are often selected on the basis of some in-
formation criterion (e.g., Akaike (1973, 1974) information criterion (AIC)28,
27There exist only a few studies that select the best supply-side specification on the basis
of some calculated marginal costs, or some publicly available information on the price-cost
margins. For example, Nevo (2001) compares the estimated and observed markups to select
the best model specification for the supply side.
28Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), based on the minimization of the loss of information,
is calculated on the basis of the mean squared prediction error (in case of the OLS estimation).
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Schwarz (1978) Bayesian information criterion (BIC)29, Hannan and Quinn
(1979)). Under this approach, the model with the smallest information cri-
terion is preferred. However, the selection procedures that these tests are based
upon are not completely satisfactory (Rivers and Vuong, 1999). The actual val-
ues of the model selection criteria can be subject to statistical variations as they
are determined by sample information. The models may not, thus, outperform
each other significantly. In case of linear regression models, the criteria that
are based on the calculation of the in-sample mean square error of prediction
(MSEP) are widespread.
As there appears to be no single most reliable way to choose the best supply-
side model, the results from the tests for non-nested hypotheses (MacKinnon,
White, and Davidson, 1983, and Rivers and Vuong, 2002), the Akaike infor-
mation criterion (AIC), the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and the sum
of squared residuals (SSR) are compared in this paper to reach some meaning-
ful and hopefully reliable results at the end. The application of MacKinnon,
White, and Davidson (1983), and Rivers and Vuong (2002) test procedures is
described in detail in Appendix. The intuition behind these tests is given in the
dissertation introduction (Chapter 1). These methods are the most frequently
applied in the literature to choose a model specification that best fits the data.
In addition, the concrete tests are chosen so that to fit my estimation methods
for the supply side.
5.3 Test for the mutual forbearance hypothesis (2): test-
ing shock effects
This test could be viewed as continuation of the previous test, or it can be
conducted separately as well30. The test procedure involves two steps.
Step 1. Estimate the demand and marginal cost equations, and identify the
competition behaviour in market segments through testing different assumptions
about the firm behaviour (e.g., one market is collusive, the others are not, or
all are collusive, etc.), and choose, as above, the best supply-side model, which
best fits the data, on the basis of some goodness-of-fit criteria, or test.
Step 2. Simulate some shock31 in a particular market segment, e.g., a price
war in the (more) collusive segment, and see whether and to what extent it
impacts the firm behaviour in the other market segments. The price war is
approximated by the changes in the ownership matrix for that market (from
29Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is similar to the AIC criterion, it imposes only a
heavier penalty for the degrees of freedom loss.
30For this test application it is not crucial that some support for a multimarket contact firms
coalition is found in the first step, where I rather test for perfect collusion among multimarket
contact firms, while there might be different degrees of collusion across markets.
31The examples of possible real shocks could be a significant change in the market share of
a firm, or some abrupt change in the multimarket contact measure over time, or a price war
in a particular market segment. The relatively short period of time for which I have the data
does not allow me to observe such changes, that is why, I choose to simulate some hypothetical
shocks.
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the collusive to the competitive assumption)32. The question is whether the
price war in this particular market segment will have some impact on the firm
behaviour in the other market segments. The major idea behind is to look at the
relative magnitude of the "own"-market reactions vs. cross-market reactions,
and to see whether there is any correlation in the prices across the market
segments. Another alternative is to move from the competitive to the collusive
behaviour assumption in a particular market segment.
Consequently, the new equilibrium price under the new ownership matrix
(Ωnew) is:
p∗ =
−
c +Ωnew (p∗)
−1 s (p∗) (28)
where p∗ is a vector of the post-predicted equilibrium prices,
−
c are the es-
timated marginal costs from the step-by-step estimation. The system of the
non-linear equations has to be solved for an equilibrium price33.
The simulation of shocks could probably help me to disentagle the effect
of market concentration and multimarket contact on the firm behaviour. In
addition, the simulation of shocks to separate markets allows to study the firms’
(strategic and collusion) interdependence across the markets.
6 Data and estimation results
6.1 Data
The major source of the automotive data for this research is the Automotive
News Market Data Book for 2001-200334. The available data for the US auto-
motive market include:
1. Car and light truck sales by market class for models. In the dataset those
models with the yearly sales of less than 200 models have been excluded.
2. Prices of cars, pickups, minivans, vans and SUVs.
Prices for the given year are shown as of April/May of the corresponding
year. The base prices include the retail price as suggested by the manufacturer
and the destination charge. The prices of imported vehicles cover ocean freight
and the U.S. import duty. State, or local taxes, or optional equipment are not
32Brenkers and Verboven (2006) apply the so-called SSNIP test to define markets. The test
searches for the smallest set of products for which a small but significant and non-transitory
increase in prices (SSNIP) (5-10%) could be jointly profitable. Ivaldi and Lörinz (2005) apply
the full equilibrium market test to computer servers. It defines the relevant market as the
set of products whose average price would be significantly raised at equilibrium if they were
priced by a hypothetical monopoly, or jointly determined by a cartel.
33Nevo (1997) solves Ωpost (p∗)
?
p∗ − amc
?
= s(p∗) using Matlab standard algorithm for
solving non-linear equations (fsolve.m).
34 I have tried to do some cross-sectional estimations, but it is difficult to fit the model. This
result is similar to the one by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), who have chosen to use
the panel data, and Nevo (2001), who has used the quarterly data for several geographical
markets.
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included into the prices. The list prices are converted into real terms by using
the US Consumer Price Index (CPI).
3. Vehicles characteristics: auto transmission, air conditioning, antilock
brakes, sunroof/moonroof; information on dimensions, engines, capacities, safety,
miscellaneous. The physical characteristics of the base specification have been
used in the estimations.
4. Automotive advertising spending in the US (measured by the US ad
spending per vehicle).
The data on miles per gallon, engine volume, cylinders are available from the
Fuel Economy Guide by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)). The
log of the total sales volume, or global production by model, which is available
from the Global Insight, can be used to account for the economies of scale. GDP
data are taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)).
The number of potential customers is approximated by the total number
of households in the economy, following Berry, Levinsonhn and Pakes (1995).
That is, each household is treated to be a potential buyer of a new car. The
information on the number of households is taken from the US Census Bureau.
The automotive market classification by the Automotive News, which I use
in this study, is determined by vehicle size, price and market intent35 . The cars
are segmented into the following classes: small, midrange, traditional, upscale,
sporty, alternative power36. The light trucks are segmented into the following
classes: pickups, vans, and SUVs. Some general statistics for the market seg-
ments and the examples of car models for each market segment can be found in
Table 6. SUVs, midrange, and pickups are the largest car market segments in
the US. The SUVs market is characterized by the highest number of car models
and may be viewed as the most competitive one. Japanese competitors play a
large role in the smaller car market segments, while the European car produc-
ers are the major competitors of the US car producers in the upscale market
segment.
Table 6. US light vehicles market: summary statistics across market seg-
ments
35For the sensitivity analysis (for my estimations, the definition of a relevant market is very
important), alternative market segmentations could be tried, in particular, the one by Ward’s
(Ward’s Automotive Yearbook). According to this classification, which is based upon price,
body style and size, the light vehicles are segmented into the following classes: small, middle,
large, luxury, cross-utility vehicles, SUVs, vans and pickups.
36The alternative power market is not analyzed because it is a thin market.
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Market Best-selling # obs. Share of Asian European
segment models, (min-max) segment in share, share,
2003 total market, %, %,
% (2003) 2003 2003
Small Toyota Corolla, 20-22 10.3 52.0 0.0
Chevrolet Cavalier,
Ford Focus
Midrange Toyota Camry, 29-31 24.7 45.7 9.2
Honda Accord,
Ford Taurus
Traditional Buick LeSabre, 6-7 2.3 13.2 0.0
Mercury Grand
Marquis,
Ford Crown
Victoria
Upscale BMW 325, 30-32 6.3 24.5 39.3
Merc. C class,
Cadillac DeVille,
Lexus ES 300
Sporty Ford Mustang, 20-25 3.0 35.8 22.1
Mitsubishi Eclipse,
Nissan 350Z
Pickup Ford F Series, 11 18.1 11.2 0.0
Chevrolet Silverado,
Dodge Ram
Van Dodge Caravan, 20-21 8.4 26.0 0.0
Honda Odyssey,
Ford Econoline
SUV Ford Explorer, 36-39 26.7 32.5 3.3
Chevrolet
TrailBlazer, Jeep
Grand Cherokee
Source: Automotive News Market Data Book, own calculations
The summary statistics for selected variables across the market segments are
presented in Table 7. The prices, size and horsepower increase as one moves
from the smaller car segments to the larger ones, also to those with the higher
presence of premium car brands.
Table 7. US light vehicles market: descriptive statistics across market seg-
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ments
Variable Mean Std. dev.
Overall Between Within
Small
horsepower 122 14.9 14.1 5.3
price 12968 1608.5 1620.4 231.8
size 11795 622.7 595.4 166.0
Midrange
horsepower 159 25.9 25.5 5.3
price 18949 2703.0 2673.3 402.1
size 13262 1038.6 1007.3 264.5
Traditional
horsepower 215 15.4 18.1 1.1
price 25064 1810.0 2050.2 351.1
size 15366.7 980.2 1006.9 27.3
Upscale
horsepower 227 38.1 37.8 6.1
price 38009 10951.9 11009.7 845.8
size 13917 1186.3 1165.6 251.7
Sporty
horsepower 199 61.7 61.8 3.9
price 29822.1 15889.1 15591.9 390.0
size 11956 1245 1235.7 169.4
Pickup
horsepower 164 35.8 35.0 11.6
price 15570 2368.2 2369.1 588.6
size 14527 1648.4 1686.2 227.2
Van
horsepower 188 19.3 17.5 8.2
price 22668 2109.9 2015.7 544.3
size 15135 1180.0 1153.8 153.4
SUV
horsepower 202 54.0 52.7 10.3
price 25386.9 7012.2 6910.2 1020.8
size 13543 1794.7 1808.4 24.9
Source: Automotive News Market Data Book, own calculations
In my estimations I do not include all the available technical characteristics
in order to minimize the problem of multicollinearity. The variables have been
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chosen into the specification on the basis of the p-value correlation analysis.
The summary of the variables used in the estimations is given in Table 8. The
following variables have been selected in the specifications: horsepower (to mea-
sure car performance), width and length (vehicle dimensions), air conditioning
and antilock brakes (safety), automatic transmission (convenience), miles per
gallon (MPG) (fuel efficiency).
Table 8. US light vehicles market: variables description
Variable Variable name Notes
Horsepower horse Net horsepower
Width width Overall width (in.)
Length length Overall length (in.)
Air conditioning air-cond Dummy: 1
if air conditioning is
standard equipment
Antilock brakes brakes Dummy: 1
if antilock brakes
is standard equipment
Transmission transm Dummy: 1 if
automatic transmission
is standard equipment
Miles-per-gallon mpgcity City miles per gallon:
for urban driving
Source: Automotive News Market Data Book, own calculations
6.2 Estimation strategies for the demand equation and
full system
In general, the demand and pricing equations can be estimated either separately,
or jointly. Under the separate, or step-by-step, estimation, the demand equation
is estimated first. After that the matrix of own- and cross-price elasticities is
constructed on the basis of the estimated demand parameters. In the next step
the pricing equation is estimated after having substituted into it the matrix of
the elasticities. The standard errors of the pricing equation parameters have to
be corrected.
There are several advantages of this two-step procedure. For example, the
computational burden may be reduced due to the separate estimation of the
demand and pricing equations. Different supply-side specifications may be es-
timated without re-estimating the demand function each time. The possible
misspecification of the supply side will have no impact on the demand side re-
sults (Goldberg and Verboven, 2001)37 . The major drawback of this procedure
is the loss in the efficiency of the estimated parameters.
37 Step-by-step estimations are also used by Nevo (2001).
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6.3 Instruments
Prices and market shares are endogenous, correlated with the error term ξj
and ωj , and, consequently, have to be instrumented. Prices will be collinear
with product characteristics that are not observed. The introduction of product
fixed effects to control for unobserved characteristics can lead to an identification
problem due to the correlation between fixed effects and product characteristics.
If there is some positive correlation between prices and omitted characteristics,
the price coefficient will tend towards zero.
The detailed discussion of the choice of the efficient instruments for differ-
entiated products models can be found in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995)38 .
In general several groups of instruments can be pointed out that have been used
in the studies on the differentiated products demand and structural model es-
timation: cost shifters and quasi-cost shifters, product characteristics, prices in
other markets (following Hausman et al. (1994) and Hausman (1996)), etc39 .
I use the product characteristics as instruments in my estimations, so I will
discuss them in more detail now.
The best candidates for the instruments in the differentiated product mar-
kets are the model characteristics, which are usually treated to be exogenous,
based on the assumption that in the short run they cannot be quickly adjusted
by a firm. Thus, the matrix Z of instruments includes the product’s own charac-
teristics (which decreases the number of necessary additional instruments) and
other exogenous variables used in the estimations. Product characteristics are
used as instruments for a set of unobserved supply shifters in the pricing, or mar-
ginal cost equation. Furthermore, the functions of the exogenous characteristics
of the competing products can be used as instruments.
The major difficulty with using nonprice characteristics as instruments is
that these variables are usually used both in the demand and cost side. As a
result, there may be an insufficient number of instruments for the parameters
that have to be estimated. This problem has been discussed by Berry (1994)
and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), and it has been suggested to use the
characteristics of competitors and their functions as additional instruments. The
functions of the exogenous physical characteristics (own and competitors’) can
be used as instruments (sums and averages). The car’s own price and demand
will be correlated with the physical characteristics of the other products, and
depend on the degree and closeness of competition that the firms face with
other competitors. The distance from the nearest neighbouring product will
determine the markup of each brand.
Bresnahan et al. (1997) suggest the following groups of instruments: princi-
ples of differentiation (defined on a group-specific basis), ownership (defined on
a firm-specific basis, making use of the economics of the multiproduct pricing)
and ownership with principles of differentiation (combination of a group-specific
38The authors follow the discussion on the set of the efficient instruments by Chamberlain
(1986).
39Other authors use a lagged error term in the demand equation (Bonnet et al., 2005), brand
dummies (Nevo, 2001), or lagged endogenous variables (Giacomo, 2004) as instruments.
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and a firm-specific basis).
Therefore, the following instruments could be used for the estimation of the
one-level nested logit: 1) number of other products in a group; 2) sum/average
of characteristics of other products in a group (interacted with a group dummy
variable); 3) number of other products the firm sells in the group; 4) sum/average
of characteristics of other products the firm sells in the group (interacted with a
group dummy variable); 5) number of products the other firms sell in the group;
6) sum/average of characteristics of products the other firms sell in the group
(interacted with a group dummy variable).
6.4 Estimation results
6.4.1 Demand and supply
The results of the demand estimation for the one-level nested logit40 can be
found in Table 9. The demand equation can be estimated by the 2SLS, or
GMM. The null hypothesis of homoscedasticity has been tested by performing
the test of heterogeneity by Pagan and Hall (1983) for instrumental variables
estimation. The tests results have not rejected the homoscedasticity hypothesis,
thus, the IV estimation should be rather used (see the first two columns in Table
9). GMM estimation results are presented for sensitivity analysis and are quite
similar in magnitudes to the 2SLS estimation results (see the last two columns
in Table 9).
Table 9. US light vehicles market: demand estimation
40The estimations with different correlation parameters for different market segments (not
reported here) produced rather implausible magnitudes (higher correlation for more luxury
segments), and some coefficients turned out to be greater than 1, although the Wald test has
not rejected the hypothesis that they could be equal to or less than one. The latter problem
could be explained by the choice of instruments. It should be also mentioned that in some
cases the coefficients greater than 1 could be consistent with the utility-maximizing behaviour.
Besides I have done estimations for the nested logit with two nests (market segment and
country of origin, i.e., domestic vs. foreign producer) and the estimates of the correlation
parameters were not consistent with utility-maximizing behaviour.
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Variables IV.A IV. B GMM.A GMM. B
α -0.00015*** -4.00*** -0.00017*** -4.47***
σg 0.87** 0.70** 0.80*** 0.69**
horsepower 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02***
width -0.06** -0.03 -0.05** -0.03*
length -0.01 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005
air conditioning 0.08 0.49*** 0.18* 0.55***
brakes 0.16 0.29** 0.21* 0.36***
transmission 0.39*** 0.34*** 0.38** 0.43***
mpgcity -0.04* -0.07*** -0.03* -0.08***
const 0.63 35.19*** -0.39 40.16***
Adj. R2 0.36 0.56 0.26 0.51
Root MSE 1.06 0.88 1.14 0.93
Pagan&Hall (all,p-value) 1.00 0.99 - -
Overidentification 4.95 3.14
Source: own estimations
Note: Specifications IV.A and GMM.A are with prices, while Specifications IV.B
and GMM.B are with logarithmic prices. ***, **, * - indicate significance at 1%, 5%
and 10% significance level, respectively. Time dummies have been included but are
not reported. mpgcity stands for miles per gallon (city). Nest is market segment.
Horsepower has been found statistically significant in all specifications and
has an expected positive sign. Width and length have got a negative sign.
Length is, however, not significant anyway. Air conditioning, brakes and au-
tomatic transmission have got an expected positive sign. The miles per gallon
variable has got a negative sign on the contrary to the a priori expectations: the
higher miles per gallon value, the more efficient the vehicle is. The negative sign
was also found in some other studies (e.g., Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995,
Sudhir, 2001). The included but not reported in the table time fixed effects
might capture macro-economic fluctuations that influence a person’s decision to
buy a car.
The most important for the calculation of own- and cross-price elasticities,
the estimation of markups and the subsequent supply-side estimations are the
estimates of price and segment correlation parameters. The price coefficient is
negative as it has been expected and is quite low in magnitude. The estimated
segment correlation parameters can be interpreted in terms of the correlation of
consumer preferences within a particular market segment. When the correlation
parameters are statistically different from zero, that may mean that consumers
may be not so willing to substitute away from that market segment when there
is a price increase in that segment. The results show that consumer preferences
are strongly correlated within a market segment. This may be interpreted as
some evidence for strong competition within market segments in the US light
vehicles market.
I have also estimated the demand equation jointly with the hedonic pricing
equation. These results can be found in Table 10 (first column, ’joint estima-
tion’). In this case width, length, and miles per gallon have got a statistically
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significant positive sign, however, the air conditioning has got a negative sign.
One may argue that adding the supply side contributes to a better model iden-
tification. The segment correlation parameter is significantly lower as under the
separate estimation of the demand equation.
I also present some results of the random coefficients model estimation for
the US light vehicles market41(the last four columns, ’random’). The first two
columns give the parameter estimates and their standard errors for the means
(β’s), while the last two columns give the parameter estimates and their stan-
dard errors of standard deviations (σk’s). However, the results of many coef-
ficients have turned out to be negative42 . Thus, it could be better to rely on
the estimates from the one-level nested logit to proceed with the test for the
multimarket contact effects.
Table 10. US light vehicles market: demand estimation (continuation)
Variables Joint estimation Random
Means (β0s) Std. deviations (σ0ks)
Esti Std. Err. Esti Std. Err.
mate mate
price-income -0.0001*** -4.30 0.00
ln (segmentshare) 0.43***
horsepower 0.01*** 0.60 0.01 0.06 0.04
width 0.11*** -1.14 0.03 0.13 0.26
length 0.01*** 2.37 0.02 0.08 0.11
air conditioning -0.23*** -0.18 0.00 0.12 0.05
brakes 1.17*** -0.15 0.01 0.03 0.05
transmission 0.97*** -0.05 0.04 0.08 0.10
mpgcity 0.13*** -3.49 0.07 0.16 0.00
year01 0.28 0.00
year02 0.39 0.01
const -17.38*** -9.83 0.12 0.24 0.05
Source: own estimations
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance,
respectively. Time dummies have been included but are not reported in case of joint
estimation.
The supply-side equation under different assumptions on the firms’ equi-
librium interactions is estimated using OLS with robust standard errors (Hu-
41 I have tried to estimate the demand equation, which is derived from the following utility
specification following Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1999):
uij = xjβ + ξj − αipj +
?
k σkxjkvik + εij for j = 1, ...J , where αi =
α
yi
, β is a vector of
mean parameters to be estimated, and σk is a vector of standard deviations parameters to be
estimated.
The price coefficient is interacted with income. Income draws are made from the US Con-
sumer Population Survey (CPS). I introduce consumer heterogeneity on the products char-
acteristics: the random draws have been made from multinominal normal distribution (νik).
This together should have allowed me to get more flexible substitution patterns.
42One of the possible explanations could be the short time period of the data that I have. A
longer time span, and, thus, a larger number of markets could contribute to the better model
identification.
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ber/White sandwich estimator of the variance) (see Table 1143). In the Table
I present the results for some selected specifications: ’Single’: single-product
Bertrand pricing equilibrium; ’Multi’: multi-product (brand-level) Bertrand
pricing equilibrium; ’Market’: market-segment collusive assumption for each
market segment; ’Hedonic’: the pricing equation under a competitive assump-
tion; MMC1: collusive assumption for GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Toyota and
Renault-Nissan and competitive assumption for the others; MMC2: collusive as-
sumption for GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Toyota, Honda, Hyundai and BMW
and competitive assumption for the others; MMC3: collusive assumption for
GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler and Toyota and competitive assumption for the
others; MMC4: collusive assumption for GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler and com-
petitive assumption for the others.
Horsepower is found to be positive in all specifications. The signs and mag-
nitudes of some coefficients have been changing across different specifications44 .
At the first sight, Toyota appears to be not the most efficient producer. These
results may be in line with some of the results of the previous studies. In par-
ticular, Petrin (2002) finds the marginal costs to be slightly higher for Japanese
producers as compared to those of American producers. Higher marginal costs
for Japanese producers have been also found by Sudhir (2001).
Table 11. US light vehicles market: supply-side estimation results under
selected assumptions
43 I present the estimation results under selected assumptions, as the results are rather
similar under all specifications, just to illustrate the problem that I have faced while choosing
the best supply-side specification: on the basis of the estimated coefficients and R-squared
comparison the supply-side models do not appear to outperform each other significantly.
44Bonnet et al. (2005), for example, obtain different magnitudes and signs of coefficients
in the cost equations. They were made, therefore, perform a non-nested test to differentiate
between different patterns of competition.
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Va r ia b le s S in g le M u lt i M a rk e t H ed o n ic M M C 1 MM C 2 M M C 3 M M C 4
h o r s e p ow e r 1 .0 0 * * * 1 .0 1 * * * 1 .2 6 * * * 0 .9 5 * * * 1 .1 8 * * * 1 .2 0 * * * 1 .1 3 * * * 1 .0 7 * * *
w id th - 0 .0 5 -0 .0 5 0 .1 6 -0 .0 5 0 .1 4 0 .0 1 0 .0 2 -0 .1 3
l e n g th - 0 .5 0 * * * -0 .5 0 * * * -0 .7 4 * * * -0 .4 8 * * * - 0 .9 4 * * * -0 .6 4 * * * -0 .7 9 * * * -0 .5 2 * * *
a ir c o n d i -
t i o n in g
0 .1 6 * * * 0 .1 6 * * * 0 .2 8 * * * 0 .1 4 * * * 0 .2 4 * * * 0 .2 4 * * * 0 .2 2 * * * 0 .1 7 * * *
b ra ke s 0 .0 7 * * * 0 .0 7 * * * 0 .0 8 * * * 0 .0 6 * * * 0 .0 5 * 0 .0 6 * * * 0 .0 5 * * 0 .0 4 * *
t r a n sm is s io n 0 .1 4 * * * 0 .1 4 * * * 0 .1 6 * * * 0 .1 3 * * * 0 .2 0 * * * 0 .1 5 * * * 0 .1 8 * * * 0 .1 9 * * *
m p g c ity 0 .0 0 0 .0 1 -0 .0 9 0 .0 2 0 .1 9 * * * 0 .1 2 * 0 .1 6 * * 0 .1 0 *
y e a r 0 1 0 .0 3 * * 0 .0 3 * * 0 .0 4 * * 0 .0 3 * * 0 .0 3 * 0 .0 4 * * 0 .0 3 * 0 .0 3 *
y e a r 0 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 3 0 .0 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 3 0 .0 2 0 .0 2
h y u n d a i - 0 .3 7 * * * -0 .3 8 * * * -0 .6 0 * * * -0 .3 4 * * * - 0 .2 2 * * * -0 .5 0 * * * 0 .2 1 * * * -0 .2 3 * * *
k ia - 0 .3 6 * * * -0 .3 7 * * * -0 .6 0 * * * -0 .3 3 * * * - 0 .1 6 * * * -0 .5 2 * * * -0 .1 7 * * * -0 .2 0 * * *
t oyo t a - 0 .2 1 * * * -0 .2 2 * * * -0 .3 3 * * * -0 .1 9 * * * - 0 .3 3 * * * -0 .3 1 * * * -0 .3 0 * * * -0 .1 0 * * *
gm -0 .3 2 * * * -0 .3 4 * * * -0 .4 7 * * * -0 .3 0 * * * - 0 .4 1 * * * -0 .4 1 * * * -0 .3 8 * * * -0 .3 4 * * *
fo rd - 0 .2 7 * * * -0 .2 9 * * * -0 .4 0 * * * -0 .2 5 * * * - 0 .3 6 * * * -0 .3 6 * * * -0 .3 3 * * * -0 .2 9 * * *
ch ry s l e r - 0 .3 0 * * * -0 .3 1 * * * -0 .4 3 * * * -0 .2 8 * * * - 0 .4 0 * * * -0 .3 9 * * * -0 .3 8 * * * -0 .3 4 * * *
n i s s a n - 0 .4 0 * * * -0 .4 1 * * * -0 .5 7 * * * -0 .3 8 * * * - 0 .5 2 * * * -0 .2 2 * * * -0 .2 7 * * * -0 .2 8 * * *
m a zd a - 0 .1 7 * * * -0 .1 7 * * * -0 .2 6 * * * -0 .1 5 * * * - 0 .2 5 * * * -0 .2 4 * * * -0 .2 2 * * * -0 .1 9 * * *
m it su b is h i - 0 .2 1 * * * -0 .2 2 * * * -0 .3 3 * * * -0 .1 9 * * * - 0 .0 8 0 .0 2 -0 .0 7 -0 .0 9 *
s u z u k i - 0 .4 0 * * * -0 .4 1 * * * -0 .5 9 * * * -0 .3 7 * * * - 0 .5 5 * * * -0 .5 7 * * * -0 .5 1 * * * -0 .4 4 * * *
h o n d a - 0 .2 4 * * * -0 .2 6 * * * -0 .3 5 * * * -0 .2 3 * * * - 0 .1 7 * * * -0 .3 1 * * * -0 .1 5 * * * -0 .1 4 * * *
v w -0 .1 2 * * * -0 .1 3 * * * -0 .2 1 * * * -0 .1 1 * * * 0 .0 2 0 .0 9 * 0 .0 2 0 .0 2
s u b a ru - 0 .2 7 * * * -0 .2 8 * * * -0 .4 0 * * * -0 .2 5 * * * - 0 .1 4 * * * -0 .1 0 * * -0 .1 4 * * * -0 .1 4 * * *
a u d i - 0 .0 5 -0 .0 6 -0 .1 2 * * -0 .0 4 - 0 .0 0 0 .0 7 0 .0 2 0 .0 5
bm w 0 .0 4 0 .0 2 -0 .0 3 0 .0 4 0 .1 0 0 .0 0 0 .2 1 * * 0 .1 3 * * *
m e r c e d e s 0 .2 2 * * * 0 .2 1 * * * 0 .1 7 * * * 0 .2 2 * * * 0 .1 8 * * * 0 .2 0 * * * 0 .2 1 * * * 0 .2 4 * * *
vo lvo 0 .0 7 * 0 .0 6 0 .0 3 0 .0 7 * 0 .0 5 0 .0 2 0 .0 7 0 .0 9 * *
ja g u a r 0 .0 8 * 0 .0 7 0 .0 0 0 .0 9 * * 0 .0 4 0 .0 3 0 .0 7 0 .1 1 * *
s a a b 0 .2 0 * * * 0 .1 9 * * * 0 .2 0 * * * 0 .1 9 * * * 0 .2 0 * * * 0 .1 6 * * * 0 .2 1 * * * 0 .2 2 * * *
c o n s t 7 .5 8 * * * 7 .4 9 * * * 6 .5 8 * * * 7 .6 1 * * * 7 .4 2 * * * 6 .4 7 * * * 7 .5 7 * * * 7 .3 0 * * *
R - sq r . 0 .8 9 0 .8 9 0 .9 0 0 .8 9 0 .8 7 0 .8 8 0 .8 7 0 .8 9
R o o t
M SE
0 .1 4 0 .1 4 0 .1 8 0 .1 3 0 .1 8 0 .1 7 0 .1 7 0 .1 5
Source: own estimations
Note: ***, **, * - indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level,
respectively. The estimates are done based on GMM.A specification. Isuzu is used as
a reference group. Horsepower, width, length and mpgcity (miles per gallon, city) are
in logarithmic form.
6.4.2 Results of the test for the mutual forbearance hypothesis
Testing collusive assumption among multimarket contact firms The
application of the test for the mutual forbearance hypothesis for the automotive
industry as described above is complicated by the high concentration ratios and
the fact that the automotive manufacturers are present in almost every market
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segment. Thus, one needs to find some variation in the multimarket contact
among the automotive firms in the US car market to reduce the number of
potential candidates for the multimarket contact firms, which could form the
”multimarket contact firms coalition” and for which the assumption of implicit
collusive behaviour could be then tested. There could be different criteria for
that, e.g., how long the firm has been present in the market, difference due to
the geographical market presence, technology difference (e.g., diesel technology),
number of markets, in which a firm is present, etc.
In the US, the firms that are present in all automotive product markets are
Toyota, GM, Ford and DaimlerChrysler. Renault-Nissan group is present in all
the markets, except for the traditional market segment.
The criteria that I use for the differentiation of the multimarket contact
to point out the coalitions of multimarket contact firms are: 1) the presence
of the firm in all or almost all market segments, 2) multimarket firms with
shares with more than 10% in each market segment (i.e., considering ”influen-
tial” rivals, with ”spheres of influence”), and 3) the combination of the above
two criteria. Under the first criterion the collusion possibility between GM,
Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Toyota and Renault-Nissan groups is tested. Under the
second criterion, there is a collusion possibility between GM, Ford, Daimler-
Chrysler, Toyota, Honda, Hyundai and BMW. Under the third criterion, the
collusion is tested between GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler and Toyota. The collu-
sive/cooperative assumption between GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler and Toyota
should be also tested on the basis of the fact that they are present in all mar-
ket segments and have the highest number of multiple contacts. In addition,
the collusive behaviour between GM, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler is tested as
these firms have tended to dominate the US automotive market in general and
across separate market segments. In addition, Toyota has been argued to be
the ”heatest” competitor for the US car producers, so the cooperative behav-
iour between them could be rather doubtful. For the other firms, I have tested
different assumptions: competitive, single-product, and multi-product.
The choice of the above criteria for the multimarket contact differentiation
has been based on the following arguments. Not only the diversification aspect
matters (to support collusion due to multimarket contact it is not enough to
be present in several markets) but also the ability of the firms to use it in the
creation of the transferrable slack should be taken into account. It is unlikely
that the firms with a small market share will be able to generate the necessary
slack (which is usually fostered by the market concentration), which could be
transferred to the other markets through the multimarket contact.
As I have mentioned above, in my estimations I distinguish between multi-
product (brand) and multi-product (manufacturer group, taking into account
the cross-shares in other firms) assumptions. Under the latter assumption, a
joint profit maximization for Hyundai/Kia, GM/Suzuki/Saab/Isuzu, Ford/Mazda/Volvo/Jaguar,
Chrysler/Mitsubishi/Mercedes, and VW/Audi is assumed, but this led to only
slight changes in the markups as compared to those under the multi-product
(brand) assumption. This is attributed to the low market shares of the car
brands that are added to the main (parent) brand and the low cross-price elas-
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ticities of demand.
In accordance with the above assumptions, the ownership matrix θ is ad-
justed, and the markups could be calculated on the basis of the demand esti-
mates from the first step. Given the markups, the marginal costs under different
assumptions could be calculated (see Section 4.2.1 for more detail).
The results of the estimated marginal costs equations under selected mul-
timarket contact assumptions can be found in Table 11 above. For the best
supply-side model selection, the best way would be, of course, to get the real
estimates of the marginal costs of the automotive firms at the model level, and
to compare the obtained estimates with those ones, but this is difficult to realize
in practice. Not surprisingly, there is not so much publicly available information
about the margins of the OEMs in the US car market.
That is why, I am moving now to the discussion of the results from statis-
tical procedures to choose the supply-side specification that best fits the data.
Relying on the "goodness-of-fit" of the model may be not the best criterion for
selecting the best model under these circumstances. As it can be already seen
from the estimation results (see Table 11), the R-squared is rather similar for
all model specifications. Below I apply the information criteria (Akaike (AIC),
and Bayesian (BIC)), sum of squared residuals (SSR), the test for non-nested
hypotheses by MacKinnon, White and Davidson (1983), and the test for model
selection by Rivers and Vuong (2002) to try to choose the model that best fits
the data.
The results of the comparison of the information criteria and the sum of
squared residuals (SSR) as a way to differentiate between the supply side mod-
els can be found in Table 12. In addition to the single-product, multi-product
(brand), multi-product (group) and market segment collusion assumptions, the
information criteria for the following multimarket contact firms coalitions have
been estimated: MMC1: collusive assumption for GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler,
Toyota and Renault-Nissan and competitive assumption for the others; MMC2:
collusive assumption for GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Toyota, Honda, Hyundai
and BMW and competitive assumption for the others; MMC3: collusive assump-
tion for GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler and Toyota and competitive assumption
for the others; MMC4: collusive assumption for GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler
and competitive assumption for the others; MMC5: collusive assumption for
GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Toyota and Renault-Nissan and single-product as-
sumption for the others; MMC6: collusive assumption for GM, Ford, Daim-
lerChrysler, Toyota and Renault-Nissan and multi-product assumption for the
others; MMC7: collusive assumption for GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Toy-
ota, Honda, Hyundai and BMW and single-product assumption for the others;
MMC8: collusive assumption for GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Toyota, Honda,
Hyundai and BMW and multi-product assumption for the others; MMC9: collu-
sive assumption for GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler and Toyota and single-product
assumption for the others; MMC10: collusive assumption for GM, Ford, Daim-
lerChrysler and Toyota and multi-product assumption for the others; MMC11:
collusive assumption for GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler and single-product as-
sumption for the others; MMC12: collusive assumption for GM, Ford, Daimler-
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Chrysler and multi-product assumption for the others.
The model specification that gets the lowest information criteria and SSR
should be chosen as the supply-side specification that best fits the data. The
specifications of the single-product, multi-product (brand) and multi-product
(manufacturer group) price competition have got the lowest Akaike Informa-
tion Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) values. How-
ever, these values are not so much different from the values for the supply-side
specification under the three multimarket contact assumptions, namely collu-
sive behaviour for Ford, GM and DaimlerChrysler and competitive (MMC4), or
single-product (MMC11), or multiproduct (MMC12) price competition for the
other automotive players. That is why, one should be rather careful in making
conclusions on the basis of these information criteria results. The comparison
of the SSR values shows a similar picture. It should be noted that the SSR in
any case could not be treated as a sufficient condition for rejecting all the other
null hypotheses.
Table 12. US light vehicles market: information criteria and sum of squared
residuals (SSR) for different supply side specifications
Specifications AIC BIC SSR
Single-product -539.63 -415.83 9.97
Multi-product (brand) -535.29 -411.49 10.05
Multi-product (group) -534.40 -410.59 10.07
Market segment collusion -306.90 -183.10 15.49
MMC1 -306.30 -182.50 15.51
MMC2 -324.57 -200.76 14.98
MMC3 -345.43 -221.63 14.40
MMC4 -497.40 -373.60 10.80
MMC5 -306.56 -182.76 15.50
MMC6 -306.77 -182.96 15.49
MMC7 -331.26 -207.45 14.79
MMC8 -331.34 -207.54 14.79
MMC9 -347.72 -223.91 14.34
MMC10 -347.81 -224.00 14.33
MMC11 -480.08 -356.28 11.16
MMC12 -478.98 -355.18 11.18
Source: own estimations
Note: ’AIC’ means Akaike Information Criterion, ’BIC’ stands for Bayesian Infor-
mation Criterion, and ’SSR’ denotes sum of squared residuals.
The results of the test for nonnested hypotheses by MacKinnon, White and
Davidson (1983) can be found in Table 13 (a,b). The detailed description of
the test procedure that I have applied can be found in Appendix. At the top
of each row there are several modes of market conduct (null hypothesis). Each
of the columns represents one of the alternative market conduct scenarios (al-
ternative hypothesis). The results of the test can be best seen by evaluating
the columns. It could be seen that when the alternative is MMC4 assumption
(specification A8), i.e., collusive assumption for the American Big Three GM,
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Ford and DaimlerChrysler and competitive assumption for all other automotive
players, all other null hypotheses are rejected. That is, this supply-side specifi-
cation could be argued to be the most preferred supply-side specification on the
basis of this test.
Table 13a. US light vehicles market: results of the test for the non-nested
hypotheses (MacKinnon, White and Davidson, 1983)
H0/H1 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8
A1 -0.0 0.6 1.7 -6.0 -0.5 -5.3 -2.6
A2 0.7 1.4 1.8 -6.4 -0.5 -5.6 -3.0
A3 0.1 -1.1 1.4 -6.4 -0.6 -5.6 -3.0
A4 -1.0 -1.3 -1.0 -6.0 -0.7 -4.8 -2.6
A5 14.8 14.9 15.0 14.7 11.2 6.2 14.4
A6 5.8 5.7 5.8 6.0 -5.2 -4.9 2.0
A7 13.0 13.0 13.1 12.8 -2.3 9.5 12.2
A8 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.3 -8.0 2.0 -7.5
A9 14.9 15.0 15.0 14.7 1.3 11.3 6.2 14.4
A10 14.8 14.9 15.0 14.7 -0.2 11.3 6.1 14.3
A11 5.9 5.8 5.8 6.1 -5.2 0.1 -4.9 2.0
A12 5.9 5.8 5.8 6.1 -5.2 0.1 -4.9 2.1
A13 13.0 13.1 13.1 12.8 -2.3 9.7 1.5 12.2
A14 12.9 13.0 13.1 12.8 -2.3 9.7 0.0 12.2
A15 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.4 -7.9 2.2 -7.4 4.1
A16 7.3 7.3 7.4 7.3 -7.9 2.1 -7.4 1.8
Source: own estimations
Note: t-statistics are given in the cells. A1: Single-product. A2: Multi-product
(brand). A3: Multi-product (group). A4: Market segment collusion. A5: MMC1.
A6: MMC2. A7: MMC3. A8: MMC4. A9: MMC5. A10: MMC6. A11: MMC7.
A12: MMC8. A13: MMC9. A14: MMC10. A15: MMC11. A16: MMC12. These
assumptions are explained in more detail in the text above.
Table 13b. US light vehicles market: results of the test for the non-nested
hypotheses (MacKinnon, White and Davidson, 1983) (continuation)
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H0/H1 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 A16
A1 -6.1 -6.1 -0.5 -0.5 -5.4 -5.3 -2.8 -2.7
A2 -6.4 -6.4 -0.5 -0.5 -5.7 -5.6 -3.2 -3.1
A3 -6.4 -6.4 -0.6 -0.6 -5.7 -5.6 -3.2 -3.1
A4 -6.0 -6.0 -0.7 -0.7 -4.9 -4.9 -2.8 -2.7
A5 -0.9 0.8 11.1 11.1 1.8 1.8 8.9 8.9
A6 -5.3 -5.3 0.0 -0.0 -5.0 -5.0 1.8 1.9
A7 -2.3 -2.2 9.5 9.5 -1.1 0.5 12.1 12.1
A8 -8.0 -8.0 2.0 2.0 -7.6 -7.5 -3.7 -1.3
A9 1.5 11.3 11.3 6.1 6.2 14.2 14.3
A10 -1.3 11.3 11.3 6.0 6.1 14.1 14.2
A11 -5.3 -5.3 -0.1 -4.9 -4.9 1.9 1.9
A12 -5.3 -5.3 0.1 -4.9 -4.9 1.9 1.9
A13 -2.4 -2.3 9.7 9.7 1.3 12.1 12.1
A14 -2.4 -2.4 9.7 9.7 -1.2 12.0 12.1
A15 -8.0 -8.0 2.2 2.2 -7.5 -7.4 1.6
A16 -8.0 -8.0 2.1 2.1 -7.5 -7.4 -1.4
Source: own estimations
Note: t-statistics are given in the cells. A1: Single-product. A2: Multi-product
(brand). A3: Multi-product (group). A4: Market segment collusion. A5: MMC1.
A6: MMC2. A7: MMC3. A8: MMC4. A9: MMC5. A10: MMC6. A11: MMC7.
A12: MMC8. A13: MMC9. A14: MMC10. A15: MMC11. A16: MMC12. These
assumptions are explained in more detail in the text above.
The interpretation of the above finding is not so straightforward. Ford, GM
and DaimlerChrysler have got extensive multimarket contacts with each other,
at the same time they individually dominate all market segments, so that the
found on the basis of the above test collusive behaviour could be attributed to
the highly concentrated nature of the US light vehicles market, which could also
foster collusive behaviour. Another interpretation of the result could be that
the collusive behaviour can be facilitated in case of both multimarket contact
presence and high market concentration, and it could be even higher than in
case of only multimarket contact presence, or only high market concentration.
Concentration in a particular market may foster a slack, which is transferred
through the multimarket contact to the other markets.
The above test for non-nested hypotheses is based upon the assumption that
one of the nested models is correctly specified. It might be, however, not the
case. That is why, for robustness checks, I have also tried to perform the model
selection test by Rivers and Vuong (2002). However, I have failed to get any
conclusive results.
The results from testing procedures are, thus, not quite satisfactory. The
test for non-nested hypothesis by MacKinnon, White and Davidson (1983) could
give some support for collusive behaviour in the US car market. Whether this
is a plausible result, that is another question, which is difficult to answer given
the absence of the publicly available cost data.
It could be argued that the US automobile market has become quite com-
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petitive recently. As a result, it is difficult to expect healthy profits in the
industry. Although this argument is quite a natural argument given the current
financial situation of the US automobile producers, several arguments could be
named to support the results of this paper. First, 2001-2003 period, although
quite competitive, is still less competitive than the subsequent and current pe-
riod, when all Big Three American car producers face severe financial problems.
Furthermore, the markups estimated on the basis of structural models and the
markups calculated on the basis of the accounting data that appear sometimes
in public could be quite different45 . In addition, several studies find collusive
behaviour in the automobile industry notwithstanding the increased competi-
tion (e.g., Jaumandreu and Moral, 2006). It would be good to conduct a similar
analysis for the earlier period of time if the data are available, say before 2000,
to try to get more support for the findings of this paper.
It should be noted that the multi-product (group) specification, which cap-
tures the effect of the cross-ownership and the impact of owing several brands by
the manufacturer group on the firm behaviour has not been found to be the most
preferred supply-side specification on the basis of the test for the non-nested hy-
potheses. It seems as if the relevant for the US car market manufacturer groups
include minor brands that may be not of great importance in determining the
firms’ equilibrium behaviour.
Testing shock effects Testing shock effects to make some inferences about
the mutual forbearance hypothesis largely depends on the results of the choice
of the supply-side specification that best describes the data46. The plausible
estimates of own- and cross-price elasticities, mark-ups and, consequently, mar-
ginal costs are likely to determine the simulation results. It should be noted
that simple logit and nested logit models have been frequently used for policy
simulations.
Testing shock effects could probably help me disentangle the effects from
concentration and multimarket contact on pricing. Two types of shocks can be
distinguished: specific-market shocks (to study multimarket contact effects, to
study the impact on other markets) and industry-level shocks (to study concen-
tration effects, to see whether there is an impact on all markets in the industry).
This analysis could be done to study the mutual forbearance hypothesis on the
basis of the multimarket contact assumption that gets most support in the first
step. If some other pricing equilibrium turns out to be supported by the data,
strategic interactions of firms could be still investigated (there could be also
different degrees of collusion in the markets due to the multimarket contact).
As I have mentioned before, the price war can be approximated by the
45Verboven (1997) also in particular argues that the price-cost margins calculated on the
basis of the accounting data should be treated with caution while evaluating market power in
an industry. The estimation of an oligopoly model gives an indirect way to determine market
power.
46The results from these simulations may be to some extent equivalent to those from the
estimation of the ”conjectures”, i.e., own- and cross-market reactions in the homogenous goods
case.
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changes in the ownership matrix for a particular market segment. Thus, even
if I test, e.g., multimarket contact assumption at the firm level (i.e., I assume
collusion for a coalition of firms in each market segment), I can simulate what
happens when the firm behaviour in one market segment becomes more com-
petitive, whether this will influence the firm(s)’ behaviour in the other market
segments, and where these changes will be most pronounced.
On the basis of the above described simulations, I have failed to derive
some conclusive evidence. I could get perhaps much more reasonable simulation
results on the basis of the random coefficients framework.
7 Concluding remarks
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study on the automotive indus-
try, which concentrates on studying various sources of the market power in an
extensive way: fewness (a few competitors and large concentration), differenti-
ation (products have unique features), market-specific collusion, and collusion
due to the multimarket contact presence, and which exclusively concentrates on
studying the firms’ equilibrium interactions in the US car market. The mutual
forbearance hypothesis is tested in the industry characterized by extensive mul-
timarket contact, however, in which it is not so easy to test for the multimarket
contact effects on collusive behaviour. In this study I have tried to analyze how
to conduct a test for the mutual forbearance hypothesis in principle, and how
to implement it using a particular data for the US automobile market.
It has been found that multimarket contact may influence competition in
the automobile markets and increase the firms’ strategic interdependence. This
effect is, however, difficult to disentangle from the effect of the market concen-
tration in the US automobile market on the firm behaviour. It should be noted
that in general the empirical studies find a problem to distinguish between inter-
nal (e.g., concentration) and external (e.g., multimarket contact) effects on the
firm behaviour. The model specifications of single-product and multiproduct
firm behaviour for the car producers have been found among the most preferred
supply-side model specifications on the basis of the information criteria and sum
of squared residuals, but not on the basis of the test for non-nested hypotheses.
The test by MacKinnon, White and Davidson (1983) showed some support for
the specification where GM, Ford and DaimlerChrysler behave in a cooperative
way, and all other automotive players behave competitively. On the basis of
the model selection test by Rivers and Vuong (2002) it was difficult to choose
the best supply-side specification. Therefore, one should be careful in applying
a particular statistical test and interpreting its results. It seems worthwile to
compare the results from several testing procedures as robustness checks for the
chosen ”best” supply-side specification.
The major novelty of this paper as compared to the other empirical studies
on the mutual forbearance hypotheses has been the specification of coalitions of
multimarket contact firms and testing collusive assumption among them. The
test has been applied in a non-traditional set-up as compared to the ”traditional”
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for such studies industries and markets (e.g., banking, or airlines). This paper
has rather concentrated on testing the existence of the significant and positive
impact of multimarket contact on the firm behaviour. Namely, it has been tested
that the firms behave perfectly collusively because of multiple market presence.
The degree of collusive behaviour is assumed to be the same in all the markets
where the rivals meet each other. The precise quantification of the multimarket
contact effect on the firm behaviour is difficult on the basis of this approach.
The results of this paper may be improved in the future by estimating more
flexible substitution patterns (e.g., on the basis of random coefficients model
estimation for a longer time period), which may lead to the more plausible
mark-ups and more reliable marginal costs estimates. A less competitive time
period could be considered using the same approach. It would be also worthwile
to have the data for a longer time period, where there may be periods of collusive
and more competitive behaviour among the multimarket contact firms.
While estimating the nested multinominal logit, I have had to rely on the
market segmentation criteria often used in other empirical and analytical auto-
motive industry studies. The changes in the market segmentation may lead to
the changes in the demand estimates. The question is how distinctive, or rele-
vant, the market segments are. Whether they are perceived in the same way by
the automotive manufacturers poses another important issue. The market defin-
ition is particularly critical in the context of the mutual forbearance hypothesis.
On the demand side, this problem can be solved by estimating the random co-
efficients model. However, the problem still remains when the interdependence
of the firm behaviour across the market segments is being tested. Sensitivity
analysis due to the changes in the market segmentation could be helpful to shed
some light on this problem. However, since the market segmentation classifi-
cation is very well-established, I have relied upon it in my estimations. The
definition of a market in the US light vehicles market could be an interesting
topic for future research, with policy implications for antitrust authorities.
List prices of light vehicles may be not the best alternative in my estimations
due to the numerous price incentives in the US automotive market, and, thus,
this could be a point of potential critique. Transaction prices should be rather
used, which are difficult to get. A possible way out is to collect information
on the customer incentives for the cars offered, which are often cited in the
automotive news media, and then calculate the "transaction" prices. On the
other hand, the problem of the list prices may be not so severe as the use of
list prices instead of transaction prices can be treated as a measurement error
in the explanatory variable, and the prices are instrumented in any way.
Some policy implications may be derived for conducting competition pol-
icy. The possible anticompetitive effects of the multimarket contact will have
to be taken into account while setting up the antitrust policy (e.g., there may
be implications for the entry of new firms), and assessing the effects of the con-
glomerate mergers. If the markets are strategically linked, then policy makers
should take into account both direct effects of their regulatory actions in one
particular market, and indirect effects in the other markets. The sole market
assumption by the regulators may, thus, be irrelevant. The measurement of the
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competitive pressure in an industry can be more complicated than it could be
inferred from the concentration ratio, or Herfindahl index, if accounting for the
multimarket contact effects.
To sum up, the results of the study allow verifying to a certain extent the
theoretical predictions about the mutual forbearance hypothesis, give empirical
evidence on the intermarket relationships of the multiproduct firms, contribute
to the literature on the market power, and, furthermore, help explore the com-
petitive interactions in the automotive industry, thus, gaining a deeper under-
standing of the pricing behaviour in the automobile market, which constantly
receives a lot of public interest.
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9 Appendix. Tests for non-nested hypotheses
9.1 MacKinnon, White and Davidson (1983) test for non-
nested hypotheses
These tests fall under the category of ”artificial testing”47. Two non-nested
models are embedded into a more general artificial model. MacKinnon, White
and Davidson (1983) derive the test for the linear case (J-test), the non-linear
47This test has been in particular applied by Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995) and Verboven
(2002).
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case (P-test), with transformed dependent variables and in case of the IV esti-
mation.
I can re-write the below pricing equation, which is derived from the first-
order conditions and can be decomposed into marginal cost and markup:
p = c+Ω−1s (29)
in the following way:
p = wγ +Dλ+ ω +Ω−1s (30)
where w are product characteristics, D are firm dummies, ω are unobserved
product characteristics. The quality-adjusted prices will then be:
π = p− wγ − ω = Dλ+Ω−1s (31)
The null hypothesis will be as follows:
H0 : p = wγ0 + π0 + ε0 (32)
The alternative hypothesis can be written down as:
H1 : p = wγ1 + π1 + ε1 (33)
If the model under H0 is a true model, then there should be no correlation
between its residuals and the difference between the fitted values of H0 and H1.
w, i.e., product characteristics, will be the same in case of both models, thus,
the quality-adjusted prices π0 and π1 will be the fitted values of interest.
The idea of the P-test is to evaluate whether p−aπ0 is orthogonal to
a
π1−
a
π0.
For that purpose, the artificial regression should be run:
(p− aπ0) = wa+ (
a
π1 −
a
π0)b+ u
a and b are the parameters to be estimated. Pairs of models are compared
on the basis of the t-statistic, which is normally distributed.
9.2 Rivers and Vuong (2002) model selection test
Assume the following cost specification48:
chj = exp(ωjγ + w
h
j ) (34)
Taking the logarithms on both sides I get:
ln chj = ωjγ + w
h
j (35)
or
48Vuong-type tests have been in particular applied by Jaumandreu and Lorences (2002),
Bonnet et al. (2006), and Jaumandreu and Moral (2006).
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ln(pj −Ω−1s) = ωjγ + wj (36)
It is assumed that two models h and h0 are tested against each other:
pj = chj + (Ω
−1s)h (37)
and
pj = ch
0
j + (Ω
−1s)h0 (38)
The lack-of-fit criteria are defined for both models as:
minQhn = min
1
n
X
(Dhj )
2 = min
1
n
X
(ln(pj −Ω−1s)− ωjγ)2 (39)
The null hypothesis is defined as the two models are asymptotically equiva-
lent when
H0 : lim
n→∞
(
_
Q
h
n −
_
Q
h0
n ) = 0 (40)
The two alternative hypotheses are that model h performs asymptotically
better than model h
0
, or that model h0 performs asymptotically better than
model h.
The test statistic is then calculated in the following way:
Tn =
√
n
a
σ
2
½
_
Q
h
n −
_
Q
h0
n
¾
(41)
where
_
Q
h
n,
_
Q
h0
n are the sample-of-lack criteria that are estimated for the mod-
els h and h0 at the estimated parameters values of the model, and
a
σ
2
is the
estimated value of the variance of the difference in the lack-of-fit. The test
statistic has an asymptotic standard normal distribution.
If the standardized difference is statistically negative that implies that the
model h is better than model h0. If the test statistic is large and positive that
means that the model h0 is better than model h.
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Abstract
This paper aims to study geographical and multi-product linkages
of markets (multiple market presence) and firm behaviour interdepen-
dence as a result of such linkages existence. In particular, it attempts
to answer whether the multimarket linkages lead to more cooperative be-
haviour among the firms, which results in higher prices and profits, and
whether the degree of collusive/cooperative behaviour varies across mar-
kets. These issues are investigated within a structural oligopoly model for
differentiated products for the European automobile market on the ba-
sis of the aggregate product-level data for 1970-1999. The results of the
study reveal weak (quantitative) effect of multimarket contact on market
conduct/pricing in the European car market as well as provide some evi-
dence on the redistribution of the market power from the more collusive
to the more competitive markets due to multimarket contact.
∗I am thankful for the financial support to the German Research Foundation (Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG)) and the Center for European Economic Research (ZEW)
during my PhD studies at the Center for Doctoral Studies in Economics (CDSE), University of
Mannheim. I am very grateful for the comments to Prof. Konrad Stahl and for the discussion
to Prof. Frank Verboven at the early stage of the paper. Enormous thanks to my sister Tetyana
Romanchenko for data assistance. The comments of the participants of 2007 CDSE Doctoral
Seminar (Mannheim) and 2007 9th INFER annual conference at Loughborough University
(UK) are appreciated.
1
1 Introduction
Most of the existing on the European car market1 studies have been devoted
to the investigation of significant price dispersion in the European car market
(e.g., Verboven, 1996, Degryse and Verboven, 2000, Goldberg and Verboven,
2001)2. Empirical studies find the following reasons for the price dispersion
in the European car market: differences in demand elasticities, concentration,
import quota constraints, lack of uniform taxation, incomplete pass-through of
exchange rates, differences in local costs3 , etc. Verboven (1996) mentions con-
siderable cross-border arbitrage costs, which result in geographical car market
fragmentation4. The volume of parallel imports is very low. Ginsburgh (1996)
and Lutz (2000) point out the ”block exemption” to be the most important
factor that has hindered competition in the European car market. Additional
obstacles to purchase a car abroad are national type approval rules (harmonized
only in 1995) and national registration systems (Goldberg and Verboven, 2001).
This leads to significant artificial trade barriers.
The European car market is characterized by extensive multimarket contact
(i.e., the firms are present in many geographic and product markets), a high
degree of interfirm linkages, and presence of several global automotive manu-
facturer groups5. The impact of these factors on the firm behaviour has not
been considered in the previous studies, which could explain more precisely the
firm conduct in the European car market and shed more light on the pricing be-
haviour differences across markets, thus, possibly contributing to understanding
better the price dispersion pattern in the European car market.
Multiple market presence is generally argued to foster collusive firm behav-
iour (e.g., Bernheim and Whinston, 1990, Spagnolo, 1999). The major objective
of this paper has been to test the game-theoretic predictions about the impact of
multimarket contact on the firm behaviour by Bernheim and Whinston (1990)
for the European car market. First of all, I have aimed to test for the general
effect of the multimarket contact presence, i.e., the extent of the markets over-
lap, on the firms’ equilibrium behaviour pattern. Furthermore, the firms should
1 In Introduction I refer to European car market as a whole Western European car market.
In my estimations later, however, under the European car market the new car sales in the
following five countries are meant: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the UK.
2A detailed survey and major findings of these studies can be in particular found in Degryse
and Verboven (2000). A number of studies on the price differentials in the European car
market has been published by the European Commission. Questions being addressed in the
other European car market studies have been in particular the effects of the reform of the car
distribution system in Europe (Brenkers and Verboven, 2006a), and defining a relevant car
market (e.g., Brenkers and Verboven, 2006b).
3Manufacturing cost differences across countries in the European car market have been
found to be important (e.g., Kirman and Schueller, 1990). The highest-cost producer is the
UK, followed by Italy and Germany, with Belgium and France being the least-cost producers.
4The possibility of arbitrage trade between markets and the degree of market segmentation
have been addressed in Lutz (2004).
5At present there are about 13 global independent automotive manufacturer groups. These
manufacturer groups own several car brands (e.g.,VW Group). The notion of interfirm linkages
comprises equity and contractual as well as horizontal and vertical relationships among the
firms. This issue will be discussed in more detail later in the paper.
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”forbear” from retaliating more, the larger shares they have in those markets.
For them there is more to lose in the concentrated markets if they choose to
deviate from collusive prices, and there will be lower coordination costs in those
markets. That is why, I have attempted to investigate whether the multimar-
ket contact effect on collusion is stronger in the more concentrated markets.
In empirical studies it is usually difficult to measure the effect of multimarket
contact on competition and to differentiate between the impact of multimarket
contact and concentration on pricing, which I have intended to address in this
paper. I have also aimed to test directly for the presence of the ”spheres of
influence” that would foster collusive behaviour (this term has been introduced
by Edwards (1955) and has been discussed by Bernheim and Whinston (1990)).
That is, I have tested for collusion among ”influential rivals”, which could re-
spect each others’ ”spheres of influence” (e.g., these could be the markets where
they have cost advantages). Finally, I have intended to test for the presence of
the strategic effects of the multimarket contact as specified by Bernheim and
Whinston (1990), namely, the redistribution of the market power from the more
collusive to the more competitive markets in case of differentiated products due
to the multimarket contact in the European car market.
The previous empirical evidence on multimarket contact effects has been
rather inconclusive concerning the existence, sign and significance of the effect
on the tacit collusion (e.g., Heggestand and Rhoades, 1978, Scott, 1982, Evans
and Kessides, 1994, Parker and Röller, 1997). In Leheyda (2007a) I could
find some evidence about the possible existence of the multimarket contact
effects on the firm behaviour in the US light vehicles market. However, some
addiditional evidence could have been worthwile to get to argue firmly about
the relevance of these effects for the automobile markets. In particular, it was
difficult to differentiate that effect from the possible concentration effect on
collusive pricing. As compared to that study, in this paper the longer period
of time and a greater number of markets allow me to study a richer number
of the research objectives (including the existence of the strategic effects of
the multimarket contact) and apply other approaches to study the multimarket
contact (as well as concentration) effects on the firm behaviour. Geographical
aspect of the multimarket contact is added to the multi-product context of the
automotive industry, which increases the number of markets, across which the
automotive firms interact.
Evidence for collusive behaviour found in the other studies, or facts observed
in reality6 could serve as an additional motivation to investigate the multimarket
contact hypothesis. The empirical evidence on the multimarket contact effects
existence, if found, might be another potential explanation/motive for cooper-
ative/collusive behaviour among the firms. Verboven (1996) could not reject
the hypothesis of the presence of collusive behaviour in Germany and United
Kingdom in 1990. Goldberg and Verboven (2001) attribute the higher prices in
Italy to the presence of the strong bias towards domestic brands, higher prices
6The UK has been, e.g., mentioned as the only European country where a legal investigation
for collusive behaviour has been initiated by Monopolies and Merger Commission (Goldberg
and Verboven, 2001).
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in the UK to ”the better equipped cars and/or differences in the dealer discount
practices”. Brenkers and Verboven (2006a) find that the firm behaviour in the
UK is slightly more collusive than the Bertrand-type behaviour, and that the
behaviour in France, Germany and Italy is slightly less competitive than the
multiproduct behaviour as compared to Belgium. As compared to the above
three studies7 , I am using other approaches to identify the collusive firm behav-
iour8. In addition, I try to link it to the presence of the extensive multimarket
contact and high concentration in the European car market. That is, I attempt
not only to report the existence of the collusive behaviour in the European car
market, but point out some factors behind its existence if found. Jaumandreu
and Moral (2006) find support for the price coalition by domestic and European
firms in the Spanish car market during 1990-1996, notwithstanding the increased
competition starting 1993 (connected with tariffs dismantling for foreign firms,
demand downturn, and high entry of new models).
Absence of the consistent and considerable evidence and no targeted study
on the firm behaviour in the European car market has served as an additional
motivation for doing this study. For example, Verboven (1996) argues that
there could be differences in the degree of collusive behaviour across countries
and calls for a more detailed analysis of the differences in the firm behaviour
across the countries. My study has been meant to be a contribution to the
market conduct literature using new empirical approaches in the IO. In this
paper the emphasis is on different demand and cost conditions in geographical
markets and also product markets, which could lead to different degrees of
collusion/cooperative behaviour in these markets due to multimarket contact,
which has been pointed out by Bernheim and Whinston (1990). The idea of this
paper is to extend the empirical approach of structural oligopoly model with
product differentiation by Verboven (1996), Goldberg and Verboven (2001) and
Brenkers and Verboven (2006a, b) for geographical markets to study the impact
of the degree of geographical and multiproduct market linkages on the firm
behaviour in the European car market. To sum up, this study attempts to
systematize the previous evidence on the firm behaviour in the European car
market and draw some new inferences by going further into the methodology
on the firm equilibrium interactions.
The major contribution of this paper in terms of the methodology to study
the impact of multiple market presence on the firm behaviour is to estimate con-
jectural variation parameters (in case of differentiated products) and test the
impact of concentration and multimarket contact within this market conduct
equation. These effects are tested directly within the hedonic pricing equation
as well. To measure the degree of multimarket linkages, I construct several mul-
7These are the only studies that estimate structural oligopoly models with product differ-
entiation for the total European car market. The other studies apply mostly the reduced-form
approach to study the price dispersion in the European car market, or they concentrate on
specific country markets developments.
8For the demand side, I take the similar demand specification. I am not interested in the
demand specification as such in this paper. The most important for me has been to get the
reliable estimates of price and correlation parameters that could have been used to estimate
substituion patterns, markups and market conduct parameters.
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timarket contact measures at the firm and market level. I also discuss different
”spheres of influence” for the car producers at geographic, market segment and
geographic-product market levels. In addition, the likelihood of a number of
multimarket contact firms coalitions as candidates for a potential equilibrium
outcome in the European car market is being tested on the basis of the menu
approach. In particular, the test for non-nested hypotheses by MacKinnon,
White, and Davidson (1983) and the model selection test by Rivers and Vuong
(2002) are applied to test for different modes of market conduct.
The results of the study reveal the existence of the effect of multimarket con-
tact on the firm behaviour in the European car market as well as provide some
evidence on the redistribution of the market power from the more collusive to
the more competitive markets. The impact of multimarket contact on the firm
behaviour is economically (quantitatively), however, rather insignificant. The
impact of concentration on prices is found to be more considerable. The mul-
timarket contact effect on the market conduct and prices may be also stronger
in the more concentrated markets. It has been challenging to choose the best
model specification for the supply side on the basis of the menu approach that
has been aimed to test directly for the ”spheres of influence” version of the
mutual forbearance hypothesis.
The paper proceeds in the following way. First, the literature review is
presented. In the next section I describe the structural characteristics of the
European car market as well as observed in the market multimarket contact
and inter-firm linkages. After that empirical framework for testing the mu-
tual forbearance hypothesis is discussed. Then data, estimation procedure and
results are described. The paper ends with some conclusions.
2 Literature review
The literature on multimarket contact theory has been more extensively dis-
cussed in the paper on the multimarket contact effects in the US light vehicles
market (Leheyda, 2007a). In this section I would like to highlight some empiri-
cal studies that are more relevant for this study and have not been discussed in
detail in the paper earlier.
As I have already mentioned, the existing empirical studies (e.g., Hegges-
tand and Rhoades, 1978, Scott, 1982, Evans and Kessides, 1994, Parker and
Röller, 1997), which are mostly done for airlines and banking industry, have
failed to give conclusive evidence about the existence, sign and significance of
the multimarket contact effect on facilitating and maintaining collusion. These
are mainly the cross-sectional studies. They may rather identify correlations
between multimarket contact and competition, while prices, concentration and
multimarket contact are rather endogenously determined. One of the sources
of endogeneity is the unobserved heterogeneity across markets, which can be
captured by introducing market fixed effects in panel-data models.
Most existing empirical studies concentrate on testing the multimarket con-
tact effect, based on the construction of some multimarket contact measure, on
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the firm’s performance (i.e., the so-called reduced-form approach), while there
have been virtually no studies done about the multimarket contact effect on
collusion within a structural model of firm behaviour. The only exceptions are
the papers by Jans and Rosenbaum (1996) and Parker and Röller (1997) for
homogenous products. The existing empirical studies have a major problem
to distinguish between internal (e.g., concentration, demand conditions, bar-
riers to entry) and external effects (e.g., multimarket contact) upon the firm
performance (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990).
Most of the existing empirical studies on the multimarket contact effects
focus on geographical markets (for banking, airlines, mobile telephony markets,
etc.). The only exception there seems to be a paper by Scott (1982), where the
study is done for the lines of businesses.
Some studies find that the effect of multimarket contact on prices is stronger
in the more concentrated markets (e.g., Scott (1982), Jans and Rosenbaum
(1996)). Scott (1982) and Jans and Rosenbaum (1996) find a more pronounced
effect of multimarket contact on collusion in the more concentrated markets,
and higher impact of concentration on collusion in the markets characterized
by the more extensive multimarket contact. Fernandez and Marin (1998) find
lower prices in the markets where it is easier to collude, and higher prices in the
markets where it is more difficult to reach collusive agreements. They attribute
this effect to the presence of the so-called strategic effects of the multimarket
contact, i.e., the redistribution of the market power from the more collusive to
the more competitive markets.
The focus of many empirical studies are the general conditions of the exis-
tence of the multimarket contact effects (i.e., studying the impact of the overlap
of the markets in which the firms are present), while not so many studies focus
explicitly on the different effectiveness of multimarket contact when the firms
differ in their territorial interests (in other words, ”spheres of influence”). This
idea of the ”spheres of influence” version of the mutual forbearance hypothesis
has been discussed in detail by Gimeno (1999). He argues that firms under mul-
timarket contact competition tend to recognize different ”territorial interests”
that the firms may have in different markets. They may use their market shares
in the markets that are important for their rivals to reduce the competition in
those markets that are important for them and sustain their dominant positions.
The benefit for the firms from multimarket retaliation threats is not equal across
all their markets. These threats of multimarket retaliation are rather used by
the firm to defend its position in those markets, where the firm has ”spheres of
influence”. The empirical literature on this aspect of the multimarket competi-
tion is not extensive, which may serve as an additional argument to investigate
this issue more profoundly in this study.
In addition to the construction of multimarket contact measures and testing
their impact on the firm performance, the estimation of the so-called conjectures
has been another approach used in the literature to study the firm strategic in-
terdependence as a result of multiple market presence. Feinberg (1985) argues
that the theory of the mutual forbearance could be treated as an extension
of traditional oligopoly theory, which foresees the possible existence of cross-
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market conjectural variations. When firms meet each other in several markets,
a firm can conjecture a possible reaction of another firm in all the markets where
they meet each other to an action by anyone of them. The estimation of own-
and cross-market effects is in tradition of the empirical industries with market
power (survey by Bresnahan (1989)). Feinberg (1985) and Gelfand and Spiller
(1987) estimate ”conjectures”, i.e., own- and cross-market reactions, and inter-
pret them in terms of the mutual forbearance hypothesis9. But what is actually
rather being tested in these papers, that is the notion of strategic interdepen-
dence (introduced by Areeda and Turner, 1979), or the presence of multiproduct
oligopolistic strategies, which may be not actually the evidence for the coop-
erative behaviour of firms. When firms recognize this mutual interdependence,
the mutual forbearance behaviour can evolve, which led to the hypothesis for-
mulated by Edwards (1955) and formalized by Bernheim and Whinston (1990)
(i.e., collusive behaviour as strong interdependence across markets).
The number of studies that estimate the conjectural variation parameters
for differentiated products industries is rather limited (as compared, e.g., to
those that estimate homogenous goods demand and marginal cost). Thus, any
contribution in this field could be welcome, despite some critisisms of this ap-
proach (e.g., identification problem, conjectures interpretation). Both menu10
and conjectural variation approaches to identify the market conduct have their
weaknesses, so it is worthwile to apply both of them in order to come up with
the reliable results at the end. This has been the strategy pursued in this paper.
3 European car market
3.1 Structural characteristics
The European car market, although less concentrated than the US car market,
is characterized by significant cross-country differences in concentration ratios.
The markets are especially concentrated in France and Italy, followed by Ger-
many and the UK, with the lowest concentration ratio for Belgium (see Graph
B1, Appendix B). The most concentrated market based on the one-firm (C1)-
concentration ratio is Italy, while the most concentrated market on the basis of
the four-firm (C4)- and seven-firm (C7)-concentration ratios is France in 1999.
During the considered period of time, i.e., during 1970-1999, the concentration
ratios have declined in Italy. The concentration ratios for the total European
car market have stayed on average at the same level, while the multimarket
contact, which will be discussed in more detail below, has increased.
The number of producers in geographic markets has increased in 1999 as
compared to 1970. In particular, several foreign producers have entered the
European car market (e.g., Mazda (1972), Mitsubishi (1976), Daihatsu (1979),
9Their analysis is based upon the investigation of the ”conjectures” values and their change
as a result of some regulatory actions.
10The menu approach to identifying the firm behaviour has been in particular described by
Gasmi et al. (1990).
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Hyundai (1980), Suzuki (1981), Seat (1983), Skoda (1993)). The share of the
non-European firms is the highest in Belgium, where there are no domestic
producers.
The European car market is also characterized by different tax levels (see
Table B2, Appendix B) and import quotas (3.0% in France, 15.0% in Germany,
1.0% in Italy, and 11.0% in the UK (Goldberg and Verboven, 2001)).
The above mentioned differences in concentration ratios as well as in the
number of car producers across geographic-product markets imply that the mar-
kets that I consider could be quite different. As Bernheim and Whinston (1990)
state (among other possible conditions), the effect of the multimarket contact
on cooperative behaviour can be facilitated in case of different markets, or in
case of a different number of firms in those markets.
A few words should be mentioned about the international price dispersion
in the European car market. International price differences are the lowest for
the luxury car market segments, while the highest international price differ-
entials are observed in segments C and D (Degryse and Verboven, 2000). In
general in the smaller car market segments the price differentials are found to
be higher. The highest price differentials are observed by Japanese and Ital-
ian brands (that have most models in the smaller car market segments). As
for international price differentials across brands, Degryse and Verboven (2000)
find the highest price differentials by Fiat, Alfa Romeo, Nissan, Honda, Toyota,
Subaru, Mazda and Ford, and the lowest by Mercedes, BMW, Lancia, Peugeot,
Citroen and Renault. Lutz (2000) finds that among European car produc-
ers Peugeot/Citroen, Fiat and Ford Groups price-discriminate more than GM
Opel, VW, and Renault. The lowest absolute price differentials have been found
for BMW, Mercedes, Audi and Volvo. Japanese producers are not found to
price-discriminate more than other producers but Nissan, Daihatsu, Suzuki and
Subaru price-discriminate more than Honda, Toyota, Mitsubishi and Mazda.
At the country level the most expensive models are found in the UK, followed
by Germany, France, Austria, Finland and Greece.
3.2 Multimarket and multi-firm linkages
This sub-section is built in the following way. I start with a definition of a
geographic-product market in the European car market, while the exact def-
inition of a market is important for identifying the effect of the multimarket
contact on the firm behaviour. After that I present a general picture of mul-
timarket contact across markets, namely describe the overlap of the markets,
in which the automobile companies are present, and describe the ”territorial
interests”, the presence of which could make the automotive companies respect
each other’s ”spheres of influence” and, thus, behave cooperatively. This dis-
cussion is presented at the geographic, market segment, and geographic-product
market for the European car market. Next the descriptive statistics for the con-
structed multimarket contact measures and concentration ratios is presented.
The sub-section ends with some discussion of interfirm relationships between
the automobile companies.
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3.2.1 Definition of a geographic-product market
The European car market is characterized by considerable multimarket con-
tact both within geographic and product-level dimensions. Geographic-product
market, i.e., the overlap of geographic and product markets (e.g., Belgium sub-
compact, Germany luxury, etc.), is a main unit upon which the multimarket
contact effects are investigated in this paper.
Geographic-product market is used as a market to define the number of
multiple contacts among the firms and to construct the multimarket contact
and concentration measures. The major question is how distinct these markets
are so that one could discuss them separately and investigate the multimarket
contact effects. The major criteria used in the literature to delineate the market
boundaries11 is to consider the cross-price elasticities of demand (econometric
tests for the delineation of market boundaries have been developed by Sheffman
and Spiller (1996)), or to investigate the co-movements in prices across markets12
(e.g., Kay, 1990).
Brenkers and Verboven (2006b)13 find the existence of distinct product mar-
kets in the European car market: the segments are the relevant markets for
all classes (subcompact, compact, intermediate, standard/luxury, and sports),
except for minivan, for which the relevant market definition should be the ag-
gregate country level, i.e., all new cars. They recommend the competition au-
thorities to investigate the impact of their policies for each car market segment
separately. The cross-price elasticities of demand are usually found to be low
with respect to the cars in the other market segments (e.g., Berry, Levinsohn and
Pakes, 1995, Brenkers and Verboven, 2006a). Demand linkages if any are likely
to be stronger across adjacent than across more remote market segments. Dif-
ferent price dispersion across market segments is also observed in the European
car market (e.g., Degryse and Verboven, 2000). To sum up, industry analysts
and academic researchers support the view that the car market segments con-
stitute distinct sub-markets, which differ in consumer demand, technology, and
competitors’ type (e.g., Requena-Silvente and Walker, 2005).
Geographical European car market fragmentation is taken as a standardized
fact: there is very little, or no cross-price elasticity of demand across country
markets. There is no single European car market: the European car market
consists of many national markets with quite distinct characteristics.
Automotive firms are multinational firms that are present in a lot of geographic-
product markets. The mutual forbearance foresees that there is a company-level
decision-making process coordinated across geographic-product markets14. It
11Candidates for markets are different products or services within an industry, geographical
demand for a product or service, different industries (Gimeno and Woo, 1999). Market defi-
nition is partially determined by the level of aggregation as there could be multiple products
in any industry, or a country market can be divided into regional, or local markets.
12 If there is a high positive correlation between the prices of two potentially competing
products, that would mean that the products are likely to be substitutes, and, thus, they
could be in the same relevant market.
13Brenkers and Verboven (2006b) apply the SSNIP (a small but significant and non-
transitory increase in prices) test to delineate relevant markets.
14Gimeno and Woo (1999) argue that the decisions should be coordinated at the organization
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has been argued that the European car market fragmentation prevents from
exploiting the economies of scale (”plant-scale”) (European Commission, 2004).
At the product market level the economies of scale (”product-scale”, large
numbers of more or less the same product) and scope (ability to make many
different and new products; not one car for different markets, but different cars
for different markets and types of customers; the number of market segments and
niches has been continuously increasing) have been important for the automotive
firms. The VW Group is an example of the company that relies a lot on scale
and scope economies.
3.2.2 General picture of multimarket contact across markets
In addition to a just simple market overlap between multipoint competitors (i.e.,
presence of the same competitors in several markets), the ”spheres of influence”
of firms could play an even more important role in sustaining collusive outcomes
between multimarket firms as the firms may tend to respect each other’s ”spheres
of influence” and behave less competitively.
The ”spheres of influence” of firms could be defined on the basis of the ”mar-
ket share dominance” and ”market dependence”15. ”Market share dominance”
is measured by the largest shares the firms hold in different markets. It is de-
fined for every firm, that is why, the share of a firm may not be the largest one if
it is not a large car producer, especially this can hold for premium producers, or
foreign producers. ”Market dependence” (”importance” of the market) is mea-
sured by the percentage of the firm’s total sales (revenue) represented by that
market16 . Domestic car markets could be considered as ”spheres of influence”
of the automobile producers at the geographical level. In addition, there are
”spheres of influence” for producers at the product level.
Below I concentrate on the descriptive analysis of the multimarket pres-
ence of the automotive manufacturers at geographical, product and geographic-
product market level as well as discuss the presence of the ”spheres of influence”
for the automotive manufacturers in the European car market. This is used later
to define the possible coalitions of the multimarket contact firms. I start with
the description of the multimarket presence of the automotive firms and their
”spheres of influence” at the geographical level.
Table B3 (Appendix B) gives an idea of the most important country mar-
kets for the car producers (comparison of 1999 to 1970). The simple market
overlap can be inferred from this Table: many of the OEMs, especially large
level if the managers want to exploit the scope economies.
15This has been first suggested by Gimeno (1999). He actually uses three criteria to de-
fine asymmetric territorial interests of firms: market share dominance, market dependence,
and resource centrality. Under ”resource centrality” the firms have different territorial inter-
ests because of different competitive advantage, which is linked to ”underlying resources and
capabilities of the firm”.
16As compared to the ”market share dominance” criterion, the ”market dependence” crite-
rion takes into account the size of the market and the size of the firm. For example, a large
firm may have a dominant share in a small market, but this may be strategically unimportant
for this large firm.
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volume ones like VW, are present in almost all countries. In 1999 France is
the most important country market for Peugeot and Renault. Germany is the
most important country market for BMW, Daihatsu, Kia, Mazda, Mercedes,
Mitsubishi, GM, Suzuki, Toyota, VW and Smart. Italy is the most important
country market for Fiat, Hyundai and Daewoo. The UK is the most important
country market for Ford, Honda and Nissan. As for the largest European vol-
ume car producers that could be seen as the primary candidates to recognize
and respect each other’s ”spheres of influence”, to sum up, it can be seen that
Italy is the most important market for Fiat, Germany is the most important
market for VW and GM, France is the most important market for Peugeot and
Renault, and the UK is the most important market for Ford. The large players
are likely to be uninterested in forming implicit collusive arrangements with
small players like Daihatsu. Mercedes and BMW are premium producers that
will rather compete with each other. Audi is also a premium brand, but it is
considered as a part of the volume car producer VW Group.
Table B4 (Appendix B) shows the share of a firm in the total country market
sales in 1999 as compared to 1970 and gives some picture of ”market share
dominance”. The ”spheres of influence” defined on the basis of this criterion
are France for Peugeot and Renault, Germany for BMW, Mercedes and VW,
Italy for Fiat, the UK for GM and Ford, which actually reflect the ”domestic
origin” of a producer, except for the UK17. The largest share in Belgium belongs
to VW, in France - to Peugeot, in Germany - to VW, in Italy - to Fiat, in the
UK - to Ford. The largest shares in the total European car market (Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy and the UK) belong to VW (20.1%), Peugeot (13.1%)
and GM (12.2%).
Now I move to the discussion of the multimarket contact presence of the
automotive producers and the determination of the ”spheres of influence” at
the market segment level for the European car market.
Table B5 (Appendix B) gives the largest car manufacturers in each market
segment and for the whole European car market in 1999 as compared to 1970
(”market share dominance”). In general, the structure of the European car mar-
ket in 1999 is as follows: subcompact (37.8%), compact (30.2%), intermediate
(19.7%), standard (6.7%) and luxury (5.6%). As for the simple overlap of mar-
kets, a fewer number of firms are present in almost all markets, which are defined
here to be the market segments, as compared to the overlap of geographical mar-
kets. There are some firms like Mercedes and BMW that are present in one or
two market segments, here standard and/or luxury market segments, or e.g., Kia
is present only in the smaller car market segments. Subcompact market segment
is a ”sphere of influence” for Daihatsu, Fiat, Hyundai, Renault, Daewoo and
Smart. Compact market segment is a ”sphere of influence” for Ford, Mitsubishi,
GM and VW. Intermediate market segment is a ”sphere of influence” for Kia,
Mazda, Nissan, Peugeot, Suzuki, Toyota and VW. Standard market segment
17As for the non-European firms, the so-called ”spheres of influence” in 1999 are Belgium
for Suzuki, FujiHI, Mitsubishi and Toyota, the UK for Honda, and Nissan, and Germany for
Daihatsu, Kia, and Mazda. The shares of these firms in these countries are, however, very
small.
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is a ”sphere of influence” for BMW and Honda. Luxury market segment is a
”sphere of influence” for Mercedes. Except for Fiat, Renault, Peugeot, VW,
GM, Ford, BMW, Mercedes, the other firms have small shares. The collusive
arrangements of the influential players with small automotive players are highly
unlikely. The most important markets (”market dependence”) are subcompact
for Daihatsu, Fiat, Hyundai, Nissan, Peugeot, Renault, Suzuki, Toyota, Dae-
woo, and Smart, compact for Ford, Honda, Mazda, GM, and VW, intermediate
for Kia and Mitsubishi, standard for BMW, and luxury for Mercedes. This can
be inferred from Table B6 (Appendix B).
The combination of geographic and product market presence leads to geographic-
product market linkages, which is actually the level of my analysis. The below
discussion is important to define the ”spheres of influence” and ”influential
rivals” at the geographic-product market level, among whom later the assump-
tion of collusive behaviour could be tested. Geographic-product market linkages
are described in Table B7 (Appendix B). The firms that are present in all 25
geographic-product markets in the European car market in 1999 (5 countries
and 5 market segments) are Fiat, Ford, GM, and VW. Peugeot and Renault are
present in almost all market segments18 . BMW has also increased its presence
across markets as compared to 1970. For Fiat, Ford and Renault the three most
important ”spheres of influence” (based on ”market share dominance”) are the
respective domestic markets, while for GM and VW the ”spheres of influence”
may lie outside of the domestic country market. For Fiat these are subcompact,
standard and luxury market segments in Italy. For Ford these are subcompact,
compact and intermediate market segments in the UK. For Renault these are
subcompact, compact, and standard market segments in France. GM has the
largest market shares in the subcompact market segment in Germany, and in
the intermediate and standard market segments in the UK. As for VW, it has
the largest market shares in the compact and intermediate market segments in
Germany and in the intermediate market segment in Italy.
Table B8 (Appendix B) presents the picture of the most important geographic-
product markets for firms (”market dependence”). As for the largest car volume
producers, the most important market for Fiat is Italy’s subcompact market
segment, for Ford - the compact market in Germany, subcompact and compact
markets in the UK, for GM - the compact market in Germany, for Peugeot -
the subcompact market in France and intermediate market segment in France,
for Renault - the subcompact market in France, for VW - the compact market
segment in Germany. These firms might behave rather collusively if they would
like that their competitors respect their ”spheres of influence” in return for that
they themselves respect the ”spheres of influence” of their competitors.
The biggest geographic-product markets in Europe are subcompact market
segment in France (the most important for Peugeot and Renault), compact
market segment in Germany (the most important market for GM and VW)
and subcompact market segment in Italy (the most important for Fiat). For
18As for non-European firms, Toyota and Nissan are the firms that are most frequently
present in the geographic-product units of the European car market.
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Ford the subcompact market segment in the UK is the most important. These
firms could be interested in respecting each other’s ”spheres of influence”, as
the stakes in the markets are rather high.
3.2.3 Multimarket contact and concentration measures for the Eu-
ropean car market
To measure the impact of multimarket contact on the firm behaviour in the
European car market, I consider the construction of several multimarket con-
tact measures. These measures can be constructed at the firm and market
level. Quite a large number of geographic-product markets in which the au-
tomobile firms are present in the European car market allows me to construct
these measures, which have not been considered for the automobile markets
before (also a long period of time allows me to get variation in these measures
(cross-sectional and within-group variation)). I consider four measures of the
multimarket contact: number of geographic-product markets, in which a firm
is present, number of multiple contacts of a particular firm with other firms,
simple and market-share weighted multimarket contact measures19.
Two simple count measures of the multimarket contact presence have been
constructed at the firm level: the number of geographic-product markets in
which a firm is present and the number of multiple contacts (see Table C1,
Appendix C).
The number of geographic-product markets in which a firm is present is
a simple count measure. Its interpretation can be twofold: multiple market
presence (the larger the number of markets in which a firm is present, the
greater is the probability that the firm will meet the same competitors in those
markets, the more cooperatively the firm should then behave) and economies of
scope (large producers are more likely to be present in several markets).
The number of multiple contacts is constructed as the sum of pairwise con-
tacts in a year: e.g., for Ford: the number of contacts between Ford and GM in
all geographic-product markets where they are both present, plus the number of
contacts between Ford and Mercedes, etc., i.e., the number of pairwise contacts
in all contact markets for the particular firm with its competitors. The larger
the number of these multiple contacts, the more cooperatively the firm should
behave with its multiple competitors and the more collusively it will tend to set
its prices (for the mutual forbearance hypothesis to hold).
As compared to 1970, in 1999 the automotive firms are characterized by
even greater multiple market presence and higher number of multiple contacts
(in particular, due to the expansion of their product line, movement to new
geographic and product markets, the entry of Asian competitors into the Euro-
pean car market). The average number of geographic-product markets in which
19These measures have been previously used in the literature, which may allow me to
compare the results of this paper with the results of the other studies as well as derive some
implications in terms of the use of such measures for the automobile industry. In Leheyda
(2007a) these measures have not been constructed as there would have been little variation
in these measures to identify their impact on prices due to a short period of time as well as a
small number of markets has been observed.
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a firm is present increased from 14.02 in 1970 to 19.37 in 1999. The average
number of multiple contacts for a firm went up from 93.49 in 1970 to 228.43 in
1999. The number of multiple contacts is also constantly being influenced by
changes in the corporate ownership, which contributes to the variation in the
multimarket contact measures.
Simple and market-share weighted multimarket contact measures at geographic-
product market level have been constructed (see Appendix A for details on the
methodology of these measures construction, see Table C2, Appendix C for the
descriptive statistics of these measures).
The intuition behind the simple multimarket contact measure construction is
as follows: to proxy the degree of multimarket contact in a particular geographic-
product market k = 1, ...,K, I take every automotive manufacturer n = 1, ...,N
in a market k (which is defined to be a focal market, or market under con-
sideration) and aggregate all the contacts this firm has in K markets (which
are defined to be contact markets) with its Nk competitors (i.e., the number
of competitors in the market under consideration). The number of contacts is
aggregated for all firms that are present in the market under consideration and
then divided by the number of firm pairs in the focal market. Thus, the firm’s
average multimarket contact with its rivals in the given market is calculated.
As compared to the above considered number of multiple contacts with other
firms calculated at the firm level, this measure is calculated as a market average
for a pair of firms.
In addition, the contact markets may have different importance for the firm,
thus, the contacts need to be weighted taking into account different character-
istics of the contact markets. I weight each contact by the market shares of
the firms. This reflects that the higher the market shares (and, thus, the firms’
stakes in those markets) are, the more likely the firms will try to compete less
aggressively (to avoid punishments, which are likely to be more severely felt by
the firm, when it has a large market share in that market), and the higher the
profits the firms may expect to get. Then all the contacts are aggregated and
divided by the number of firm pairs in the market under the consideration to get
the average share-weighted multimarket contact measure at the market level.
As compared to the simple multimarket contact measure, the share-weighted
measure may show more variation (as there is large variation in the market
shares over time).
The higher the simple and market-share weighted multimarket contact mea-
sures for a market, the more cooperatively the firms should behave (for the
mutual forbearance to hold) and the higher prices should be observed.
The average simple multimarket contact measure increased from 8.07 in 1970
to 14.41 in 1999, while the average market-share weighted multimarket contact
measure somewhat decreased from 1258.53 in 1970 to 1021.11 in 1999. The
highest simple count multimarket contact measure is found for the intermediate
market segment, while the lowest value is found in the luxury market segment.
In case of the share-weighted multimarket contact measure, the highest value is
found for the luxury car market segment, which is related to the high market
shares of luxury car producers and a small number of such producers in this
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market segment (BMW, Mercedes, and Fiat in Italy).
Concentration measures (C1, C4, and C8) have been constructed at the
country (see Graph B1) and geographic-product market level. Some descriptive
statistics for these concentration measures at the geographic-product market
level can be found in Table C3 (Appendix C). The average concentration ratios
have decreased: C1 ratio from 47.38 in 1970 to 34.40 in 1999, C4 ratio from
89.68 to 77.15, C8 ratio from 99.53 to 94.45. On the basis of the C1 ratio,
the most concentrated markets are the luxury car market segment of Belgium,
France and Germany and the subcompact market segment of Italy. Except for
the luxury car market segments, the most concentrated markets on the basis
of C4 ratios are intermediate, standard and subcompact market segments in
France, standard market segment in Germany, and standard and subcompact
market segments in Italy. Higher concentration is generaly expected to result
in higher prices.
3.2.4 Some picture of interfirm linkages
The discussion in this Section is important as I aim to test for the mutual for-
bearance hypothesis among the multimarket firms, and it should be decided
whether these effects should be evaluated at brand (e.g., Mercedes), or manu-
facturer group (e.g., DaimlerChrysler) level.
As it has been already mentioned, the automobile industry is characterized
by a lot of interfirm linkages. By interfirm linkages I mean both contractual
and equity arrangements of firms. By contractual arrangements first of all non-
traditional contracts are implied (e.g., joint R&D, joint product development,
long-term sourcing agreements, joint manufacturing, joint marketing, shared
distribution service). Equity agreements may generally take up different forms,
in particular with or without new equity creation. The picture of international
linkages between automotive manufacturers (in particular, contractual arrange-
ments) can be found in Automobile Production (Automobil Produktion) (2005)
that has been originally prepared by WardsAuto.
The automobile industry has gone through a period of tremendous consol-
idation. This consolidation has influenced the degree of external multimarket
contact and decreased the number of the independent automotive manufactur-
ers. At present there are about 13 global independent automotive manufacturer
groups. Table B9 (Appendix B) gives the picture of the presence of global man-
ufacturer groups that own several car brands. These brands within a group may
directly compete with each other especially if they are very similar and belong
to the same market segment. For example, Opel and Saab are both present in
the standard market segment. Or Rover and Volvo compete in the standard
market segment, Ford and Rover both have car models in the compact market
segment.
Table B10 (Appendix B) gives the picture of the cross-ownership in the
automobile industry20. Cross-ownership arrangements between manufacturers
20Partial ownership arrangements as it has been mentioned have been in particular discussed
by Davis and Alley (2004) and Alley (1997). It has been found that even small partial
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and suppliers (i.e., vertical interfirm linkages) are not considered in this paper.
As for the overlap of the market shares, for example, Ford and Mazda are present
together in the three market segments: subcompact, compact and intermediate,
Mazda has, however, much lower market segment shares than Ford. As for GM
(Subaru, Suzuki, Isuzu) and Fiat constellation, Suzuki has very small market
shares, Opel’s shares are higher than Fiat’s in the UK, Germany and Belgium,
while Fiat’s shares are higher in Italy and somewhat more comparable in France.
The multimarket contact effects in this paper are discussed at the level of
automotive manufacturers, which may own several brands. The possible cross-
ownerships are not taken into account. It could be worthwile to find out about
the interbrand competition within an automotive manufacturer group (e.g., VW
Group). It is interesting to analyze whether groups (no brands) develop prod-
ucts to compete with rival firms, or they suffer more from ”cannibalization”.
The analysis could be more of relevance for only volume brands, or only pre-
mium brands. This could be a subject of future research.
4 Structural oligopoly model for the European
car market
In this section of the paper an empirical oligopoly model for the European
car market is presented. This is a model with multiproduct firms that sell
differentiated products in geographically segmented markets.
4.1 Demand side
The demand equation is derived from a two-level nested logit where the price
coefficient is interacted with income, and, thus, enters the demand equation in
a non-linear way21.
The general utility function can be written down in the following way:
Uij = Vij + εij (1)
Vij is the deterministic part of the utility function and can be expressed
by Vij = δj + α ln(yi − pj). The error term εij follows the assumptions of a
two-level nested logit distribution. The common part to all consumers in the
utility function is δj = xjβ + ξj . The individual-specific part is −αipj + εij ,
where αi = 1/yi. αi is the consumers’ distaste for price increases. It is assumed
that the distribution of αi varies with income. Price sensitivity is modelled as
ownership arrangements may lead to collusive behaviour.
21 In the exposition below, I follow Berry (1994), Verboven (1996) and Brenkers and Ver-
boven (2006a), after McFadden (1978) and Ben-Akiva and Lehrman (1985). The demand-side
derivation on the basis of restricted two-level nested logit (i.e., without consumer heterogene-
ity) can be also found in Leheyda (2007b). The interaction of consumers’ individual charac-
teristics with products’ characteristics is generally expected to allow getting more reasonable
substitution patterns.
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inversely proportional to income. Income effects are one of the most important
sources of consumer heterogeneity in the automobile markets.
It is assumed that there are G+1 exhaustive and mutually exclusive groups,
g = 0, ..., G, where 0 is an outside good. In each group there are further sub-
groups Hg, h = 1, ...,Hg. Utility uij of household i for product j in subgroup h
of group g is given by:
uij = xjβ−αipj+ ξj+ εig+(1− σg) εihg+(1− σhg) εij , j ∈ hg ⊂ g,∀i,∀j (2)
where /ij = εig + (1− σg) εihg + (1− σhg) εij and αi = 1yi . Variation in
consumer tastes enters through αi and εij .
The error term /ij is decomposed into an iid shock, a group-specific compo-
nent and a sub-group specific component. εig, εih, εij are standard for the nested
logit distributions, εig, εig + (1− σg) εihg and εig +(1− σg) εihg + (1− σhg) εij
are assumed to have an extreme value distribution. It is assumed that εij are
uncorrelated across customers; for a particular customer, ε’s, which belong to
the same group, will be more correlated with each other than with the ε’s that
belong to any other group (εig22); and for a particular customer, ε’s, which
belong to the same subgroup, will be more correlated with each other than with
the ε’s that belong to any other subgroup (εihg). That is, the products of the
same sub-group or group share common features, and consumers’ preferences
for these features may be correlated. Nesting parameters σhg and σg can be in-
terpreted as random coefficients on discrete dummies for subgroups and groups
rather than on variables that are continuously measured (e.g., performance or
size). It should be noted that correlation parameters σhg and σg here are al-
lowed to be different across groups and subgroups. In such a way additional
consumer heterogeneity is introduced into the model.
σhg measures the degree of substitutability of products in a subgroup, and
σg is the degree of substitutability of products in a group. The following
0 ≤ σg < σhg < 1 should hold to be consistent with random utility maximiza-
tion. That is, consumer preferences will be more correlated across all products
of the same subgroup than across products of the same group but a different
subgroup. Consequently, more plausible substitution patterns can be obtained,
and localized competition among the products from the same group or subgroup
can be allowed.
The above mentioned assumptions upon the aggregation of choices across
all consumers result in the well-known formulas of the nested logit model for
the conditional choice probabilities. The mean utility for the outside good is
normalized to zero, δ0 = 0.
The choice probability of a consumer i for a car j in a subgroup h, group g
can be written down as:
sij(p) =
e(δj−αipj)/(1−σhg)
eIihg/(1−σhg)
eIihg/(1−σg)
eIig/(1−σg)
eIihg
eIi
(3)
22For consumer i, the variable ε is common to all products in a group g and has a distribution
function that depends on σg . Similar interpretation is for a subgroup.
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where Iihg , Iig and Ii are called "inclusive values" for consumer i, which
are defined in the following way:
Iihg = (1−σhg) ln
JhgX
j=1
e(δl−αipj)/(1−σhg), Iig = (1−σg) ln
HgX
h=1
eIihg/(1−σg), Ii = ln
GX
g=1
eIig
(4)
The individual probabilities over the number of individuals are averaged into
the predicted aggregate market share for product j below:
sj(p) =
NX
i=1
sij(p)/N (5)
where N is the number of individuals drawn from an empirical income dis-
tribution.
4.2 Cost side and multimarket contact equilibrium inter-
actions
The firm f maximizes its profits over all markets in period t πft:
πft =
MX
m=1
X
j∈Ffmt
(efmtpwjmt−efstcjmt)Lmtsjmt(pmt)+
MX
m=1
X
ϕjmt
j /∈Ffmt
(efmtpwjmt−efstcjmt)Lmtsjmt(pmt)
(6)
where M is the number of markets, Ffmt is the set of products of firm f in
market m in period t, pwjmt are wholesale prices for product j in market m in
period t, pmt are list prices (includes prices of products that are in market m in
period t), cjmt is the constant marginal cost of producing product j in market
m in period t, efmt is an exchange rate between the registration country of firm
f and the destination market, efst is an exchange rate between the registration
country of firm f and the production location of model j, Lmt is market size in
market m in period t, and sjmt is the share of product j in market m in period
t.
ϕjmt is the weight on competitors’ products for product j in market m in
period t: a positive value means cooperative behaviour relative to Bertrand,
while a negative value can be interpreted as aggressively competitive behaviour
relative to the Bertrand behaviour. The value of zero implies just multi-product
Bertrand pricing assumption. The value of one is the case of perfect collusion.
But generally these parameters are allowed to take on any values in a broad
range. If the product is sold in all five geographic markets, there will be five
values of the market conduct parameter for this product.
Demand linkages across geographical markets are assumed away: the sales
of each car model in marketm depend on the prices only in that market and not
on the prices for that model in the other markets (prohibitive arbitrage costs to
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the consumers are assumed, this also follows from considerable artificial trade
barriers).
The relationship between consumer (list) pjmt and wholesale pwjmt prices is
modelled as exogenous and takes up the following functional form:
pwjmt =
pjmt
[(1 + tjmt)(1 + τ jmt)]
(7)
where tjmt is a value added tax in market m, period t for product j, and
τ jmt is a dealer markup in market m, period t for product j23.
The first-order conditions can be written down in the following way24:
X
k∈Ffmt
(efmtpwkmt−efstckmt)
∂skmt
∂pwjmt
+
X
ϕjmt
j /∈Ffmt
(efmtpwkmt−efstckmt)
∂skmt
∂pwjmt
+efmtsjmt = 0
(8)
The Jmt pricing equations can be further expressed in matrix form for all
models that are sold in period t in market m as:
pmt = cmt + [∆. ∗ (Ξown +Θcomp)]−1smt (9)
where Ξown,Θcomp are ownership matrices: Ξowni,j = 1, if i and j are produced
by the same firm, and zero otherwise, and Θcompij = ϕj if the products i and j
are produced by different firms. This value will be an average value for product
j with respect to the products of its competitors in market m in period t. The
vector ϕ for J products is obtained25. Ξown, Θcomp are the matrices of the
same dimension Jmt (i.e., the number of products in market m in period t). ∆
is a matrix of own- and cross-price elasticities, also of dimension Jmt. Thus,
I have got an element-by-element multiplication of two matrices of the same
dimension.
The marginal cost for product j in market m in period t takes up the fol-
lowing form:
cjmt = exp(ωjmtφ+ ws + wf + wm + wt + wjmt) (10)
where ωjmt are the product characteristics other than price, φ is the vector
of parameters to be estimated, ws, wf , wm, wt are the fixed effects for production
locations, firms, markets and time, respectively, and wjmt is an iid error term.
23Some information on the dealer discounts in the European car market can be found in
Verboven (1996). In particular, in 1990 the maximum dealer markups were 11% in Belgium,
8% in France, 10% in Germany, 10% in Italy, and 15% in the UK.
24Here I follow Goldberg and Verboven (2001) in the derivation of the first-order conditions
and, subsequently, price expressions. The authors derive the first-order conditions accounting
for absolute and relative import quotas. I do not take into account import quotas in my
estimations, following Brenkers and Verboven (2006a) but allow to have conjectural variations
parameters in the pricing equation.
25For homogenous products in case of market power the following equation is written down:
MR = P + λ
?
1
α
?
Q, where α is the price sensitivity parameter, and λ is the market conduct
parameter.
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In addition, to examine the roots for why a firm takes into account the
behaviour of other firms while setting prices in a particular market, I allow ϕ to
depend upon firm, geographic and product market characteristics zjmt that may
help explain the deviation in prices across the same products across different
markets, including concentration and multimarket contact:
ϕjmt = λzjmt + ηs + ηf + ηm + ηt + ηjmt (11)
where λ is the vector of parameters to be estimated, ηjmt is an iid disturbance
term, and ηs, ηf , ηm, ηt are the fixed effects for production locations, firms,
markets, and time, respectively. The fixed effects are important to include into
the model to control for systematic differences in the market conduct parameter.
Higher positive values of the conjectures imply more cooperative firm behav-
iour relative to multi-product Bertrand pricing behaviour. Larger negative val-
ues of the conjectures imply more competitive firm behaviour relative to multi-
product Bertrand pricing behaviour. In the market conduct equation (11), one
would expect a positive relationship between concentration and market conduct
and a positive relationship between multimarket contact and market conduct
(for the mutual forbearance hypothesis to hold). In addition to the multimarket
contact and concentration variables, I include the interaction term between the
two and attempt to measure the so-called strategic effects of the multimarket
contact, e.g., the distribution of the market power from the more collusive to
the more competitive markets. In this case this term should be negative. Con-
centration and the number of competitors in a geographic-product market are
used to distinguish between more and less competitive/collusive markets in the
European car market.
4.3 Testing multimarket contact firms coalitions
In addition to testing the direct impact of the multimarket contact measure
on the market conduct parameter as above (where the so-called ”conjectural
variation” approach is applied), the collusive assumptions could be tested for
multimarket contact coalitions in the supply-side specification (that is, the so-
called ”menu” approach is rather applied here). The best supply-side model
specification can be then selected with the help of a statistical test (e.g., MacK-
innon, White and Davidson (1983), Rivers and Vuong (2002)).
The idea behind this approach is that the multimarket contact firms will
jointly maximize their profits. The first-order conditions for a multimarket
contact firm that internalizes the cross-price effects with its competitors can be
written down as follows (as compared to equation (8) above):
X
k∈FMMCmt,f∈FMMCmt
(efmtpwkmt − efstckmt)
∂skmt
∂pwjmt
+ efmtsjmt = 0 (12)
where MMCmt is the coalition of firms in market m in period t, FMMCmt
are all products of multimarket contact firms, including firm f , in market m in
period t.
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The Jmt pricing equations can be further expressed as (as compared to equa-
tion (9) above):
pmt = cmt + [∆. ∗ (ΞMMC)]−1smt (13)
where ΞMMCi,j = 1 if i and j are produced by multimarket contact firms that
behave collusively and 0 otherwise (the same is true for the own products of the
firm). That is, as compared to the approach that I have just discussed in the
section above, where I estimate conjectural variation parameters, I test for the
assumption that the conjectural variation parameters are equal to 1, i.e., I test
for the case of perfect collusion among multimarket contact firms in market m
in period t.
5 Data description and estimation procedure
5.1 Data description
The dataset on the European car market is maintained by Penny Goldberg and
Frank Verboven26. The dataset includes the information on list prices, sales, and
technical characteristics of cars during 1970-1999 for five European countries:
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the UK. The data are rather aggregate,
at the level of a model (e.g., VW Polo). The average number of models per
year is about 100 models. The technical characteristics include horsepower,
displacement, weight, length, width, height, fuel consumption, acceleration time
and maximum speed. In addition, there is some data on such macroeconomic
variables as GDP, exchange rates, population, price indexes, and tax rates.
Furthermore, there is information on the production location of each model,
brand ownership, and market segment. The detailed description of the data
sources can be found in particular in Goldberg and Verboven (2001). Some
descriptive statistics for the car dataset (in general and across countries) can be
found in Table D1 (Appendix D).
5.2 Estimations steps
5.2.1 Demand side
Demand, pricing and market conduct equations are estimated separately27. On
the demand side, the two-way error components model is estimated to account
for the panel nature of the data similar to Brenkers and Verboven (2006a).
26The dataset is available at the website of Prof. Frank Verboven.
27 I pursue this approach notwithstanding the possible loss in the efficiency, first of all
because of computational tractability. Step-by-step estimation has been pursued in a number
of papers. In particular, separate estimation approach for demand, pricing and excess margins
equation has been pursued by Slade (2004), only the standard errors in the second step have
to be adjusted. The estimation steps for the demand side are described in Nevo (2000). The
Matlab algorithm for random coefficients demand model is available from Ariel Nevo’s website.
I am also very grateful to Prof. Frank Verboven for the opportunity to get acquainted with
his Gauss code on the demand equation estimation.
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The structure of the error term is as follows: ξjmt = ξj + ξmt + ujmt, where
ξj does not vary across time (e.g., style), ξmt can account for macroeconomic
fluctuations in market m in period t (captured by market/time fixed effects
dummies), ujmt captures the remaining unobserved characteristics. The fixed
effects model is estimated. A within-transformation of the data is used to control
for the product-fixed effects.
The instruments that I have used in the demand estimation for prices and
market shares are standard in the literature (for a more detailed discussion of
the instruments see Leheyda (2007a)). Formally, E [ujmt|z] = 0. The instru-
ments have been constructed at group and sub-group levels: these are the own
characteristics of the firm and the sum of characteristics of own and competing
products in the market segments and in the subgroups of domestic and foreign
producers as well as the number of own and competing products in the market
segments and the subgroups of domestic and foreign cars.
The market share for product j can be written down as:
sj =
Z
y
e(δj−αipj)/(1−σhg)
eIihg/(1−σhg)
eIihg/(1−σg)
eIig/(1−σg)
eIihg
eIi
d
ˆ
P
∗
(y) (14)
where d
ˆ
P
∗
(y) is the distribution of income. It is approximated by the em-
pirical income distribution in each country. The market shares of different types
of consumers are added based on how common that type is.
The above integral has no closed form, therefore, its computation requires
aggregation via simulation. This procedure has been suggested by Pakes (1986).
The market share is computed for an average consumer in each income class (10
deciles are distinguished), and then the average market share is calculated:
sj =
1
NS
NSX
ns=1
e(δj−αipj)/(1−σhg)
eIihg/(1−σhg)
eIihg/(1−σg)
eIig/(1−σg)
eIihg
eIi
(15)
The following contraction mapping is used to recover the mean utility level
δjt by minimizing the distance between the observed and predicted sales:
δt+1 = δt + (1−max(σ1, ..., σG))(ln(s)− ln(s
¡
δt
¢
)) (16)
The demand side unobservables are afterwards computed conditional on the
linear parameters
a
β:
ξjt = δjt(
a
α,
a
σ)− xj
a
β (17)
These unobservables are then interacted with a set of instruments to get a
GMM estimator.
One searches for the parameter vector that minimizes the objective function
min
a
ξ
0
ZΦ−1Z0
a
ξ (18)
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where Φ is a weighting matrix. Φ−1 = Z0Z is used as a starting point.
This search is a non-linear search. The linear parameters
a
β can be expressed
as a function of the non-linear parameters
a
α and
a
σ
a
β = (X 0ZΦ−1Z0X)−1X 0ZΦ−1Z0δ(
a
α,
a
σ) (19)
where
a
σ includes group and subgroup correlation parameters. The non-linear
search can be, thus, limited to the non-linear parameters α and σ.
The quasi-Newton gradient-based algorithm is used as a search method28.
The asymptotic variance-covariance matrix takes up the following form:
AvCov = inv((Z0XG)0w(Z0XG)) (20)
where G is the gradient of the objective function with respect to price and
group and subgroup correlation parameters, and w is some weighting matrix.
5.2.2 Substitution patterns
The two-level nested logit has the assumption that consumers tastes have an
extreme value distribution but allows consumer tastes to be correlated (in a
restrictive way) across product j (correlations between groups and subgroups
are modelled in a simple way). This allows for more reasonable substitution
patterns as compared to a simple logit. Consumer heterogeneity that enters
through the price-income coefficient also allows getting more reasonable elastic-
ities and markups as compared to the usual (restricted) two-level nested logit.
The calculation of the own- and cross-price elasticities because of additional
consumer heterogeneity becomes, however, more burdensome.
The own price elasticity Esj/pj of the market share sj of product j (taking
into account heterogenous price-income coefficient) is:
Esj/pj =
∂sj
∂pj
pj
sj
=
pj
sj
Z
y
−αisij
∙
1
1− σhg
−
µ
1
1− σhg
− 1
1− σg
¶
sij/hg −
σg
1− σg
sij/g − sij
¸
d
ˆ
P
∗
(y)
(21)
where sij , sij/g, sij/hg are estimated market shares and are defined as above,
and where αi = 1yi .
The cross-price elasticity Esj/pm of the market share of product j with re-
spect to the price of product m pm, when j and m belong to the same subgroup,
is given by:
28This method requires the calculation of a Hessian as well as gradients and Jacobians.
The secant method (Broyden, Fletcher, Goldfarb, and Shanno) is used to update the Hessian
instead of computing it at every iteration. The quasi-Newton methods are similar to Newton
methods. They are both based upon the calculation of first and second derivatives. The
only difference is that under the quasi-Newton methods the Hessian is not calculated but
approximated (Gauss tutorial).
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Esj/pm =
∂sj
∂pm
pm
sj
=
pm
sj
Z
y
αisij
∙µ
1
1− σhg
− 1
1− σg
¶
sij/hg +
σg
1− σg
sim/g + sim
¸
d
ˆ
P
∗
(y)
(22)
The cross-price elasticity Esj/pk of the market share of product j with respect
to the price of product k pk, when k belongs to a different subgroup in the same
group, is given by:
Esj/pk =
∂sj
∂pk
pk
sj
=
pk
sj
Z
y
αisij
∙
σg
1− σg
sik/g + sik
¸
d
ˆ
P
∗
(y) (23)
The cross-price elasticity Esj/pl of the market share of product j with respect
to the price of product l pl, when l belongs to a different group, is given by:
Esj/pl =
∂sj
∂pl
pl
sj
=
pl
sj
Z
y
αisilsijd
ˆ
P
∗
(y) (24)
Each individual has a different price sensitivity, which is averaged to a mean
price sensitivity using the individual probabilities of purchase as weights. The
intergrals have to be calculated by simulation using the knowledge of the distri-
bution of different types of consumers.
5.2.3 Estimation of conduct parameters
Conduct parameters for a product could be more precisely calculated once the
marginal costs were known. Then having the information on the market shares
and elasticities, the conduct parameters could be estimated from the first-order
conditions. The pricing equation (9) is difficult to estimate at individual level
for heterogenous products in practice. Nevo (1998) show the problem of iden-
tification of the conjectural variations parameters in the simplest case of two
single-product firms. That is why, to calculate the market conduct, or conjec-
tural variations parameters (which are difficult to identify otherwise at individ-
ual level for heterogenous products), I follow Brenkers and Verboven (2006a)
approach and construct them after having estimated the demand side assuming
that the marginal costs of producing a product j in a given country (subgroup
hg group g) are the same as those in a reference country, which is taken to be
Belgium (subgroup hg group g):
(p−Ω−1s)Be lg ium = (p−Ω−1s)Germany (25)
Ω may be written down as 4ϕ, which is an element-by-element multiplica-
tion of two matrices of two dimensions.
Replacing zeros for competing products in subgroup hg group g of product
j I define matrix (4ϕ)f as:
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(4ϕ)f =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
ψ
∂s(Jf1 )
∂p(Jf1 )
... ψ
∂s
?
Jfk(f)
?
∂p(Jf1 )
... ... ...
ψ
∂s(Jf1 )
∂p
?
Jfk(f)
? ... ψ
∂s
?
Jfk(f)
?
∂p
?
Jfk(f)
?
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(26)
where ψij = 1 if the products i and j are produced by the same firm, and
ψij = ϕj if the products are produced by different firms in subgroup hg group
g in market m in period t, and Jk(f) is the number of products in subgroup hg
of group g.
The implied ϕ for Belgium will be, thus, set to zero by default. Marginal
costs could be different across countries, or market conduct could be different
across countries. Because of these considerations it is important to perform
sensitivity analysis with estimating only the hedonic pricing equation with mul-
timarket contact and concentration measures in addition to the market conduct
equation with multimarket contact and concentration measures.
5.2.4 Supply side
For the pricing/market conduct equations estimations, the data are pooled for
all countries, and the equation is estimated using OLS, including fixed effects,
and with robust standard errors to account for possible autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity (Huber-White sandwich estimator of the variance). In case
of market conduct equations, the standard errors have to be adjusted as the
dependent variable is estimated from the above step. Consumer list prices are
recalculated into wholesale prices taking into account the information on VAT
across countries as well as information on dealer markups29. In case of pricing
equations the product characteristics enter the supply equation in the logarith-
mic form.
6 Estimation results
6.1 Demand side
The results from the demand-side estimations can be found in Table 1. The price
is expressed in destination currency, including VAT and dealer markup. Horse-
power, width and height have got positive and statistically significant signs.
Thus, consumers have preferences for large and powerful cars. Fuel efficiency
has got an expected negative and statistically significant sign, i.e., consumers
will buy rather fuel-efficient vehicles. Dummy for a foreign car producer is
negative and statistically significant. Therefore, consumers may have higher
preferences towards domestic car brands.
29Goldberg and Verboven (2001) have experimented with consumer list prices and trans-
action prices taking into account the dealer discounts, but that had little influence on the
estimation results.
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Table 1. European car market: demand estimation results (two-level nested
logit)
Nests: market segment, producer origin
Dependent variable: ln(sj)-ln(s0) Estimation method: GMM
Sample period: 1970-1999 No. observations: 11549
Coefficient t-statistics
horsepower 0.01 3.82
fuel efficiency -0.03 -3.13
width 0.03 6.90
height 0.01 2.95
foreign car -0.72 -13.10
price-income 3.00 5.97
Sub-group correlation parameter (σhg)
subcompact 0.88 24.08
compact 0.74 18.73
intermediate 0.64 15.40
standard 0.82 18.75
luxury 0.30 3.37
Group correlation parameter (σg)
subcompact 0.34 6.95
compact 0.67 13.17
intermediate 0.51 10.69
standard 0.74 14.35
luxury 0.04 0.36
Source: own estimations
Note: market/time fixed effects are included but are not reported.
The signs of the group and subgroup correlation parameters are in general
consistent with a priori expectations. They are higher in the smaller car market
segments, where the car customers are expected to be more homogenous (their
preferences will be more correlated). The only exception is the standard market
segment group correlation coefficient, which is difficult to interpret.
The group correlation parameters are lower than the subgroup correlation
parameters, and both groups of parameters are between 0 and 1, which is con-
sistent with random consumer utility maximization. The only problem is a low
and statistically insignificant sign of the luxury segment group coefficient. The
statistical significance and expected signs of the group and subgroup correlation
parameters support the importance of the two principles of differentiation in the
car market, namely market segment and producer origin.
The price-income coefficient, which captures the country-dependent effects
of car prices on demand and allows for a more flexible demand model, is statis-
tically significant and has got an expected negative sign.
The average own-price elasticities of demand and the estimates of price-cost
margins under single-product and multi-product (firm) Bertrand-Nash pricing
assumptions can be found in Table 2. Their pattern is in general consistent
with a priori expectations, with the exception of probably the standard market
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segment, but this result may have been already anticipated from the group
and subgroup correlation parameters estimates for this market segment. I find
the lowest price elasticities in the luxury car market segment and the highest in
the subcompact market segment. The difference between the price-cost margins
under single-product and multi-product pricing assumptions is rather small since
due to model aggregation many firms have got just one brand in a market
segment and the cross-price elasticities with respect to the own products in the
other market segments are usually found to be low.
Table 2. European car market: own-price elasticities and price-cost margins
(averages for market segments)
Own-price Price-cost margins
elasticity single multi
subcompact -4.73 0.07 0.10
compact -2.70 0.11 0.12
intermediate -1.83 0.13 0.14
standard -2.64 0.05 0.05
luxury -1.19 0.14 0.14
Source: own estimations
Note: Under ’single’ single-product Bertrand-Nash assumption is meant. Under
’multi’ multi-product (firm) Bertrand-Nash assumption is meant.
I have found the lowest own-price elasticities for the cars in Germany, fol-
lowed by Belgium and France, and the highest elasticities in Italy and the UK.
This pattern of the elasticities can be linked to different per capita income levels:
the lower own-price elasticity of demand is expected with the higher per capita
income (high-income consumers are less price-responsible). The lowest nominal
GDP per capita in common currency is observed in Italy and the UK, while Ger-
many has got the highest per capita incomes. Goldberg and Verboven (2001)
find the lowest own-price elasticities for Italy, followed by Germany, France, Bel-
gium, and the highest own-price elasticities in the UK. Their demand model is,
however, different from the demand model estimation in this paper. Irandoust
(1996) finds lower price elasticities in Japan, Germany and France than in the
UK, Italy, Sweden and the US. Bourdet (1988) also finds higher own-price elas-
ticities for the cars in Italy and the UK than in France. Elasticities may be also
driven by consumer brand loyalty (as compared to income-driven elasticities),
which one would have expected for example for Italy, where domestic brand
loyalty for Fiat is perceived to be high, but this pattern (namely low own-price
elasticities) has not been found in the obtained results.
6.2 Supply side and testing for mutual forbearance hy-
pothesis
In this section I present the empirical results of testing for the mutual for-
bearance hypothesis in the European car market. The below presented several
hypotheses have been formulated on the basis of the research objectives of this
study (I have done this for the better presentation of the results in this Section):
27
Hypothesis H1: General overlap of the markets leads to more cooperative
firm behaviour.
Hypothesis H2: For the mutual forbearance to hold, it may be not just
enough to be present in several markets. It could be important for firms to
have significant shares in those markets (impact of share-weighted multimarket
contact measure). The effect of the multimarket contact on the firm behaviour
is stronger in the more concentrated market.
Hypothesis H3: Concentration contributes to higher prices.
Hypothesis H4: I test directly for the impact of the ”spheres of influence” on
the firm behaviour considering the multimarket contact firms coalitions. The
respect of the ”spheres of influence” leads to more cooperative behaviour.
Hypothesis H5: The strategic effects of the multimarket contact could be
observed, i.e., the redistribution of the market power from the more collusive
to the more competitive markets. The result is that the effect of multimarket
contact on prices could be weaker in the more concentrated markets.
6.2.1 Market conduct equation estimations
The following market conduct equations are estimated: base, with both multi-
market contact and concentration (number of competitors) measures, and with
an interaction term between multimarket contact and concentration (number of
competitors) variables.
The number of markets in which a firm is present and the number of multiple
contacts for a firm with its competitors have got a statistically insignificant effect
on the market conduct parameter (see Table 3). The impact of the concentration
on the market conduct is, however, negative and statistically significant. The
lower concentration ratios are, the larger the number of firms that are present in
the market is, the more competitively the firms are expected to behave relative
to the Bertrand assumption. The constructed conjectures are found to be the
lowest for France, Germany and Italy, and do not differ much in magnitude.
France is the most concentrated market based on C1 concentration ratio, and
Italy is the most concentrated market on the basis of C4 and C7 concentration
ratios. Given this descriptive statistics, the found relationship between market
conduct and concentration may be not that surprising30.
Table 3. European car market: market conduct estimations (1)
Variable Sp1 Sp2 Sp3 Sp4 Sp5 Sp6
MMC1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
MMC2 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003
C1 -0.007*** -0.007***
C4 -0.02*** -0.02***
C8 -0.04*** -0.04***
R2 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
Source: own estimations
30Waldfogel and Wulf (2006) have found a negative effect of C-4 concentration ratio on
prices in the radio broadcasting industry.
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Note: Fixed effects (firm dummies, market segment dummies, market/time fixed
effects) are included but are not reported. ***, **, * mean statistical significance at
1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Explanations: MMC1 (number of
markets in which a firm is present), MMC2 (number of multiple contacts).
The simple count multimarket contact measure has got a statistically signif-
icant negative effect when C-1 concentration ratio is included (see Table 4) and
the share-weighted multimarket contact measure has got a statistically signif-
icant positive effect in all specifications. The values are, however, very low in
magnitudes. The higher the simple count measure in the contacts markets is,
the lower is the market conduct parameter in the home market. This result is
somewhat difficult to interpret as related to the mutual forbearance hypothe-
sis. It should be noted also that there has been evolving theoretical literature
that multimarket contact may actually raise the intensity of competition (e.g.,
Thomas and Willig, 2006). The higher the share-weighted measure due to high
market shares in the contact markets is, the higher is the market conduct para-
meter in the market under consideration, the more collusively the firms behave.
The concentration variables are statistically significant and negative as they
have been also found above.
Table 4. European car market: market conduct estimations (2)
Variable Sp7 Sp8 Sp9 Sp10 Sp11 Sp12
MMC3 -0.02*** 0.003 0.007
MMC4 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
C1 -0.007*** -0.008***
C4 -0.02*** -0.03***
C8 -0.04*** -0.05***
R2 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
Source: own estimations
Note: Fixed effects (firm dummies, market segment dummies, market/time fixed
effects) are included but are not reported. ***, **, * mean statistical significance at
1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Explanations: MMC3 (simple count
multimarket contact measure), MMC4 (share-weighted multimarket contact measure).
I have also estimated specifications for the supply side, where instead of the
concentration variables I include the number of competitors in the market (see
Table 5). The number of competitors is positive and statistically significant in
almost all specifications. The larger the number of competitors is in the market,
the larger reactions of them are expected to the actions of the other firms. The
sign and significance of the multimarket contact measures is similar as in case
of including concentration measures.
Table 5. European car market: market conduct estimations (3)
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Variable Sp13 Sp14 Sp15 Sp16 Sp17
MMC1 -0.001
MMC2 0.0003
MMC3 -0.02**
MMC4 0.0001***
No. Comp 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01 0.05***
R2 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
Source: own estimations
Note: Fixed effects (firm dummies, market segment dummies, market/time fixed
effects) are included but are not reported. ***, **, * mean statistical significance at 1%,
5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Explanations: MMC1 (number of markets
in which a firm is present), MMC2 (number of multiple contacts), MMC3 (simple count
multimarket contact measure), MMC4 (share-weighted multimarket contact measure).
’No.Comp’ stands for the number of competitors.
When the interaction term between multimarket contact and concentration
is added (see Table 6), the negative sign of the interaction term is obtained,
also statistically significant, which may speak in favour of the presence of the
multimarket contact strategic effects. High multimarket contact combined with
high market concentration leads to the lower market reactions of the firms.
Table 6. European car market: market conduct estimations (4)
Var Sp18 Sp19 Sp20 Sp21 Sp22 Sp23
MMC1 0.03*** 0.06*** 0.30***
MMC2 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.02***
C1 0.007*** 0.009***
C4 -0.01*** -0.008**
C8 0.01 0.001
MMCc1 -0.08*** -0.009***
MMCc4 -0.07*** -0.01***
MMCc8 -0.31*** -0.02***
R2 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
Source: own estimations
Note: Fixed effects (firm dummies, market segment dummies, market/time fixed
effects) are included but are not reported. ***, **, * mean statistical significance at
1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Explanations: MMC1 (number of
markets in which a firm is present), MMC2 (number of multiple contacts).
When the interaction term is added in the regressions with simple and share-
weighted multimarket contact measures, the sign of the interaction term is sen-
sitive towards specifications and can be either positive or negative (see Table
7). If it is negative, this may be interpreted as the presence of the strategic
effects due to the multimarket contact. If it is positive one could argue that the
effect of the multimarket contact on the firm behaviour is stronger in the more
concentrated market.
Table 7. European car market: market conduct estimations (5)
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Var Sp24 Sp25 Sp26 Sp27 Sp28 Sp29
MMC3 0.01 -0.10** -1.28***
MMC4 -0.0004*** -0.0004* 0.01***
C1 -0.0001 -0.02***
C4 -0.04*** -0.03***
C8 -0.20*** 0.03*
MMCc1 -0.06*** 0.0007***
MMCc4 0.11** 0.0005**
MMCc8 1.30*** -0.01***
R2 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
Source: own estimations
Note: Fixed effects (firm dummies, market segment dummies, market/time fixed
effects) are included but are not reported. ***, **, * mean statistical significance at
1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Explanations: MMC3 (simple count
multimarket contact measure), MMC4 (share-weighted multimarket contact measure).
I have also estimated the market conduct specification with the interaction
term between the number of competitors in a market and multimarket contact
measures in that market (see Table 8). The interaction term is only positive and
statistically significant in case of the multimarket contact measures at the firm
level. This may be interpreted as the evidence for the presence of the strategic
effects due to multimarket contact.
Table 8. European car market: market conduct estimations (6)
Var Sp30 Sp31 Sp32 Sp33
MMC1 -0.03***
MMC2 -0.002***
MMC3 -0.02
MMC4 0.0001***
No. Comp -0.02* -0.03** 0.01 0.05***
MMCnoComp 0.002*** 0.0003*** -0.0001 0.000
R2 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
Source: own estimations
Note: Fixed effects (firm dummies, market segment dummies, market/time fixed
effects) are included but are not reported. ***, **, * mean statistical significance at 1%,
5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Explanations: MMC1 (number of markets
in which a firm is present), MMC2 (number of multiple contacts), MMC3 (simple count
multimarket contact measure), MMC4 (share-weighted multimarket contact measure).
’No. Comp’ stands for the number of competitors.
To sum up, it is rather difficult to interpret the whole picture about the
multimarket contact effects in the European automobile markets on the basis of
the market conduct equation estimations. Multimarket contact has been found
positive and statistically significant only in case of share-weighted multimarket
contact measure. Negative impact of simple count measure has been found.
The impact of concentration on the market conduct parameters is negative and
statistically significant. The number of competitors is positively and statistically
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significantly related to the conjectural variation parameters. Some evidence
has been found about the existence of the strategic effects of the multimarket
contact: higher multimarket contact and concentration in the market contribute
to the larger deviations from non-cooperative pricing assumption, but alone both
result in lower market reactions (after the interaction term is added). A firm
with higher multiple multiple market presence will set lower prices in the more
concentrated markets.
The above discussion (corresponding to the research objectives and the re-
spective hypotheses) has been summarized in Table 9.
Table 9. European car market: summary of the evidence on mutual forbear-
ance hypothesis (market conduct equation)
Supported/Not supported/Inconclusive
H1 general overlap not supported:
negative impact of simple count measure,
insignificant firm-level measures
H2 conc. matters supported:
positive impact of share-weighted measure
H3 concentration not supported
H4 ”spheres of influence” supported (indirectly)
H5 strategic effects supported
Source: on the basis of own estimations
6.2.2 Pricing equation estimations
In addition to the estimation of the market conduct equation, I study the effect
of the multimarket contact and concentration directly on prices. This is done
within the hedonic pricing model. The general reduced form for the pricing
equation can be written down as pi = ci+kipi, where ki is a percentage markup.
The following hedonic regression can be estimated for the European car market,
where the price is expressed as a linear function of the cost and market power
parameters:
ln(pimt) = ximtγ + zimtβ + αs + αf + αm + αt + αimt (27)
where xi are the product characteristics other than price, zi are the parame-
ters that measure the extent the prices diverge away from marginal costs, e.g.,
concentration, multimarket contact, etc., γ and β are the vectors of parameters
to be estimated, αs, αf , αm, αi are the fixed effects for production locations,
firms, markets, and time, respectively, and αimt is an iid error term.
I expect the coefficient on the concentration variable in the pricing equation
to be positive (the higher the market concentration is, the higher the prices
can be charged). If the multimarket contact hypothesis is correct, I expect
the positive coefficient on the multimarket contact variables. The coefficient
on the interaction term between multimarket contact and concentration can be
either positive or negative. If it is positive that could be interpreted that profits
are higher in the markets where high firm concentration and high multimarket
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contact coincide. If the negative effect is found that may be attributed to the
presence of the strategic effects due to the multimarket contact, i.e., the redis-
tribution of the market power from the more collusive to the more competitive
markets.
Prices, concentration and multimarket contact (also market conduct) may be
rather endogenously determined. Thus, concentration and multimarket contact
variables need to be instrumented in the pricing/market conduct equations.
Some endogeneity may be captured by introducing market fixed effects. This
is the strategy that I pursue in this paper (it has been rather difficult to find
appropriate instruments).
Similar to the market conduct equation, several specifications for the pricing
side have been estimated: base, with both multimarket contact and concentra-
tion (number of competitors) measures, and with an interaction term between
concentration (number of competitors) and multimarket contact measures.
As for the first two variables to measure multimarket contact (i.e., the num-
ber of markets in which a firm is present, and the number of multiple contacts
for a firm), they have been found to be positive and statistically significant (see
Table 10), although their impact is quite low in magnitude. Thus, the higher
multiple presence of a firm as well as the higher number of pairwise contacts
may lead to higher prices.
As for the concentration ratios, only C4 has been found to be statistically
significant, and higher in magnitude than the multimarket contact measure
coefficient31. That is, concentration may facilitate higher prices and profits in
the automobile markets.
Fixed effects allow estimating whether there are significant price differences
across markets after adjusting for car model specification differences. Market-
time fixed effects are the highest in Germany and the UK. Fixed effects for
the market segments are the lowest in the subcompact and standard market
segments.
Table 10. European car market: supply-side estimations (pricing equation
(1))
Var Sp1 Sp2 Sp3 Sp4 Sp5 Sp6 Sp7
horse 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50***
weight 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42***
width -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06
height -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
const 3.34*** 3.40*** 3.24*** 3.32*** 3.41*** 3.26*** 3.33***
mmc1 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
mmc2 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002***
c1 -0.004 -0.005
c4 0.09*** 0.09***
c8 0.05 0.05
R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
31This may be also the most adequate and suitable concentration measure for the automobile
market.
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Source: own estimations
Note: Fixed effects (firm dummies, market segment dummies, market/time fixed
effects) are included but are not reported. Prices and car characteristics are expressed
in logarithms. ***, **, * mean statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% signifi-
cance level, respectively. Explanations: MMC1 (number of markets in which a firm is
present), MMC2 (number of multiple contacts).
The simple multimarket contact measure has been found to be positive and
statistically significant (see Table 11). The sign and statistical significance of
the share-weighted multimarket contact measure is not so straightforward. The
quantitative impact of the multimarket contact measures on prices is quite low.
The share-weighted multimarket contact measure, which is constructed at
the geographic-product market level, could be interpreted in the following way:
the slack in the other markets (market power in the non-home markets as mea-
sured by concentration) due to multimarket contact enhances collusion in a
market under consideration. This measure captures the trade-off between the
benefit of the aggressive action in the focal market and the cost of retaliation in
the other contact markets. This measure was found to be negative and not sta-
tistically significant in case of C1 and C8 ratios. It is positive and statistically
significant in case of C4 ratio, but very low in magnitude. So when I account
for concentration in the contact markets, the multimarket contact seems not to
have any significant economic effect on prices.
Table 11. European car market: supply-side estimations (pricing equation
(2))
Var Sp8 Sp9 Sp10 Sp11 Sp12 Sp13
horse 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50***
weight 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42***
width -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05
height -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
const 3.25*** 3.16*** 3.30*** 3.34*** 3.18*** 3.24***
mmc3 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004***
mmc4 -0.000 0.000** -0.0002*
c1 -0.01 -0.001
c4 0.06*** 0.09***
c8 -0.04 0.06*
R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
Source: own estimations
Note: Fixed effects (firm dummies, market segment dummies, market/time fixed
effects) are included but are not reported. Prices and car characteristics are expressed
in logarithms. ***, **, * mean statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance
level, respectively. Explanations: MMC3 (simple count multimarket contact measure),
MMC4 (share-weighted multimarket contact measure).
I have also included the number of competitors in a market as a measure of
competition intensity (see Table 12). It has been found negative and statistically
significant. This could also shed light whether the entry of foreign producers,
although small ones, has increased competition in the automobile markets. An
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increase in the number of competitors is correlated with a decrease in the price
of products. The number of competitors might be a more suitable measure
of market segment competition intensity (internal factor) as compared to the
concentration measure.
Table 12. European car market: supply-side estimations (pricing equation
(3))
Var Sp14 Sp15 Sp16 Sp17 Sp18
horse 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50***
weight 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42***
width -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04
height -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01
const 3.26*** 3.31*** 3.32*** 3.23*** 3.19***
mmc1 0.002***
mmc2 0.0002***
mmc3 0.002***
mmc4 -0.00001***
No. comp -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.007***
R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
Source: own estimations
Note: Fixed effects (firm dummies, market segment dummies, market/time fixed
effects) are included but are not reported. Prices and car characteristics are expressed
in logarithms. ***, **, * mean statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% signifi-
cance level, respectively. Explanations: MMC1 (number of markets in which a firm
is present), MMC2 (number of multiple contacts), MMC3 (simple count multimarket
contact measure), MMC4 (share-weighted multimarket contact measure). ’No. comp’
stands for the number of firms in a geographic-product market.
When the interaction term between concentration and multimarket contact
is added to study the strategic effects of the multimarket contact (see Table
13), the sign of the interaction term is statistically significant and positive when
C1 and C4 concentration measures are included32. This may be interpreted as
that the multimarket contact measured at the firm level combined with higher
concentration in a given market contributes to higher prices in the market under
consideration. That is, multimarket contact leads to more collusion in the more
concentrated markets.
Table 13. European car market: supply-side estimations (pricing equation
(4))
32 Jans and Rosenbaum (1996) have also found that multimarket contact and concentration
have become statistically insignificant after the interaction term has been included. The
interaction term itself was statistically significant and positive.
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Var Sp19 Sp20 Sp21 Sp22 Sp23 Sp24
MMC1 0.00 -0.005*** 0.009**
MMC2 -0.00 -0.001*** 0.0005
C1 -0.07*** -0.11***
C4 -0.05 -0.14***
C8 0.18** 0.10
MMCc1 0.004*** 0.001***
MMCc4 0.008*** 0.001***
MMCc8 -0.01* -0.0003
R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
Source: own estimations
Note: Fixed effects (firm dummies, market segment dummies, market/time fixed
effects) are included but are not reported. Prices and car characteristics are expressed
in logarithms. ***, **, * mean statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% signifi-
cance level, respectively. Explanations: MMC1 (number of markets in which a firm is
present), MMC2 (number of multiple contacts). Product characteristics are included
but are not reported.
The interaction term is statistically significant and negative for the simple
count and share-weighted multimarket contact measures (See Table 14). Thus,
I can argue that there is some evidence on existence of the strategic effects of
the multimarket contact, i.e., the redistribution of the market power from the
more collusive to the more competitive markets.
Table 14. European car market: supply-side estimations (pricing equation
(5))
Var Sp25 Sp26 Sp27 Sp28 Sp29 Sp30
MMC3 0.06*** -0.0001 0.04***
MMC4 0.00005*** 0.0001*** 0.0005***
C1 0.04 0.09***
C4 0.02 0.17***
C8 0.36*** 0.39***
MMCc1 -0.005* -0.00008***
MMCc4 0.004 -0.0001***
MMCc8 -0.04*** -0.0005***
R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
Note: Fixed effects (firm dummies, market segment dummies, market/time fixed
effects) are included but are not reported. Prices and car characteristics are expressed
in logarithms. ***, **, * mean statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance
level, respectively. Explanations: MMC3 (simple count multimarket contact measure),
MMC4 (share-weighted multimarket contact measure). Product characteristics are
included but are not reported.
I have also estimated the pricing equation with the interaction term between
multimarket contact measures and the number of competitors in a market (see
Table 15). It is negative and statistically significant, which may be interpreted
that prices are lower in the markets characterized by higher multimarket contact
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and larger number of competitors (thus, higher competition intensity). This
could be interpreted as some evidence in favour of the presence of the strategic
effects due to multimarket contact.
Table 15. European car market: supply-side estimations (pricing equation
(6))
Var Sp31 Sp32 Sp33 Sp34
MMC1 0.006***
MMC2 0.0008***
MMC3 0.008***
MMC4 -0.000***
No. Comp 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.005*** -0.008***
MMCnoComp -0.0004*** -0.00006*** -0.0008*** -0.000***
R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
Note: Fixed effects (firm dummies, market segment dummies, market/time fixed
effects) are included but are not reported. Prices and car characteristics are expressed
in logarithms. ***, **, * mean statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% signifi-
cance level, respectively. Explanations: MMC1 (number of markets in which a firm
is present), MMC2 (number of multiple contacts), MMC3 (simple count multimarket
contact measure), MMC4 (share-weighted multimarket contact measure). ’No. Comp’
stands for the number of competitors in a market. Product characteristics are included
but are not reported.
To sum up, in general multimarket contact is positively related to prices
(in most specifications) - a result, which is consistent with mutual forbearance
reducing competition. Greater levels of mulimarket contact move prices above
marginal costs. However, although the relationship is statistically significant,
the multimarket contact effect has little economic influence on the prices of the
car producers. Higher concentration leads to higher prices. Multimarket contact
firms forbear from retaliating more in a concentrated market. Some evidence
has been found about the existence of the strategic multimarket contact effects:
higher multimarket contact and concentration contribute to lower prices. The
summary of the found effects is given in Table 16.
Table 16. European car market: summary of the evidence on the mutual
forbearance hypothesis (pricing equation)
Supported/Not supported/Inconclusive
H1 general overlap Supported
H2 conc. matters Supported
H3 concentration Supported
H4 ”spheres of influence” Supported (implicitly)
H5 strategic effects Supported
Source: on the basis of own estimations
6.2.3 Results from testing coalitions of multimarket firms
The construction of the multimarket contact measures allows me to study the
general effect of the multimarket contact presence, i.e., the extent of the market
37
overlap in the industry, on facilitating collusive behaviour as well as the role of
concentration. To some extent, the impact of the ”spheres of influence” might
have been captured through the construction of the share-weighted multimar-
ket contact measure. To test explicitly for the effectiveness of the ”territorial
interests”, or ”spheres of influence” (i.e., Hypothesis H4) I have tried to point
out the so-called multimarket contact firms coalitions. These coalitions have
been pointed out on the basis of the constructed multimarket contact measures
and on the basis of the discussed picture of multiple market presence in the
European car market. The idea has been to test for collusive behaviour among
these firms as it has been explained above (see Section 4.3).
The firms that are present in the largest number of markets and have got
the largest number of multiple contacts over the considered period of time are
VW, Fiat, GM, Ford and Peugeot. This coalition of firms could be treated as
a multimarket contact firms coalition, and the collusive assumption among the
firms in this coalition could be tested as a potential equilibrium outcome.
Not only the diversification aspect matters (to support collusion due to mul-
timarket contact it is not enough to be present in several markets) but also the
ability of the firms to use it in the creation of the transferrable slack should
be taken into account. It is unlikely that the firms with a small market share
will be able to generate the necessary slack (which is usually fostered by market
concentration), which could be transferred to the other markets through the
multimarket contact. On the basis of the above described picture of multiple
market presence by the automobile companies, several potential multimarket
coalitions can be pointed out. The firms that have more than 5% market share
in each geographic market are Ford, GM, Peugeot, Renault, and VW. The firms
that have more than 5% market share in each or at least four product markets
are Fiat, Ford, GM, and VW, with 1% market share these are Fiat, Ford, GM,
Peugeot, Renault, and VW. Firms that are present in all geographic-product
markets and have more than 1% share in each geographic-product market are
Fiat, Ford, GM, and VW.
Small firms like Daihatsu are unlikely to be engaged into implicit collusive
arrangements with large players like VW. Such arrangements are most likely
to be among the ”influential” rivals. These ”influential” players are likely to
respect each other’s ”territorial interests”. That is why, in addition I have
considered defining an ”influential firm” for each geographic-product market
and for each year (i.e., a firm with the highest market share), and then testing
collusive behaviour among such firms. This would allow me to test directly for
the presence of the ”spheres of influence” that could foster collusive behaviour.
On the basis of such analysis, I have found that the same firms seem to dominate
the markets during the observed period of time: Alfa Romeo (later belongs to
Fiat), Fiat, VW, BMW, Mercedes, Peugeot, Renault, Ford, GM, and Rover
(later belongs to BMW).
Under this approach (testing multimarket contact firms coalitions) I do not
consider the possibility that there could be different degrees of cooperative be-
haviour across the markets. Basically I try to differentiate between the two
extreme cases: no collusion at all (as represented by single-product, or multi-
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product assumptions), or collusive behaviour between multimarket contact firms
in all markets, which I attribute to multimarket contact presence.
The following candidates for the equilibrium firm interactions in the Eu-
ropean car market have been considered: A1: single-product assumption, A2:
multiproduct (brand) assumption, A3: multiproduct (firm) assumption, A4:
collusive assumption for firms that have more than 5% market share in each
geographic market: Ford, GM, Peugeot, Renault and VW and single-product
assumption for all other firms, A5: collusive assumption for firms that have more
than 5% market share in each geographic market: Ford, GM, Peugeot, Renault
and VW and multi-product (brand) assumption for all other firms, A6: collusive
assumption for firms that have more than 5% market share in each product mar-
ket: Fiat, Ford, GM and VW and single-product assumption for all other firms,
A7: collusive assumption for firms that have more than 5% market share in each
product market: Fiat, Ford, GM and VW and multi-product (brand) assump-
tion for all other firms, A8: collusive assumption for firms that have more than
1% market share in each market: Fiat, Ford, GM, VW, Peugeot and Renault
and single-product assumption for all other firms, A9: collusive assumption for
firms that have more than 1% market share in each market: Fiat, Ford, GM,
VW, Peugeot and Renault and multi-product (brand) assumption for all other
firms, A10: collusive assumption for firms that have ”spheres of influence”: Alfa
Romeo, Fiat, VW, BMW, Mercedes, Peugeot, Renault, GM, Ford and Rover
and single-product assumption for all other firms, A11: collusive assumption for
firms that have ”spheres of influence”: Alfa Romeo, Fiat, VW, BMW, Mercedes,
Peugeot, Renault, GM, Ford and Rover and multi-product (brand) assumption
for all other firms, A12: collusive assumption for firms that are present in the
largest number of markets and have the highest number of multiple contacts:
VW, Fiat, GM, Ford and Peugeot, and single-product assumption for all other
firms, A13: collusive assumption for firms that are present in the largest number
of markets and have the highest number of multiple contacts: VW, Fiat, GM,
Ford and Peugeot, and multi-product (brand) assumption for all other firms.
On the basis of the multimarket contact firms coalitions that have been
pointed out above I have tested for the best supply-side specification (i.e., the
specification that best fits the data). I present and discuss the results from
several testing procedures: information criteria, test for non-nested hypothesis
(MacKinnon, White, and Davidson, 1983) and model selection test (Rivers and
Vuong, 2002).
As it can be seen from Table 17, the single-product and multi-product
(brand) Bertrand-Nash assumptions have got the lowest information criteria
and sum of squared residuals (there is only a slight difference in the markups
under these two assumptions). There appears also little difference between
multi-product (brand) and multiproduct (firm) assumptions, which could shed
more light on the intrabrand competition within an automobile manufacturer
group. No multimarket contact firms coalition can be supported on the basis of
these criteria.
Table 17. European car market: information criteria and sum of squared
residuals (SSR) for different supply side specifications
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Specifications AIC BIC SSR
A1 9429.46 10054.58 1507.53
A2 9426.52 10051.64 1507.15
A3 9516.45 10141.57 1518.93
A4 9798.20 10423.32 1556.44
A5 9758.53 10383.65 1551.11
A6 9990.87 10615.99 1582.63
A7 9984.40 10609.52 1581.74
A8 9803.40 10428.52 1557.15
A9 9802.63 10427.75 1557.04
A10 9717.68 10342.80 1545.63
A11 9718.82 10343.94 1545.78
A12 10029.1 10654.22 1587.88
A13 10027.65 10652.77 1587.68
Source: own estimations
Note: ’AIC’ stands for Akaike information criterion, ’BIC’ stands for Bayesian
information criterion, and ’SSR’ stands for the squared sum of residuals.
In addition I have conducted the test for non-nested hypotheses by MacK-
innon, White and Davidson (1983) (see Tables 18a,b). The intuition behind
this test is that if the price-cost margin from a given model has a statistically
significant impact on the price-cost margin from another model, that means
that the latter model should be rejected. This test is very easy to implement in
practice. Within this approach, the two non-nested models are embedded into
a more general artificial model. On the basis of the test results, it is, however,
difficult to choose the ’best’ supply-side specification. When the alternative as-
sumptions are A4-A9, all the null hypothesis are rejected, i.e., these should be
the preferred specifications (but they perform only slightly better as compared
to the other specifications). Given that the difference between single- and multi-
product (brand) assumptions is small, basically for the A4-A9 assumptions the
plausibility of the three coalitions of multimarket contact firms should be inves-
tigated: 1) Ford, GM, Peugeot, Renault, and VW; 2) Ford, GM, VW, and Fiat,
and 3) Ford, GM, Peugeot, Renault, VW, and Fiat. The open question is how
to choose among these ”best” supply-side specifications.
Table 18a. European car market: results of the test for the non-nested hy-
potheses (MacKinnon, White and Davidson, 1983)
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H0/H1 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7
A1 8.58 11.16 12.79 13.89 13.54 13.92
A2 -4.64 8.60 12.90 12.02 11.62 12.10
A3 1.73 1.47 12.99 10.79 8.13 9.01
A4 -10.04 -9.98 -9.92 -4.38 -4.33
A5 -9.91 -8.68 -1.32 24.39 3.88 4.21
A6 -1.25 -2.10 -6.86 9.19 7.94 5.65
A7 -1.61 -2.53 -7.68 9.28 7.70 -5.52
A8 -4.57 -5.24 -7.49 -8.44 -2.09 -5.94 -5.61
A9 -4.75 -5.45 -7.76 -8.44 -2.38 -6.23 -5.93
A10 -10.05 -10.65 -12.29 -10.22 -9.77 -11.28 -11.12
A11 -10.04 -10.65 -12.28 -10.22 -9.76 -11.27 -11.12
A12 -2.90 -3.81 -7.82 5.22 4.90 -5.58 -4.81
A13 -3.16 -4.13 -8.30 5.27 4.65 -6.23 -5.59
Source: own estimations
Table 18b. European car market: results of the test for the non-nested hy-
potheses (MacKinnon, White and Davidson, 1983) (continuation)
H0/H1 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13
A1 16.95 17.16 21.30 21.31 14.83 15.13
A2 15.70 19.95 20.46 20.47 13.18 13.54
A3 13.37 13.67 18.96 18.96 10.26 10.79
A4 12.43 12.43 14.62 14.62 0.21 0.28
A5 13.21 13.53 19.68 19.69 7.67 8.00
A6 12.55 12.85 18.83 18.83 7.98 8.66
A7 12.31 12.66 18.79 18.80 7.22 8.04
A8 4.57 15.49 15.49 -4.76 -4.33
A9 -4.48 15.35 15.36 -5.15 -4.76
A10 -11.28 -11.07 -0.35 -10.87 -10.70
A11 -11.27 -11.07 0.41 -10.87 -10.70
A12 11.00 11.39 18.35 18.35 5.29
A13 10.64 11.11 18.28 18.29 -5.18
Source: own estimations
Note: t-statistics are given in the cells.
The results of Rivers and Vuong (2002) test could not shed more light on
the above results. I have failed to select any supply-side specification on the
basis of this test.
To sum up, on the basis of the statistical procedures that I have done it
has been difficult to choose the model that best describes the firms’ equilibrium
interactions. That is why, I have to rely on the results from the estimation of
market conduct and pricing equations estimations in the above sections to draw
some conclusions about the effect of multimarket contact on the firm behaviour
in the automobile markets.
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7 Conclusions
The paper has been an attempt to analyze the conduct behaviour of the auto-
motive firms in the European car market in a systematic way. I have extended
the earlier models for the European car market in particular by augmenting the
supply side through explicitly considering the factors that contribute to market
conduct and pricing behaviour of the automotive firms. Most previous auto-
motive industry studies have concentrated on explaining the international price
differentials in the European car market. The focus of this paper has been to
study the impact of the internal (concentration, number of competitors in a
market) and external (multimarket contact) factors on the firm behaviour.
In addition, this study has been motivated by the presence of extensive mul-
timarket contact in the automobile industry, which is generally argued to foster
collusive behaviour and which has not received interest in the previous auto-
motive studies. Industry consolidation has raised the level of the multimarket
contact. The concentration ratios for the total European car market have stayed
on average at the same level or declined during the considered period of time,
while the multimarket contact has increased. The number of competitors has
also grown, in particular due to the entrance of Japanese competitors.
Finally, the study has been motivated by the lack of conclusive empirical ev-
idence (in general, not only for automobile markets) on the mutual forbearance
hypothesis. It has been first formulated by Edwards (1955), i.e., the extended
interdependence when firms meet each other in several markets may lead to tac-
itly collusive arrangements between the firms. The hypothesis has been formally
described for the first time by Bernheim and Whinston (1990). The estimation
of the conjectures equations helps me to see whether they can be really attribut-
able to the multimarket contact, while some studies just estimated conjectures
and attributed them to the mutual forbearance presence (e.g., Gelfand and
Spiller, 1987).
It has been found that the general overlap of the markets may lead to more
cooperative firm behaviour. For the mutual forbearance to hold, it may be,
however, not just enough to be present in several markets. It could be important
for firms to have ”spheres of influence” in those markets. The effect of the
multimarket on the firm behaviour is stronger in the more concentrated market.
Concentration alone also contributes to higher prices. The strategic effects of
the multimarket contact could be observed in the European car market, i.e.,
the redistribution of the market power from the more collusive to the more
competitive markets. The result is that multimarket contact may lead to lower
prices in the more concentrated markets. I have tested directly for the impact
of the ”spheres of influence” on the firm behaviour considering multimarket
contact firms coalitions. However, it was difficult to choose the best supply-
side model on the basis of the statistical procedures that I have applied. Thus,
to sum up, the results of the study reveal some weak quantitative effect of
multimarket contact on pricing/market conduct in the European car market as
well as provide some evidence on designing strategic policies by the automotive
firms and shifting their market power across the markets, in which they operate.
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Because of weak economic impact of multimarket contact on competition,
one may argue that multimarket contact notwithstanding its extensive pres-
ence in the automobile industry does not play a large role. The results of the
study may, therefore, raise the question whether sector differences (e.g., indus-
try structure, demand growth prospects) could account for the different effect
of multimarket contact on competitive behaviour. In particular, the economic
effects of the multimarket contact have been found to be much stronger for air-
lines, hotels, mobile telephone markets, etc. (e.g., Evans and Kessides (1994),
Jans and Rosenbaum (1996), Parker and Roller (1997), Fernandez and Marin
(1998)). In those industries a larger number of markets is observed. As com-
pared to the other multimarket contact studies (that focus on local/regional
geographical markets), I have focused on the combination of both geographic
and product dimensions of markets to measure the degree of multimarket link-
ages for the automotive firms and study the impact of this degree on the firm
behaviour. It should be noted that some studies report the economic signifi-
cance of the effect similar to mine, especially when similar multimarket contact
measures are constructed (e.g., Heggestad and Rhoades (1978), Waldfogel and
Wulf (2006)). However, the studies by Evans and Kessides (1994) and Jans and
Rosenbaum (1996) that use similar multimarket contact measures show much
stronger economic effect of multimarket contact on prices. As compared to my
study on the mutual forbearance hypothesis for the US car industry (Leheyda,
2007a), I was able to get more conclusive evidence on the multimarket contact
effects in general. In addition, I could find some support for the presence of the
strategic effects due to the multimarket contact, i.e., the redistribution of the
market power from the more collusive to the more competitive markets.
Alternatively, one may argue that the construction of the multimarket con-
tact measures as well as pointing out multimarket contact firms coalitions may
be not suitable for studying the multimarket contact effect on the firm behav-
iour in the automobile industry and that some other approach could be thought
of to investigate this issue more profoundly.
The ”ideal” test to study multimarket contact effects on collusive behaviour
would be to contrast the pricing behaviour in a single-product (e.g., two firms in
one market M1) and a multiproduct context (e.g., these two firms move together
to another market M1+M2) to test for incremental effects in the firm behaviour.
In addition, one can take some period of time and compare the break-down of
collusive prices in M1 world and M1+M2 world, and if this period of break-
downs under the latter scenario is shorter, then this is a hard test for showing
that the multimarket contact effect leads to more collusion. This situation
could be difficult to find in terms of the necessary data in general and for the
automobile market in particular. That is why, I have been made restricted to
applying the suggested in this paper methods to try to identify the effects of the
presence of the multimarket situations on the firm behaviour in the automotive
industry. The ”ideal” and the developed in this paper methodologies could be
applied in the context of other industries and markets.
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9 Appendix A. Multimarket contact measures
9.1 Simple multimarket contact measure
The simple count measure is constructed in the following way33. It is assumed
that there are k = 1, ...,K geographic-product markets and n = 1, ...,N auto-
motive manufacturers. In geographic-product market k there areNk automotive
firms. Let Dnk be a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if firm n is present
in market k and zero otherwise. Matrix A = (aij) should be constructed with
aij =
KP
k=1
DikDjk. This is a symmetric matrix, where the diagonal elements aii
33 Simple count and market-share weighted measures have been constructed in particular by
Evans and Kessides (1992) and Jans and Rosenbaum (1996).
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are the number of markets in which the firm i is present, and the off-diagonal
elements aij are the number of markets in which both firms i and j are present:
A =
⎛
⎝
a11 ... a1N
.. ... ...
aN1 ... aNN
⎞
⎠
I calculate the average multimarket contact per firm-pair in market k in the
following way:
AverMarketContactk =
N−1X
i=1
NX
j=i+1
aijDikDjk/(Nk(Nk − 1)/2) (28)
whereNk is the number of firms in market under consideration k. Nk(Nk−1)
is the total number of possible pairs of firms in this market.
The example below (see Table 19) shows the construction of such a measure
for a particular geographic-product market in a particular year (Italy, standard,
1999).
Table 19. European car market: example of construction of a multimarket-
contact measure at the geographic-product market level
BMW Fiat Ford Honda GM Peugeot VW Daewoo Sum
BMW 19 19 19 13 19 13 19 17 119
Fiat 25 25 14 25 19 25 18 126
Ford 25 14 25 19 25 18 101
Honda 14 14 13 14 12 53
GM 25 19 25 18 62
Peugeot 19 19 18 37
VW 25 18 18
Daewoo 18
Sum 516
MMC 18.43
Source: own estimations
The diagonal elements in the above Table are the number of geographic-
product markets, in which a firm is present. The off-diagonal elements show the
number of geographic-product markets in which both firms meet each other.
The number of these contacts (off-diagonal elements) is aggregated for each
firm and is given in the last column. The contacts are aggregated for all firms
(516) and then they are divided by the number of possible firm pairs in this
market (Nk(Nk−1)/2=28) to get the multimarket contact measure of 18.43 for
Italy’s standard market segment in 1999.
This measure is calculated for each geographic-product market and for each
year (which is extremely time-consuming). If there is only one automotive firm
in the market, the measure will be equal to zero.
The impact of this measure on the firm behaviour may be interpreted in the
following way: facing a trade-off between the benefit of the aggressive action
in the focal market (i.e., the market under consideration) and the cost of the
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rival retaliation in the other contact markets, the firms may tend to behave less
aggressively.
9.2 Share-weighted multimarket contact measure
Relatively more important markets could be given some greater weight in the
multimarket contact measure, which leads me to the construction of the next
measure.
I construct a quadratic weighting multimarket contact measure in the fol-
lowing way. The revenue share of firm i from market k (Rik) is multiplied by the
revenue share of firm j from the same market k, which is then used to weight
the contribution of the pairwise contact of firms i and j in market k. The fol-
lowing matrix is then constructed: R = (rij) with rij =
KP
k=1
RikRjk. This is a
symmetric matrix.
I calculate the average revenue-weighted market contact in the following way:
AverMarketRe venueContactk =
N−1X
i=1
NX
j=i+1
rijDikDjk/(Nk(Nk − 1)/2) (29)
The construction of this measure is similar to the construction of the simple
multimarket contact measure, except for the fact that the measure is weighted
by the market shares of the firm.
The interpretation of this measure is similar to the one of the simple multi-
market contact measure above. If this measure value is small, the potential cost
of retaliation is low as compared to the benefit of the aggressive behaviour in
the focal/home market (i.e., the market under consideration). If it is high, the
multimarket contact may exert large influence upon the focal market behaviour,
and higher prices in that market should be observed. This measure captures
that in the more concentrated markets the firms might have more to lose, thus,
they may withhold from competitive behaviour.
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Appendix B. European car market: general descriptive statistics (concentration, multiple 
market presence and ownership) 
 
Graph B1. European car market: development of concentration ratios (one-firm (C1), four-firm (C4), 
seven-firm (C7)) over time at country market level 
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Source: European car market database, own calculations 
 
Table B2. European car market: purchase taxes on new vehicles, 1999 
 
Country VAT (%) Purchase taxes Registration fees  
(in local currency) 
Belgium 21 Based on capacity and age 2500 FB 
France 20.6 None Local tax 102 to 195 FF 
(+ parafiscal charges) 
Germany  16 None 50 DM 
Italy 20 Provincial, based on fiscal power 300000 to 720000 L 
United Kingdom 17.5 None None 
Source: Gaulier and Haller (2000) 
 
 
 
 
Table B3. European car market: shares in a firm’s total European sales, 1970 as compared to 1999 
 Belgium France Germany Italy UK ‚Spheres of influence’ 
(‚market dependence’) 
 1970 1999 1970 1999 1970 1999 1970 1999 1970 1999 1970 1999 
Alfa Romeo 2.32  6.38  10.50  79.01  1.78  Italy  
BMW 5.93 3.88 5.30 8.52 80.07 45.90 5.89 12.01 2.80 29.69 Germany Germany 
Daihatsu  1.70    68.03  5.35  24.92  Germany 
Fiat 3.43 2.15 20.76 10.68 11.57 10.54 62.57 68.98 1.66 7.65 Italy Italy 
Ford 4.97 4.11 6.74 13.75 32.30 28.33 10.08 17.41 45.91 36.40 UK UK 
Honda 18.22 4.19 45.07 7.69 36.71 29.64  10.67  47.81 France UK 
DeTomaso       100.00    Italy  
Hyundai  4.30  5.87  22.47  37.81  29.55  Italy 
Kia  8.07  5.88  66.83  16.80  8.30  Germany 
Mazda  7.02    67.06  4.10  15.94  Germany 
Mercedes 3.91 3.37 5.28 7.54 85.29 66.52 4.65 11.83 0.88 10.74 Germany Germany 
Mitsubishi  13.22  3.25  60.18  4.11  19.23  Germany 
Nissan 100.00 4.79  9.47  27.21  18.17  40.37 Belgium UK 
GM 4.83 4.34 4.93 10.78 63.59 42.88 8.34 15.93 18.31 26.07 Germany Germany 
Peugeot 5.54 5.82 81.06 49.43 10.91 10.96 2.49 12.75  21.04 France France 
Renault 5.28 4.77 61.96 49.09 22.06 19.20 6.05 11.82 4.65 15.12 France France 
FujiHi  100.00          Belgium 
Rover 2.72  3.61  2.46  0.33  90.89  UK  
Saab 56.73    43.27      Belgium  
Suzuki  8.97  11.51  39.89  10.60  29.03  Germany 
Toyota    87.57 8.94  11.80  30.48  20.05 12.43 28.73 Belgium Germany 
VW 3.60 5.03 2.93 12.63 80.43 55.07 8.77 14.94 4.28 12.33 Germany Germany 
Volvo 26.81  13.29  27.78  3.89  28.22  UK  
DAF 21.34  21.11  33.53  11.72  12.30  Germany  
TalbotSimcaHillmanSunbeam 5.71  35.61  15.94  16.54  26.21  France   
TalbotMatra 5.92  94.08        France   
Daewoo  4.13  10.18  9.52  51.86  24.31  Italy 
Daimler (Smart)    7.29  67.95  24.76    Germany 
Total market sales 4.66 4.57 21.91 19.85 34.36 34.26 23.15 20.74 15.93 20.58 Germany Germany 
Source: European car market database, own calculations 
Note: ‘Spheres of influence’ (‘market dependence’) are defined as those geographical markets where a firm has the highest market share in a firm’s total European sales.
Table B4. European car market: shares of a firm in total market sales, 1970 as compared to 1999 
 Belgium France Germany Italy UK Europe ‚Spheres of influence’ 
(‚market share dominance’) 
 1970 1999 1970 1999 1970 1999 1970 1999 1970 1999 1970 1999 1970 1999 
Alfa Romeo 0.77  0.45  0.47  5.26  0.17  1.54  Italy  
Daihatsu  0.07    0.38  0.05  0.23  0.47  Germany 
BMW 2.46 4.86 0.47 2.45 4.49 7.67 0.49 3.31 0.34 8.25 1.93 5.72 Germany Germany 
Fiat 18.45 4.91 23.70 5.62 8.43 3.21 67.63 34.71 2.61 3.88 25.02 10.44 Italy Italy 
Ford 10.28 10.71 2.96 8.26 9.05 9.86 4.19 10.01 27.73 21.09 9.62 11.92 UK UK 
Honda 0.21 1.07 0.11 0.45 0.06 1.01  0.60  2.72 0.05 1.17 Belgium UK 
Hyundai  0.83  0.26  0.58  1.60  1.26  0.88  Italy 
DeTomaso       3.76    0.87  Italy  
Kia  0.47    0.52  0.22  0.11  0.27  Germany 
Mazda  1.84  0.36  2.35  0.24  0.93  1.20  Germany 
Mercedes 2.55 3.85 0.73 1.98 7.56 10.14 0.61 2.98 0.17 2.73 3.04 5.22 Germany Germany 
Mitsubishi  1.64  0.09  0.99  0.11  0.53  0.57  Belgium 
Nissan 1.02 2.54  1.16  1.93  2.12  4.76 0.05 2.42 Belgium UK 
GM 11.10 11.58 2.41 6.62 19.81 15.27 3.86 9.37 12.30 15.45 10.70 12.20 Germany UK 
Peugeot 7.29 16.70 22.67 32.68 1.95 4.20 0.66 8.07  13.42 6.13 13.13 France France 
Renault 13.25 10.48 33.04 24.84 7.50 5.63 3.06 5.72 3.41 7.38 11.68 10.05 France France 
FujiHi  0.04          0.00  Belgium 
Rover 3.90  1.10  0.48  0.09  38.14  6.69  UK  
Saab 0.21    0.02      0.02  Belgium  
Suzuki  0.62  0.18  0.37  0.16  0.45  0.32  Belgium 
Toyota 3.59 4.54  1.38  2.07  2.25 0.15 3.24 0.19 2.32 Belgium Belgium 
VW 12.06 22.06 2.08 12.76 36.51 32.25 5.91 14.46 4.19 12.02 15.60 20.06 Germany Germany 
Volvo 2.96  0.31  0.42  0.09  0.91  0.51  Belgium  
DAF 2.87  0.60  0.61  0.32  0.48  0.63  Belgium  
TalbotSimcaHillmanSunbeam 7.00  9.28  2.65  4.08  9.39  5.71  France, UK  
TalbotMatra 0.02  0.08        0.02  France  
Daewoo  1.18  0.67  0.36  3.28  1.55    Italy 
Daimler    0.23  1.22  0.74    0.62  Germany 
Total market sales 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0    
C-1  18.45 22.06 33.04 32.68 36.51 32.25 67.63 34.71 38.14 21.09 25.02 20.06   
C-4  53.09 61.06 88.69 78.54 73.80 67.51 82.99 68.55 87.57 61.99 63.00 57.31   
C-7  79.44 81.30 96.14 93.24 93.35 85.01 94.68 85.66 97.78 82.38 85.44 83.51   
Source: European car market database, own calculations 
Note: ‘Spheres of influence’ (‘market share dominance’) are reflected by the largest shares the firms hold in different geographical markets. 
Table B5. European car market: shares of a firm in market segment sales, 1970 as compared to 1999 
 
 Subcompact Compact Intermediate Standard Luxury Total ‚Spheres of influence’ 
(market share dominance) 
 1970 1999 1970 1999 1970 1999 1970 1999 1970 1999 1970 1999 1970 1999 
Alfa Romeo   3.89  5.94      1.54  Intermediate  
BMW  0.14 1.89 4.92 4.26  4.83 44.06 12.30 22.11 1.93 5.72 Luxury Standard 
Daihatsu  0.50    0.03      0.19  Subcompact 
Fiat 39.14 18.46 7.51 4.89 24.97 3.80 12.44 12.90 0.99 6.61 25.02 10.44 Subcompact Subcompact 
Ford  11.32 16.40 15.05 32.70 13.06 19.64 5.05  3.40 9.62 11.93 Intermediate Compact 
Honda 0.11 0.28  2.29    5.63   0.05 1.17 Subcompact Standard 
Hyundai  1.03  1.00  0.94      0.88  Subcompact 
DeTomaso 1.77          0.87  Subcompact  
Kia  0.31  0.09  0.62      0.27  Intermediate 
Mazda  0.55  1.77  2.32      1.20  Intermediate 
Mercedes    5.66     82.06 62.79 3.04 5.22 Luxury Luxury 
Mitsubishi    0.56  2.01      0.57  Compact 
Nissan 0.10 3.20  1.70  3.45    0.37 0.05 2.43 Subcompact Intermediate 
GM  10.18 26.02 16.82 0.72 12.07 30.70 11.07 4.65 2.83 10.70 12.20 Standard Compact 
Peugeot 4.82 17.28 6.66 7.06 7.52 22.23 11.03 1.21   6.13 13.13 Standard Intermediate 
Renault 18.87 16.11 9.40 7.15  8.04  3.16   11.68 10.05 Subcompact Subcompact 
Rover 9.48  4.85    6.31    6.69  Subcompact  
Saab       0.14    0.02  Standard  
Suzuki  0.45    0.58      0.29  Intermediate 
Toyota     2.24 0.74 2.63  3.40  0.19   0.19 2.32 Compact Intermediate 
VW 17.24 14.46 17.88 27.13 13.47 26.45 10.60 16.38  1.89 15.60 20.07 Subc., comp. Comp., interm. 
Volvo       4.16    0.51  Standard  
DAF 1.27          0.63  Subcompact  
TalbotSimcaHillmar 7.20  4.75  10.42      5.71  Intermediate  
TalbotMatra       0.16    0.02  Standard  
Daewoo  1.86  1.27  1.01  0.35    1.31  Subcompact 
Daimler  1.63          0.62  Subcompact 
Tot. segm. sales 100.00 100.00  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00   
Source: European car market database, own calculations
 
Table B6. European car market: shares of a firm in a firm’s sales, 1970 as compared to 1999 
 Subcompact Compact Intermediate Standard Luxury ‚Spheres of influence’ 
(market dependence) 
 1970 1999 1970 1999 1970 1999 1970 1999 1970 1999 1970 1999 
Alfa Romeo   64.8  35.2      Compact  
BMW  0.95 25.1 25.93 20.2  31.0 51.48 23.7 21.64 Standard Standard 
Daihatsu  97.21    2.79      Subcompact 
Fiat 76.89 66.89 7.69 14.12 9.13 7.18 6.15 8.26 0.15 3.55 Subcompact Subcompact 
Ford  35.89 43.69 38.07 31.06 21.60 25.24 2.83  1.60 Compact Compact 
Honda 100.00 9.07  58.83    32.10   Subcompact Compact 
Hyundai  44.47  34.51  21.02      Subcompact 
DeTomaso 100.00          Subcompact  
Kia  43.96  10.59  45.45      Intermediate 
Mazda  17.41  44.44  38.15      Compact 
Mercedes    32.66     100.00 67.34 Luxury Luxury 
Mitsubishi    29.80  70.20      Intermediate 
Nissan 100.00 49.95  21.15  28.04    0.86 Subcompact Subcompact 
GM  31.55 62.30 41.58 0.61 19.50 35.47 6.07 1.61 1.30 Compact Compact 
Peugeot 38.67 49.78 27.85 16.21 11.22 33.39 22.25 0.62   Subcompact Subcompact 
Renault 79.37 60.64 20.63 21.47  15.78  2.11   Subcompact Subcompact 
Rover 69.72  18.61    11.67    Subcompact  
Saab       100.00    Standard  
Suzuki  59.93    40.17      Subcompact 
Toyota     36.46 100.00 34.10  28.88  0.56   Compact Subcompact 
VW 54.32 27.25 29.39 40.78 7.89 25.99 8.40 5.46  0.53 Subcompact Compact 
Volvo       100.00    Standard  
DAF 100.00          Subcompact  
TalbotSimcaHillmar 61.99  21.33  16.68      Subcompact  
TalbotMatra       100.00    Standard  
Daewoo  53.83  29.20  15.20  1.77    Subcompact 
Daimler  100.00          Subcompact 
Tot. segm. sales 49.15 37.83 25.64 30.16 9.14 19.72 12.37 6.69 3.71 5.60 Subcompact Subcompact 
Source: European car market database, own estimations 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B7. European car market: geographic-product market presence (defined by shares of a firm in a market segment (‘market-share dominance’)), 1999 
 BMW Daihatsu Fiat Ford Honda Hyundai Kia Mazda Mercedes Mitsubishi Nissan GM Peugeot Renault FujiHI Suzuki Toyota   VW Daewoo Daimler 
b_subc 0.07 0.25 6.67 9.44 0.49 0.72 1.02 1.61   2.62 11.52 21.61 14.67 0.14 0.99 4.24 22.44 1.49  
b_compt 1.68  3.09 10.52 1.69 1.17 0.05 2.54 3.69 0.92 2.81 17.03 10.51 13.44   5.34 24.30 1.21  
b_inte 0.00  1.90 13.47  0.88 0.67 2.09  5.57 3.28 6.08 28.00 5.37  1.41 6.04 24.02 1.22  
b_stan 39.40  14.67 7.54 4.53       8.63 2.24 3.98   0.42 18.04 0.56  
b_lux 24.60  6.59 11.22     50.85  0.58 4.80      1.36   
f_subc   8.41 6.58 0.15 0.15  0.16   1.09 6.69 31.92 31.75  0.17 1.54 10.31 0.59 0.48 
f_comp 3.16  3.64 13.72 1.03 0.54  0.58 3.06 0.14 0.91 8.71 20.23 20.98   1.31 20.96 1.03  
f_inte   1.04 7.35  0.26  0.61  0.26 1.81 4.77 53.35 17.05  0.43 1.46 11.07 0.53  
f_stan 33.53  11.76 1.91 3.81       6.60 7.50 25.60    8.70 0.61  
f_lux 22.29  6.20 5.94     61.52   2.56      1.49   
g_subc 0.28 1.50 7.48 12.25 0.58 0.65 0.64 1.44   2.74 14.79 8.50 13.33  0.77 2.29 27.17 0.58 4.99 
g_comp 1.48  1.34 11.61 1.60 0.52 0.23 2.91 9.14 0.91 1.51 20.96 2.09 4.05   2.31 38.98 0.37  
g_inte  0.08 1.60 10.27  1.12 1.36 4.62  3.22 3.27 14.57 6.40 4.39  0.86 3.21 44.61 0.43  
g_stan 51.94  4.52 4.13 3.25       11.29 0.46 0.13   0.19 24.10   
g_lux 22.77  1.52 2.14     69.63  0.37 1.25      2.32   
i_subc 0.06 0.09 42.73 7.96 0.31 2.15 0.24 0.21   2.68 7.40 9.78 9.46  0.13 2.26 9.54 3.72 1.30 
i_comp 5.03  18.46 17.08 1.45 1.09  0.33 4.93 0.29 0.82 17.23 3.50    2.82 23.96 3.02  
i_inte   22.24 10.70  1.18 0.75 0.39  0.42 3.74 8.34 15.35 3.19  0,80 2.83 26.60 3.47  
i_stan 28.78  48.74 4.58 1.77       3.75 0.32     10.45 1.61  
i_lux 16.90  31.91 3.09     45.38   1.72      0.99   
u_subc 0.32 0.69 6.38 22.48  0.85 0.32 0.40   7.54 13.69 20.12 10.10  0.88 2.70 11.50 2.04  
u_comp 12.83  2.94 21.64 5.05 2.08  1.39 2.25 0.34 2.93 14.72 8.55 6.79   3.31 13.37 1.80  
u_inte   1.31 24.58  1.24  1.50  1.89 5.34 19.04 16.88 7.49   5.40 14.21 1.13  
u_stan 44.16  5.60 8.55 15.19       19.04  0.28   0.41 6.77   
u_lux 24.12  1.44 5.70     55.51  0.95 10.98      1.31   
t_subc 0.14 0.50 18.46 11.32 0.28 1.03 0.31 0.55   3.20 10.18 17.28 16.11  0.45 2.24 14.46 1.86 1.63 
t_comp 4.92  4.89 15.05 2.29 1.00 0.09 1.77 5.66 0.56 1.70 16.82 7.06 7.15  0.00 2.63 27.13 1.27  
t_inte 0.00 0.03 3.80 13.06  0.94 0.62 2.32  2.01 3.45 12.07 22.23 8.04  0.58 3.40 26.45 1.01  
t_stan 44.06  12.90 5.05 5.63       11.07 1.21 3.16   0.19 16.38 0.35  
t_lux 22.11  6.61 3.40     62.79  0.37 2.83      1.89   
‚Spheres   
of influence’ 
(‚market  
share  
dominance ’) 
b_stan,  
g_stan, 
u_stan  
g_subc i_subc,  
i_stan, 
i_lux 
u_subc, 
u_comp, 
u_inte 
u_stan i_subc g_inte g_inte luxury b_inte u_subc g_comp, 
u_inte, 
u_stan 
b_inte, 
f_subc, 
f_inte 
f_subc, 
f_comp, 
f_stan 
 b_inte b_inte g_comp, 
g_inte,  
i_inte 
i_inte g_subc 
Source: European car market database, own calculations  
 
 
Table B8. European car market: geographic-product market presence (share of a market segment in the total sales of a firm (‘market dependence’)), 1999 
 
 BMW Daihatsu Fiat Ford Honda Hyundai Kia Mazda Mercedes Mitsubishi Nissan GM Peugeot Renault FujiHI Suzuki Toyota   VW Daewoo Daimler Total  
segment  
sales 
b_subc 0.02 1.70 0.85 1.05 0.56 1.09 5.07 1.77   1.43 1.25 2.18 1.93 100.00 4.58 2.42 1.48 1.51  1.33 
b_comp 0.46  0.47 1.40 2.28 2.12 0.28 3.36 1.12 2.59 1.84 2.21 1.27 2.12   3.65 1.92 1.47  1.59 
b_inte 0.00  0.20 1.22  1.09 2.72 1.89  10.64 1.46 0.54 2.31 0.58  5.33 2.81 1.29 1.01  1.08 
b_stan 2.40  0.49 0.22 1.35       0.25 0.06 0.14   0.06 0.31 0.15  0.35 
b_lux 0.99  0.15 0.22     2.25  0.06 0.09      0.02   0.23 
f_subc   7.50 5.14 1.16 1.56  1.23   4.18 5.11 22.64 29.42  5.68 6.18 4.78 4.22 7.29 9.31 
f_comp 2.58  1.63 5.39 4.12 2.90  2.27 2.74 1.13 1.76 3.34 7.22 9.78   2.65 4.89 3.70  4.68 
f_inte   0.47 2.90  1.41  2.38  2.12 3.52 1.84 19.15 8.00  7.05 2.97 2.60 1.92  4.71 
f_stan 4.34  0.84 0.12 2.41       0.40 0.42 1.89    0.32 0.35  0.74 
f_lux 1.59  0.24 0.20     4.80   0.09      0.03   0.41 
g_subc 0.41 65.24 6.02 8.63 4.18 6.20 20.17 10.08   9.50 10.18 5.44 11.14  22.66 8.27 11.37 3.71 67.95 8.40 
g_comp 3.14  1.56 11.83 16.65 7.16 10.31 29.46 21.28 19.46 7.55 20.88 1.93 4.90   12.10 23.61 3.45  12.16 
g_inte  2.79 1.09 6.16  9.11 36.36 27.52  40.72 9.63 8.53 3.48 3.12  21.44 9.86 15.89 2.36  7.15 
g_stan 28.85  1.38 1.10 8.82       2.94 0.11 0.04   0.25 3.82   3.18 
g_lux 13.50  0.50 0.61     45.24  0.52 0.35      0.39   3.39 
i_subc 0.12 5.35 48.23 7.86 3.17 28.79 10.43 2.02   13.03 7.14 8.78 11.09  5.38 11.44 5.60 33.47 24.76 11.78 
i_comp 4.23  8.51 6.89 5.94 5.95  1.33 4.54 2.43 1.64 6.79 1.28    5.84 5.74 11.09  4.81 
i_inte   4.85 2.04  3.07 6.37 0.75  1.69 3.51 1.56 2.66 0.72  6.35 2.77 3.02 6.03  2.28 
i_stan 5.18  4.81 0.40 1.56       0.32 0.03     0.54 1.27  1.03 
i_lux 2.48  2.56 0.22     7.29   0.12      0.04   0.84 
u_subc 0.40 24.92 4.29 13.22  6.82 8.30 2.31   21.80 7.87 10.75 7.05  21.52 8.15 4.02 10.93  7.01 
u_comp 15.52  1.95 12.56 29.84 16.38  8.02 2.98 4.20 8.37 8.35 4.51 4.68   9.86 4.61 9.50  6.92 
u_inte   0.57 9.28  6.34  5.61  15.04 9.91 7.03 5.79 3.36   10.47 3.19 3.88  4.50 
u_stan 10.69  0.74 0.99 17.97       2.16  0.04   0.24 0.47   1.39 
u_lux 3.08  0.10 0.35     7.76  0.29 0.66      0.05   0.73 
Total firm  
sales 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
‚Spheres of 
influence’ 
(‚market 
share 
dependence’) 
g_st g_su i_su g_co, 
u_su, 
u_co 
u_co i_su g_in g_co, 
g_in 
g_lu g_in u_su g_co f_su, 
f_in 
f_su b_su g_su, 
g_in, 
u_su 
g_co, 
i_su, 
u_in 
g_co i_su g_su  
Source: European car market database, own calculations 
 
Table B9. European car market: automotive manufacturer groups 
 
Firm (equivalent to 
corporate group) 
Brands 
Alfa Romeo Alfa Romeo (till 1986 (including 1986)) 
BMW BMW, Rover Triumph (1994-1999) 
Daihatsu  Daihatsu (starting 1979) 
Fiat 1970: Citroen, Fiat, Lancia, Autobianchi; 1971: Citroen, Fiat, Lancia; 1972-1974: 
Citroen, Fiat, Lancia, Autobianchi; 1975: Citroen, Fiat, Lancia; 1976-1986: Fiat, 
Lancia; 1987-1989: AlfaRomeo, Fiat, Lancia; 1990-1996: Alfa Romeo, Fiat, 
Lancia, Innocenti; 1997-1999: Alfa Romeo, Fiat, Lancia 
Ford Ford, Volvo (1999) 
Honda Honda 
Hyundai  Hyundai (starting 1980) 
DeTomaso Innocenti (1970-1989) 
Kia Kia (starting 1993) 
Mazda  Mazda (starting 1972) 
Mercedes Mercedes 
Mitsubishi  Mitsubishi (starting 1976) 
Nissan NissanDatsun 
GM OpelVauxhall, Saab (starting 1990) 
Peugeot Peugeot, Citroen (starting 1976), Talbot (1980-1986) 
Renault Renault 
Rover RoverTriumph (1970-1993), Rover (1970-1979), Triumph (1970-1979), Princess 
(1976-1979) 
Saab Saab (1970-1989) 
Seat  Seat (1983-1985) 
Fujuhi  Subaru (starting 1979) 
Suzuki  Suzuki (starting 1981) 
Toyota    Toyota 
VW Audi, Volkswagen, Seat (starting 1986), Skoda (starting 1993) 
Volvo Volvo (1970-1998) 
Yugo  Yugo (1981-1991) 
Daewoo  Daewoo (starting 1995) 
Daimler  MMC (1998-1999) 
DAF DAF (1970-1975) 
TalbotSimca 
HillmanSunbeam 
TalbotHillmanChrysler (1970-1979), TalbotSimca (1970-1977), TalbotSimca 
(1978-1979), TalbotMatra (1978-1979) 
TalbotMatra TalbotMatra (1970-1977) 
Lancia  Lancia (1971) 
Source: European car market database, own calculations 
 
Table B10. European car market: cross-ownership changes 
 
Firm (equivalent to corporate group) Brands 
Ford Group Mazda (33%) 
GM Group Subaru (20%), Suzuki (20%), Isuzu (12%), Fiat (10%)  
RenaultNissan Group Nissan (44%) 
Toyota Daihatsu (52%) 
DaimlerChrysler  Mitsubishi (24.7%) 
Hyundai Kia (60%) 
Source: Deustche Bank (2004) 
Note: The shares are given as of 2004; they may have been changing over time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C. European car market: descriptive statistics for concentration ratios and multimarket contact 
measures 
 
Table C1. European car market: descriptive statistics for multimarket contact measures (averages across 
years and firms))  
 
Firm Number of markets in which a firm is 
present 
Number of multiple contacts 
 Mean Std. deviation Mean Std. deviation 
Alfa Romeo 12.74 0.12 126.86 1.88 
BMW 15.54 0.20 131.40 2.52 
Daihatsu 4.20 0.12 53.42 1.56 
Fiat 21.99 0.08 202.15 1.14 
Ford 19.00 0.11 200.28 1.71 
Honda 12.72 0.24 138.51 2.37 
Hyundai 9.46 0.29 123.52 4.15 
De Tomaso 2.26 0.14 19.21 1.34 
Kia 8.96 0.35 122.22 5.14 
Mazda 12.79 0.12 152.25 1.84 
Mercedes 5.46 0.09 28.07 1.52 
Mitsubishi 9.53 0.11 117.5 1.33 
Nissan 15.64 0.12 174.04 1.62 
GM 21.91 0.12 210.28 1.78 
Peugeot 19.73 0.02 208.83 0.64 
Renault 17.32 0.12 183.46 1.72 
Rover 14.84 0.12 155.93 1.80 
Saab 5.72 0.29 54.38 2.26 
Seat 5.18 0.27 53.29 3.21 
Fujihi 1.59 0.09 20.34 1.16 
Suzuki 6.58 0.29 80.18 4.00 
Toyota 14.42 0.12 166.44 1.71 
VW 20.90 0.07 213.94 1.10 
Volvo 13.14 0.23 125.64 2.37 
Yugo 2.71 0.10 28.86 1.13 
Daewoo 14.36 0.56 185.44 7.30 
Daimler 2.5 0.50 37.50 7.50 
DAF 4.79 0.12 36.86 1.08 
Talbotsimca 14.03 0.16 121.94 2.10 
Talbotmatra 3.17 0.16 27.91 1.69 
Lancia 8.00 0.00 71.00 0.00 
Source: own estimations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C2. European car market: descriptive statistics for multimarket contact measures and number of 
competitors (averages across years and geographic-product markets))  
Firm Simple count Share-weighted  No. of competitors 
 mean std. dev. mean std. dev. mean std. dev. 
Belgium: compact  10.69 0.08 740.19 8.14 14.47 0.08 
Belgium: intermediate 11.88 0.05 810.88 10.48 12.86 0.09 
Belgium: luxury 9.93 0.21 1866.22 92.68 5.85 0.11 
Belgium: standard 11.41 0.13 938.40 16.70 12.59 0.10 
Belgium: subcompact 9.99 0.08 770.99 5.69 12.33 0.07 
France: compact  12.36 0.07 889.63 6.96 12.95 0.06 
France: intermediate 13.20 0.06 992.52 12.46 11.53 0.10 
France: luxury 10.08 0.28 2738.35 179.06 5.14 0.13 
France: standard 12.14 0.15 1142.59 22.60 11.01 0.10 
France: subcompact 11.96 0.12 1043.22 10.36 10.39 0.05 
Germany: compact  11.99 0.08 849.39 6.28 12.93 0.07 
Germany: intermediate 12.76 0.09 943.21 14.07 11.65 0.11 
Germany: luxury 10.08 0.22 1976.58 74.06 5.65 0.12 
Germany: standard 12.16 0.12 1079.97 15.53 10.72 0.08 
Germany: subcompact 11.60 0.09 965.55 11.02 10.90 0.09 
Italy: compact  13.53 0.09 1282.32 16.58 10.48 0.11 
Italy: intermediate 14.07 0.09 1412.00 27.84 9.68 0.14 
Italy: luxury 9.34 0.28 2138.78 76.93 5.05 0.10 
Italy: standard 12.66 0.16 1420.79 20.08 8.86 0.07 
Italy: subcompact 11.81 0.10 1227.70 14.60 9.49 0.09 
UK: compact  11.49 0.09 794.58 4.77 13.32 0.08 
UK: intermediate 12.32 0.05 863.61 11.10 12.49 0.11 
UK: luxury 9.69 0.23 2136.97 146.41 5.71 0.14 
UK: standard 11.67 0.15 1020.77 19.30 11.56 0.11 
UK: subcompact 11.36 0.09 933.01 8.00 11.21 0.08 
Source: own estimations 
 
Table C3. European car market: descriptive statistics for concentration ratios (across geographic-product 
markets) 
 No. obs. C1  C4  C8  
  mean std. dev. mean std. dev. mean std. dev. 
Belgium: compact  618 23.13 0.18 60.96 0.24 87.19 0.17 
Belgium: intermediate 588 24.80 0.19 67.25 0.32 90.70 0.17 
Belgium: luxury 211 61.80 0.66 96.63 0.18 100 0 
Belgium: standard 514 26.89 0.33 70.66 0.31 91.89 0.35 
Belgium: subcompact 742 24.44 0.12 66.73 0.18 93.18 0.11 
France: compact  541 33.44 0.27 80.36 0.19 95.47 0.08 
France: intermediate 488 48.47 0.34 88.43 0.18 97.83 0.09 
France: luxury 165 63.13 0.81 97.41 0.15 100 0 
France: standard 426 46.05 0.48 87.44 0.18 97.69 0.08 
France: subcompact 645 40.85 0.24 87.76 0.21 99.43 0.02 
Germany: compact  518 40.71 0.19 80.16 0.16 93.16 0.17 
Germany: intermediate 509 43.61 0.25 83.88 0.30 95.87 0.15 
Germany: luxury 199 73.58 0.66 98.48 0.10 100 0 
Germany: standard 422 38.14 0.43 86.76 0.22 98.05 0.07 
Germany: subcompact 635 28.41 0.38 76.74 0.38 97.26 0.09 
Italy: compact  447 38.18 0.56 81.85 0.36 97.88 0.14 
Italy: intermediate 418 42.57 0.86 83.03 0.46 97.29 0.19 
Italy: luxury 175 49.94 0.84 97.91 0.10 100 0 
Italy: standard 353 43.33 0.43 86.07 0.31 98.68 0.08 
Italy: subcompact 634 64.71 0.41 89.98 0.25 99.44 0.06 
UK: compact  557 32.49 0.30 74.76 0.38 92.28 0.15 
UK: intermediate 531 34.81 0.51 78.98 0.32 95.34 0.12 
UK: luxury 176 45.75 1.08 96.74 0.22 100 0 
UK: standard 439 31.36 0.58 74.56 0.52 93.82 0.23 
UK: subcompact 598 31.73 0.53 72.68 0.31 97.50 0.07 
Source: own calculations 
Note: in some geographic-product markets less than three firms can be present.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix D. European car market: descriptive statistics (dataset) 
 
Table D1. European car market: descriptive statistics for the European car market 
 
 mean std. err. min max 
Total European (No. observations: 11549) 
price/income 0.83 0.41 0.24 6.47 
sales 19813.24 37719.92 51 433694 
horsepower 57.14 23.88 13 169.5 
weight 978.87 225.41 520 1910 
width 164.38 9.62 122 188 
height 140.43 4.62 117.5 173.5 
fuel efficiency 8.18 1.72 4 18.6 
domestic car 
dummy 
0.19 0.39 0 1 
Belgium (No. observations: 2673) 
price/income 0.72 0.34 0.25 3.45 
sales 3925.42 4453.51 51 62410 
horsepower 56.53 23.71 13 165 
weight 976.00 227.46 520 1750 
width 164.16 9.82 122 188 
height 140.34 4.63 117.5 173.5 
fuel efficiency 8.22 1.76 4.5 18.6 
domestic car 
dummy 
0 0 0 0 
France (No. observations: 2265) 
price/income 0.75 0.32 0.27 3.59 
sales 23305.81 38090.45 279 300395 
horsepower 56.17 23.02 13 169 
weight 973.02 220.39 520 1750 
width 164.28 9.46 122 188 
height 140.46 4.85 117.5 173.5 
fuel efficiency 8.12 1.66 4.5 15.5 
domestic car 
dummy 
0.25 0.43 0 1 
Italy (No. observations: 2027) 
price/income 0.99 0.49 0.28 5.35 
sales 24292.14 45754.1 291 433694 
horsepower 57.22 24.86 13 169.5 
weight 978.69 229.32 520 1910 
width 164.06 9.99 122 188 
height 140.63 4.68 117.5 173.5 
fuel efficiency 8.08 1.69 4.6 18 
domestic car 
dummy 
0.24 0.42 0 1 
Germany (No. observations: 2283) 
price/income 0.65 0.27 0.24 2.45 
sales 31002.55 50282.04 350 414132 
horsepower 57.45 24.27 13 169 
weight 983.05 228.66 520 1750 
width 164.57 9.74 122 188 
height 140.49 4.66 117.5 173.5 
fuel efficiency 8.24 1.77 4 18 
domestic car 
dummy 
0.27 0.44 0 1 
UK (No. observations: 2301) 
price/income 1.05 0.45 0.32 6.47 
sales 19784.34 29875.92 296 193784 
horsepower 58.42 23.61 13 165 
weight 984.00 221.13 520 1825 
width 164.82 9.06 129.5 188 
height 140.27 4.29 122 173.5 
fuel efficiency 8.22 1.68 4.5 18 
domestic car 
dummy 
0.23 0.42 0 1 
Source: European car market database, own estimations 
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Abstract
This paper studies the introduction of new products (increase in prod-
uct variety) in the automobile industry. The focus is on the two sources of
market power that may allow the firms to get higher profits (and, thus, re-
coup investments): new products and brand-name reputation. The effects
of new products on the private incentives to innovate are investigated on
the basis of the dataset for the German car industry for 2003. The dataset
is rather unique in the sense that it contains detailed information on the
technical characteristics of cars, prices and sales as well as information on
the introduction of new car models (including new variants and versions)
into the German car market at a very disaggregate level. It has been
found that both a new model and brand-name reputation may allow the
innovative firms to get some market power and recoup their investments.
Competition is, however, not localized within a market segment and the
class of new, or old models, i.e., products from different market segments,
new and old products compete with each other (coexisting and not elimi-
nating each other) and do not constitute separate market niches. On the
other hand, new (old) models are perceived to be closer substitutes than
old (new) models. Consumer preferences towards brand and new products
vary depending on their age.
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1 Introduction
There has been a growing stream of literature, devoted to the introduction of
new goods. The major developments directions in this literature have been
summarized by Bresnahan and Gordon (1997). These are the historical treat-
ment of new goods and their diffusion over time, measurement of recent and
on-going innovations, in particular, quantifying social and/or private returns to
innovation, and adjustment for quality changes in the official price indices.
The notion of product innovations, which can be used in empirical studies,
has been conceptualized by Trajtenberg (1989). Product innovation has been
defined as the introduction of goods new to the market, or with improved quality
of the existing products.
Private returns from investment and consumer benefits from new goods can
be evaluated. A number of papers concentrates on the measurement of the
social welfare from the introduction of new products, or quantification of the
economic value of innovation (e.g., Trajtenberg, 1989 (for computed tomog-
raphy scanners), Hausman, 1994 (for a new brand of cereal), Hausman, 1997
(for cellular phones), Hausman et al., 1997 (for new services in telecommunica-
tions), Bresnahan et al., 1997 (for personal computers), Petrin, 2002 (for auto-
mobiles), Goolsbee and Petrin, 2002 (for direct broadcast satellites), Hausman
and Leonard, 2002 (for tissue paper), Cleanthous, 2004 (for pharmaceuticals),
Gentzkow, 2005 (for online news)). The new products allow the firms to enjoy
some transitory market power, which allows them to pay for innovation (Arrow,
1962).
Competition behavior and private incentives to innovate (also role of a brand
name) are explicitly addressed in a few empirical papers (e.g., Stern, 1996,
Bresnahan et al., 1997). Stern (1996) finds the pioneer (branded) products
to be closer substitutes with each other and to be substantially differentiated
from generic products. Bresnahan et al. (1997) find that moving forward a
technological frontier and relying on a brand-name reputation allowed innovative
PC firms to get transitory market power. They argue that the new products
can be protected from competition as they cannot be perfectly substituted with
the existing goods because of some novel features, or they may be cheaper
to produce. Product segmentation due to a brand name is another source of
innovative rents to the innovators. The role of brand-name reputation as a
premium for high quality has been addressed in a number of theoretical papers
(e.g., Shapiro, 1982, Wernerfelt, 1988). It has been found that consumers are
willing to pay a premium for high-quality products, and the protective umbrella
of a brand can be extended over the other products of a firm.
Hedonic prices indexes literature (e.g., Pakes, 2002) addresses a problem of
new goods in the price indexes and defends the use of such indexes as compared
to alternative price indexes.
Automobile industry appears to be interesting to study different aspects of
the economics of innovation. The industry is highly innovative and competitive
(with a lot of product and process innovations, product variation and prolifer-
ation). Simultaneously, there are high development costs, and reduced model
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cycles due to increased competition put additional pressure on the automobile
producers. The introduction of new, differentiated from existing products, mod-
els and the creation of new market niches may give the automotive firms some
transitory market power. This can yield profits to the innovators and allow
them to recoup their investments, and may also bring gains to the consumers.
On the other hand, brand differentiation is a good strategy against price
competition. Pricing pressure in the premium and luxury car market with more
differentiated products may be rather moderate as compared to the volume-
end car segment, and higher profit margins can be obtained. Competition may
rather concentrate on brand and product attributes and innovations, conse-
quently, there is more competition in quality. Through the establishment of
strong brands, the margins can be secured rather permanently. In addition, the
protective umbrella of a premium brand may be extended over the new prod-
ucts of a premium car producer. This generates larger cash flows, which leads
to more investment being undertaken by the premium and luxury car manufac-
turers. This, in turn, allows them to become the creators of competence and
technology.
To sum up, there could be two major sources of market power, which may
allow the automotive firms to recoup their investments: through building brand-
name reputation and the establishment of strong brands, which is rather per-
manent, and through the introduction of new products and the creation of new
market niches, which is rather temporary1.
Automobile industry literature seems to be not so rich in terms of studies
about the effects of the introduction of new products, or rents from innovative
investment. However, there is a number of studies, which construct hedonic
price indices for the automobile industry (e.g., Court, 1939, Griliches, 1961,
Ohta and Griliches, 1983). The studies that look explicitly at the economic
effects of new products introduction in the US automobile industry are the ones
by Petrin (2002) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (2004).
Petrin (2002) assesses the economic effects of the minivan introduction (Dodge
Caravan by Chrysler). He measures the change in the consumer welfare as well
as changes in the producer surplus through evaluating the extent of the first-
mover advantage and profit cannibalization by innovator (his profits were found
to be higher than development costs) and imitators (their variable profits were
falling each year). Potential demand for new products and the impact on the
market shares of the existing products has been evaluated by Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes (2004). The authors study this effect on the example of the intro-
duction of new ’high-end’ SUVs. In another prediction exercise they look at the
effects of the close-down of the GM Oldsmobile division in 2000 and find the car
models that have most benefitted from this closure. In general, in automobile
industry studies it has been found that higher quality cars appear to have higher
margins (e.g., Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995).
The purpose of this research paper has been to look whether it pays off
1 Intellectual property rights protection could be another mechanism to enjoy some rent
before the innovators catch up (as it has been in particular mentioned by Bresnahan et al.,
1997). This aspect is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
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to produce new models, i.e., whether there are mark-ups on new car models
specifications, which would allow the firms to cover the product development
costs and provide enough incentives to develop new products, and to investigate
the role of the brand-name reputation in the ability of the firm to get market
power and recoup its investments. In addition, I have intended to see whether
the competition is localized within volume or premium market segments (new
vs. old classes). The two mentioned above sources of market power may be
quite interlinked, which leads me to the empirical investigation whether both
new model and brand-name reputation contribute to the higher market power
(as compared e.g., to the introduction of new products by volume manufactur-
ers). That is, I have aimed to study the (simultaneous) impact of a new model
(innovation) and brand name (reputation) on the ability of the innovative firms
to get market power (i.e., whether the protective umbrella of a brand-name rep-
utation can be extended over new products, or continuous innovation creates
brand-name reputation).
The questions are investigated on the basis of the aggregate product-level
data for the German automobile market in 2003. This paper rather concentrates
on the measurement of the private benefits, as compared to the assessment of the
general welfare effects, due to the introduction of new car model specifications
(which differ in innovation value), and investigates this linkage to the role of
brand-name reputation to get market power, which has not been addressed in
the previous automotive industry studies. The importance of the principles of
differentiation such as market segment and new vs. old model for the automobile
markets is also addressed in this study.
New products in this paper are viewed as rather those new car model spec-
ifications that fill in the product space (product characteristics) and products
new to the firm (i.e., completely new products). Thus, another major difference
to the other papers is that my research focus is not on drastic, but rather incre-
mental innovations, or changes in the products’ features/products’ quality. The
advantage of the data for the German car market that I use in this research is
that one can study highly differentiated products at really a very disaggregate
level, so that all the product variety could be really captured2. It should be
also noted that in general in other industries a lot of products are introduced
into the market, which are not completely new products, but rather the exist-
ing products with added new or improved features. This also involves research
and development costs, therefore, it would be interesting to see whether this
strategy pays off. The continuation of the old model with new specifications is
an alternative to the introduction of a completely new model, concerning which
the firms should make strategic decisions3.
2The car model variant is the major item of competition in the automobile markets at
present. Firms compete in rather standardized product lines (models and their variants) and
not on individual car sales (Kaiser and Sofka, 2006).
3The literature that deals with modelling of the entry and exit in the differentiated prod-
ucts industries should be mentioned. The firms, both incumbents and entrants, face several
decisions concerning the placement of their products in the market. In general, the firm can
place its products close to its existing products, known as ’cannibalization’ (e.g., Schmalensee,
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The German car market is characterized by a high degree of new product
introductions, a large role of brand-name reputation and consumer loyalty, and
presence of important domestic premium and volume car manufacturers. It
is also a lead market for many innovations. All this makes it together to be
suitable and interesting to study the above stated research questions.
The incentives to innovate are studied within the context of a discrete choice
model. The structural oligopoly model for differentiated products is estimated
on the basis of the market-level data on prices, quantities, and product charac-
teristics. It has been found that both brand-name reputation and a new model
have positive impact on the market shares of firms. Consumers are rather
heterogenous within a market segment, however, there are more correlated pref-
erences for the cars of the same market segment than for the cars of different
market segments. New products do not constitute a separate market niche, they
compete with old products. However, there exists some differentiation between
new and old car model specifications, which may allow the firms to enjoy some
market power due to the new products introduction. It has been also found
that consumer preferences towards brand and new cars vary depending on their
age.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I discuss competition,
innovation, and brand-name reputation in the automobile markets, finishing
with the discussion of new product development in the German car market.
After that empirical structural framework, estimation procedure and ways to
address the research objectives of this paper are discussed, followed by the
descriptive statistics for the whole data sample and for the new models. The
paper concludes with the presentation of the empirical findings and discussion
of the results.
2 Competition and new products introduction
in the automobile markets
Increased global competition in the automobile markets has put pressure on
the global automotive players to direct their efforts to build up reputation and
pursue R&D activities to maintain, or increase their market shares. The com-
petition and innovation trends, role of brand-name reputation, and new product
development in the German automobile industry are discussed in the next sub-
sections.
2.1 Competition and innovation developments
Recently price competition has been growing in virtually each car market seg-
ment. It has become especially fierce in the volume car segment, where product
differentiation has faded away, and the products offered are rather similar and
1978, Eaton and Lipsey, 1979), or it can prempt the entire market (e.g., Spence, 1976, Brander
and Eaton, 1984, Bonnano, 1987).
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commoditised. In this case, the price becomes a major factor behind the pur-
chasing decision of a consumer. The volume producers pursue cost-price lead-
ership strategies to increase the market shares and profits. Competition may
have increased among premium producers as well, especially, under the weak-
ening role of brand-name reputation and quality problems by the premium car
producers.
As a general trend, there has been increasing competition for the premium
producers from the volume manufacturers attracted by higher profit margins.
On the other hand, some premium brand producers move to the lower-end car
market (e.g., Mini and BMW 1er by BMW, Smart by DaimlerChrysler), es-
tablishing premium niches in the entry segments in order to capture customers
already at the time of entering the car market for the first time. Competition
between premium and volume cars (in the same market segment) may intensify
when consumer demand stagnates. Another important trend is rising compe-
tition for European luxury brands from Asian ones. Japanese competitors are
gaining, in particular, reputation for building reliable cars.
Increased global competition in the automobile markets has put pressure
on the OEMs to look through their competitive strategies. The automobile
industry is characterized by the continuous product development and the in-
troduction of new products into the market (completely new models, models
with new and improved features and designs). There has been more electronics
being put into the car, more safety innovations, improvements in steering and
breaking systems, more innovations in the sphere of comfort and convenience,
more environmentally driven innovations and innovative materials.
The OEMs can respond to the competitive pressures by going to new mar-
ket segments or niches, which may help to maintain or increase market shares
and earn considerable returns. They may add new functional features to their
vehicles to differentiate their products. This differentiating advantage can how-
ever rather rapidly disappear as the other firms can do the same rather fast.
Thus, the competitive advantage can be only incremental but not sustainable
if the innovation is easy to copy. Furthermore, the car producers may increase
the quality of their cars but other global competitors may respond also rather
quickly to this. New models, new product segments and niches can offer better
pricing resistance. Furthermore, the new models can be generally cheaper pro-
duced than the previous generation after the adjustment for content differences
(because of learning curve effect, efficiency gains in the production process, etc.).
The strategy of new products segments and niches is not so easy to implement
as many key automobile players are present in almost all existing niches and
first-mover advantages may dissipate rather quickly. The above described de-
velopments sharpen market fragmentation further. Higher competition results
in the shorter product life of many products.
The above mentioned product innovations are accompanied by process in-
novations, namely, the introduction of labour-saving, capital-saving, and input-
saving techniques. This can allow to generate economies of scale and scope,
which may help to cover high investment costs for model development and con-
siderable fixed costs in the industry. The long life of a car model (6-7 years)
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is under pressure towards shortening under the growing competition. Platform
strategies (identical platforms are used for various models) have been pursued
by the automotive players.
The process of constant product and process innovations involves high prod-
uct development costs. For example, the joint development of Toyota Aygo,
Citroen C1 and Peugeot 107 has cost EUR 1.3 bn of investments (Sofka and
Zimmermann, 2005).
To sum up, the car manufacturers compete not only in price but new prod-
ucts development for maximum profits. The results are the proliferation of new
products and the growing fragmentation of markets (customers are increasingly
demanding and differentiated, with preferences towards a broad variety of mod-
els and variants). Simultaneously, the product innovations can be relatively
easily adopted by the other car manufacturers, that is why, they cannot be
viewed as a permanent answer to the new competitive challenges. Here, the de-
velopment of a brand name can become an important factor of rather permanent
market power.
2.2 Brand-name reputation and premium brands
It has been argued that largely the premium and luxury car market introduces
new technologies. Usually the competitive advantage from a single functional
feature is rather short-lived, as it may be rather quickly adopted by the volume
segment of the market. The rivals’ technologies and new products features are
quickly followed in this market segment.
The strategy of continuous technological improvement is being pursued by
some OEMs such as Mercedes, which allowed them to create a leading edge
brand image. European car manufacturers are argued to have a competitive
edge because they can differentiate by model, in addition to brand identity
(McKinsey Global Institute, 2005). The premium OEMs differentiate also in
style, as it is important not to have scaled-down, or upscaled versions of each
other. The luxury producers may rather concentrate on the consistency of the
model designs over time, which helps them to build consumer loyalty (Thomas
and Weigelt, 2000). The addition of new features may not make the consumers
switch to competing models. Thus, there will be less intrasegment competition
as compared to the volume segment. Because of the consumer loyalty, the
OEMs, both premium and volume, try to capture the customers already in the
entry-level car market segments.
Premium brand customers exhibit higher brand loyalty and consumer iner-
tia, which may alleviate the competition pressure, reduce marketing costs and,
consequently, lead to the higher profit margins by the premium brand producers
than by the volume manufacturers.
As a result of the above described developments, there appears to be a shift
in the traditional pattern of the European automobile demand, the so-called
”loss of the middle” (Dudenhoeffer, 2006). The traditionally strong middle car
market segment appears to be less important, while the OEMs’ success appears
to be to a large extent determined in the premium and entry market segments.
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The automobile manufacturers in the traditional middle car market segment
such as Ford, Opel or VW lose their market shares, while the premium segment
producers such as BMW or Mercedes, or producers in the entry market segment
such as Toyota, Peugeot, Renault or Hyundai win market shares. As a result,
brand differentiation seems to be even more important as it is difficult to reduce
the gap between the entry and premium market segments.
As for brand consumer loyalty, there have been some surveys done (e.g.,
Dralle, 2006). Audi has the highest share of loyal customers (74%), followed by
BMW and Mercedes (71%). The mentioned criteria behind the Audi’s success
are clear positioning and product success, while BMW is argued to bind its
customers through the introduction of new products.
To sum up, brand strength and quality reputation could be important sources
of pricing power, in addition to cost factors such as features, performance and
design of a car. The OEMs try to win consumer loyalty (already in the entry-
level segment) and build up long-term relationships with their customers.
2.3 Product development in the German automobile mar-
ket
Generally several major terms could be distinguished while talking about prod-
uct development in the automobile markets that have been described by Diez
(2001). These are product innovation, model changeover and product variation,
and product proliferation.
Product innovation is defined in the automobile industry as the introduction
of a completely new model by a producer. The value of the innovation of a
new product can be measured by a change of technical-quality and/or formal-
aesthetic features of a vehicle. Here it is possible to differentiate between two
cases: the introduction of a new model to widen the product program, and the
introduction of a new model to change an already existing in the market model
(i.e., model changeover). The product development processes are very similar
in both cases.
For the model change-over policy there are two very much connected vari-
ables: degree of innovation value and duration of a model cycle. Product varia-
tion (also Relaunch) is defined as the change of an already existing in the market
model while keeping the major construction features. In the automobile eco-
nomics the product variation is usually characterized as face-lifting. The role
of the face-lifting is a technical and optical updating of a model. In this case
further product development as by a model changeover is not implied. The ob-
jective of the face-lifting is to support a planned model cycle. The advantage of
the face-lifting as compared to the model change-over is that the existing in the
market products are not sold at strongly reduced prices. The most often used
measures of face-lifting are the introduction of a new aggregate or component
(e.g., motor); change of an exterior or interior; widening of a model equipment
(e.g., special equipment becomes standard model equipment).
Product proliferation is defined as widening of a product program through
product differentiation and widening of a product width. Product differentia-
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tion implies the classification of a model into different types depending on motor
performance, mode of drive, build, and equipment packages. The widening of
a product width means the introduction of an additional model. One of the
objectives of the product proliferation is the support of a model cycle. As com-
pared to the face-lifting, the product proliferation has an innovative character.
Three types of strategies can be distinguished: full-line-producer (both vertical
and horizontal product differentiation), specialized producers (either vertical or
horizontal product differentiation) and niche producers. The major risk by prod-
uct differentiation are substitution effects between different types of a model or
between different models (’cannibalization’). There are costs risks: product de-
velopment (type-specific R&D expenses), production (type-specific investments
are needed), sales and service. There is a risk of not achieving economies of
scale effect.
The German car market is characterized by a lot of new models introduc-
tions. These introductions and product variety are at different levels: model,
model variant and version (see Table 1).
Table 1. German automobile market: levels of model disaggregation
Category Example
group VW Group
brand VW
line Passat
model Passat Variant
model variant/version Passat Variant 4Motion Highline 85 kw
Source: Federal Bureau of Motor Vehicles and Drivers (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt
(KBA))
Each car model specification in my dataset has the year and month of intro-
duction into the German car market (the detailed descriptive statistics of this
dataset will follow later). Within those models that are characterized by 2003
year of introduction several classes can be distinguished4 (see Table 2):
Group 1. Entirely new models (e.g., Smart forfour).
Group 2. Supplemental items: existing products with some new features
added (with added functional features, improved quality, higher performance
(e.g., diesel variant, higher horsepower), etc.).
Group 3. Replacement items: e.g., a new generation of a car (e.g., Lancia
Ypsilon).
Table 2. German automobile market: model policy of car manufacturers
4The classification of new models that I use is based upon the classification by Armknecht,
Lane and Stewart (1997) in Bresnahan and Gordon (1997) who distinguish among the following
cases of new products:
1. Replacement items: these are new models, which are previously available items that are
or soon will be discontinued, such as the current year‘s automobile models.
2. Supplemental items: they include newly added brands of currently available goods (e.g.,
cereal) and new ways to sell a service (e.g., airline travel).
3. Entirely new items: these are those, which are not closely tied to any previously available
item.
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No. and New (by KBA) Entirely Supple Replace
best-selling new mental ment
models
Mini (16) Renault Lancia Smart& Lancia
Twingo, Ypsilon prabus; Ypsilon
Smart, (09/2003) Ka SportKa
VW Polo
Small (37) VW Polo, Citroen C2 Citroen A2 1.4 TDI; Mazda 2
Opel Corsa, (08/2003), C2, Fiat Punto
Ford Fiesta, Mazda 2 (01/2003), Smart 1.3 JTD
Skoda Fabia Smart Forfour Forfour Dynamic
(09/2003)
Low (32) VW Golf, Mazda 3 Megane 2.0 Mazda 3
middle Bora, (08/2003) Luxe
Opel Astra, Privilege
Ford Focus
Middle (38) BMW 3er, Daewoo Evanda 320 cd; Daewoo
VW Passat, (02/2003), VW Variant Evanda,
Mercedes Mazda RX-8 TDI Highline Mazda
C-Klasse (11/2003) RX-8
Upper (23) Mercedes Kia Opirus Kia Opirus Nissan 350Z
middle E-Klasse, (05/2003),
BMW 5er, Nissan 350Z
Audi A6, S6 (10/2003)
Source: own classification on the basis of the Federal Bureau of Motor Vehicles
and Drivers (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt (KBA)) data
The value of innovation is different for all these three classes of new products.
As it has been mentioned above, the value of the innovation can be measured by
a change of technical quality and/or formal-aesthetic features of a vehicle5. The
highest innovation value is by the entirely new items, followed by the replace-
ment models and supplemental items. The product development processes are
very similar in case of entirely new and replacement models. In my dataset the
new models are mostly the so-called supplemental items (new variants and ver-
sions of cars, or variants/versions with added new features) (for some examples,
see Table 2 above).
For my estimations I define all these classes as a new product group. This
combined definition of new products seems to be suitable for investigating my re-
5Clark et al. (1987) discuss the product development in the automobile industry and argue
in general: ”New products may simply be those incorporating minor changes to the established
designs (for example, a washing machine with an almond cabinet instead of a white one), or
they may use new technology to create new markets (the Xerox 914 copier)”.
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search objectives. Many of these new car specifications capture product prolifer-
ation, which has an innovative character, and not just face-lifting6. In addition,
as I have mentioned before, the new products in this paper are viewed as rather
those new car model specifications that fill in the product space (product char-
acteristics) and products new to the firm (i.e., completely new products). My
research focus is not on drastic but rather incremental innovations, or changes in
the products’ features/products’ quality. Not so many completely new models
and replacement items were introduced in 2003.
3 Empirical structural framework and estima-
tion procedure
3.1 Empirical structural framework
3.1.1 Demand
Utility (McFadden’s (1978) utility specification) Assume that consumer
i, i = 1, ..., n has utility uij = u
¡
xj , ξj , pj ; θ
¢
from consuming product j, j =
1, ..., J , where j = 0 is an outside good, xj and ξj are observed (e.g., horsepower,
engine size) and unobserved (e.g., style, image) product characteristics, pj is the
price of product j, and θ = (α, β) are the parameters to be estimated.
The linear version of the random indirect utility is given by:
uij = δj + /ij , i = 1, ..., n, j = 0, ..., J (1)
where /ij is assumed to be identically and independently distributed across
consumers and products.
The mean valuation for product j common to all consumers is:
δj ≡ xjβ − αpj + ξj (2)
It is assumed that a consumer purchases one unit of good that brings him
the highest utility. Therefore, consumer i purchases one unit of product j if and
only if
uij > uik, 0 ≤ k ≤ J, k 6= j (3)
Consequently, the probability sij that the consumer i purchases the product
j is:
sij = Pr {δj + /ij > δk + /ik, j 6= k} =
= Pr {/ik < /ij + δj − δk, j 6= k} =Z ∞
−∞
Fj (/ij + δj − δ0, ..., /ij , ..., /ij + δj − δJ) (4)
6Announced for 2003 facelifts include Ford Mondeo, and Alfa Romeo 156 (Autobild, 2003).
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where Fj are the partial derivatives of the joint cumulative distribution func-
tion F of (/i0, ..., /iJ) with respect to its jth argument.
Different specifications of the discrete choice models for the demand side can
be derived depending on the assumptions about the distribution of the random
utility term /ij , in particular, simple logit, multinominal nested logit, principles
of differentiation generalized extreme value (PD GEV7) and random coefficients
models. Below I present the empirical framework and later discuss the results
on the basis of the two-level multinominal nested logit (the estimations results
are, however, also presented for the one-level nested logit).
Two-level multinominal nested logit It is assumed that there are G + 1
exhaustive and mutually exclusive groups, g = 0, ..., G, where 0 is an outside
good. In each group there are further subgroups Hg, h = 1, ...,Hg. Utility uij
of household i for product j in subgroup h of group g is given by8:
uij = xjβ−αpj + ξj + εig +(1− σg) εihg +(1− σhg) εij , j ∈ hg ⊂ g,∀i,∀j (5)
where δj ≡ xjβ − αpj + ξj and /ij = εig + (1− σg) εihg + (1− σhg) εij .
Variation in consumer tastes enters through the last term.
The error term /ij is decomposed into an iid shock, a group-specific compo-
nent and a sub-group specific component. εig, εih, εij are standard for the nested
logit distributions, εig, εig + (1− σg) εihg and εig +(1− σg) εihg + (1− σhg) εij
are assumed to have an extreme value distribution. It is assumed that εij are
uncorrelated across customers; for a particular customer, ε’s, which belong to
the same group, will be more correlated with each other than with the ε’s that
belong to any other group (εig9); and for a particular customer, ε’s, which be-
long to the same subgroup, will be more correlated with each other than with
the ε’s that belong to any other subgroup (εihg). That is, the products of the
same sub-group or group share common features, for which consumers may have
correlated preferences. Nesting parameters σhg and σg can be interpreted as
random coefficients on discrete dummies for subgroups and groups rather than
on variables that are continuously measured (e.g., performance or size)10 .
σhg measures the degree of substitutability of products in a subgroup, and σg
is the degree of substitutability of products in a group. The following 0 ≤ σg <
σhg < 1 should hold to be consistent with random utility maximization. That
is, consumer preferences will be more correlated across all products of the same
subgroup than across products of the same group but a different subgroup.
Consequently, relatively plausible substitution patterns can be obtained, and
7This model has been first suggested by Bresnahan et al. (1997).
8 In the exposition below, I follow Berry (1994), Verboven (1996) and Brenkers and Ver-
boven (2006), after McFadden (1978) and Ben-Akiva and Lehrman (1985).
9For consumer i, the variable ε is common to all products in a group g and has a distribution
function that depends on σg . Similar interpretation is for a subgroup.
10 In my estimations I do not allow the correlation parameters to vary across groups and
subgroups.
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localized competition between the products from the same group or subgroup
can be allowed.
The above mentioned assumptions upon the aggregation of choices across
all consumers result in the well-known formulas of the nested logit model for
the conditional choice probabilities. The mean utility for the outside good is
normalized to zero, δ0 = 0. The market share for a car j in subgroup h, group
g can be written down as:
sj =
eδj/(1−σhg)
eIhg/(1−σhg)
eIhg/(1−σg)
eIg/(1−σg)
eIhg
eI
(6)
where Ihg , Ig and I are called "inclusive values" , which are defined in the
following way:
Ihg = (1− σhg) ln
JhgX
j=1
eδl/(1−σhg), Ig = (1− σg) ln
HgX
h=1
eIhg/(1−σg), I = ln
GX
g=1
eIg
(7)
with Jhg being the set of cars in a subgroup h of a group g, and Hg being
the set of subgroups in a group g.
Berry (1994) suggested the log-linearization of the above formula for the
market share. The demand equation that can be taken to the estimations can
be written down as:
ln(sj/s0) = xjβ − αpj + σhg ln
¡
sj/hg
¢
+ σg ln
¡
sh/g
¢
+ ξj (8)
where sj is the share of product j in the total market, s0 os the share of
the outside good in the total market, sj/hg is the market share of product j in
subgroup h of a group g, sh/g is the share of all products in subgroup h in a
group g.
Substitution patterns The two-level nested logit has the assumption that
consumers tastes have an extreme value distribution but allows consumer tastes
to be correlated (in a restrictive way) across product j (correlations between
groups and subgroups are modelled in a simple way). This allows for more
reasonable substitution patterns as compared to a simple logit. Nevertheless,
as compared to the more general random coefficients model, the correlation
patterns depend on the groupings of products, which are determined prior to
the estimation. They do not depend on the values of continuous variables.
The group dummy variables could be viewed at least as a partial proxy for the
omitted continuous variables (e.g., the cars from the same group are likely to
have similar performance, size, and other characteristics) (Nevo, 2000).
The own price elasticity Esj/pj of the market share sj of product j is:
Esj/pj =
∂sj
∂pj
pj
sj
= −αpj
∙
1
1− σhg
−
µ
1
1− σhg
− 1
1− σg
¶
sj/hg −
σg
1− σg
sj/g − sj
¸
(9)
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The cross-price elasticity Esj/pm of the market share of product j with re-
spect to the price of product m pm, when j and m belong to the same subgroup,
is given by:
Esj/pm =
∂sj
∂pm
pm
sj
= αpm
∙µ
1
1− σhg
− 1
1− σg
¶
sm/hg +
σg
1− σg
sm/g + sm
¸
(10)
The cross-price elasticity Esj/pk of the market share of product j with respect
to the price of product k pk, when k belongs to a different subgroup in the same
group, is given by:
Esj/pk =
∂sj
∂pk
pk
sj
= αpk
∙
σg
1− σg
sk/g + sk
¸
(11)
The cross-price elasticity Esj/pl of the market share of product j with respect
to the price of product l pl, when l belongs to a different group, is given by:
Esj/pl =
∂sj
∂pl
pl
sj
= αplsl (12)
Introducing consumer heterogeneity (age differentiation) As it has
been mentioned above, the two-level nested logit still results in rather restricted
substitution patterns. Some consumer heterogeneity could be introduced into
the model through interacting product characteristics with consumer character-
istics, e.g., age in some flexible way. The likely constraints that age imposes
on preference-based consumer car choices could be, therefore, exploited: a con-
sumer has a different probability of choosing a specific car depending upon his
age.
Such type of estimation may allow getting more reasonable substitution pat-
terns (consumers’ valuation for cars will vary across consumers of different age)
without adding up any computational burden to the estimation procedure. The
idea is to compute a purchase probability for an ”average” consumer in each
age group and sum up these probabilities to generate the market shares for
each product j. The total market size will be the population of this age in the
country in a given year.
The above demand equation (8) is, thus, estimated for each age group:
ln(saj/s
a
0) = xjβi − αipj + σihg ln
³
saj/hg
´
+ σig ln
³
sah/g
´
+ ξij (13)
where ai stands for a respective age group, saj is the share of product j in
the total market for age group a, sa0 is the share of the outside good in the total
market for age group a, saj/hg is the share of product j in subgroup h of group
g for age group a, sah/g is the share of all products in subgroup h in group g
for age group a. Product characteristics and prices are the same for each age
group. The coefficients βi and αi will be different for each age group.
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In this case each age group has a different price sensitivity that is averaged
to a mean price sensitivity using the age-group specific probabilities of purchase
as weights.
3.1.2 Costs and firm behaviour
The log-linear marginal cost function is assumed:
ln(cj) = wjγ + ωj (14)
where wj and ωj are observed and unobserved product characteristics, re-
spectively, and γ are the parameters to be estimated.
Assume F sellers of a differentiated product11 .
Firm f produces Jf of F total differentiated products. The demand for a
product j is given by Msj (p,X; θ), where M is the market size.
Let PJf be the set of prices that the player f sets. Product characteristics
for any year are assumed to be exogenous.
Assume that the outside good is competitively supplied.
The firm f chooses PJf to maximize its profits, for given J and pj with
j ∈ Jf :
max
pJf
πf =
X
j∈Jf
(pj − cj)Msj (p)−
X
j∈Jf
Fj (15)
where cj is the constant marginal cost of a brand j, sj (p) is the market share
of a brand j, being a function of all brands’ prices, and Fj is a fixed cost.
The first-order conditions for the manufacturer f ’s profit maximization prob-
lem are (assuming that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in prices exists and
that prices are strictly positive):
sj (p) +
X
r∈Jf
(pr − cr)
∂sr (p)
∂pj
= 0 (16)
Let firm f have k (f) products, which are indexed by j = Jf1 , ..., J
f
k(f), with
J11 = 1 and J
F
k(F ) = J .
Define the matrix of own- and cross-price elasticities ∆f as:
∆f =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
∂s(Jf1 )
∂p(Jf1 )
...
∂s
?
Jfk(f)
?
∂p(Jf1 )
... ... ...
∂s(Jf1 )
∂p
?
Jfk(f)
? ...
∂s
?
Jfk(f)
?
∂p
?
Jfk(f)
?
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(17)
In vector notation, the first-order conditions for J total products simultane-
ously can be written down as:
11 In the exposition below, I follow Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995).
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⎛
⎝
s1
...
sJ
⎞
⎠
s
+
⎛
⎝
41 0
...
0 4F
⎞
⎠
Ω
⎛
⎝
p1 − c1
...
pj − cj
⎞
⎠
p−c
= 0 (18)
Assume thatΩ is a non-singular matrix. Therefore, the first-order conditions
can be expressed as:
p = c+Ω−1s (19)
with the marginal cost equation taking up the following form:
ln(p−Ω−1s) = wγ + ω (20)
The term Ω−1s is a mark-up. Therefore, variable profits can be calculated
on the basis of the estimated structural model for differentiated products.
Within the last equation, most often Bertrand-Nash behaviour with single-
product firms, or Bertrand-Nash behaviour with multi-product firms is assumed.
3.2 Estimation strategies for the demand- and supply-side
equations
In general, the demand and pricing equations can be estimated either separately,
or jointly. Under the separate, or step-by-step, estimation, the demand equa-
tion is estimated first, after which the matrix of own- and cross-price elasticities
is constructed on the basis of the estimated demand parameters. The pricing
equation is estimated in the second step after having substituted into it the ma-
trix of the elasticities. The standard errors of the pricing equation parameters
have to be corrected. There are several advantages of this two-step procedure,
e.g., reduction in the computational burden, experimenting with different sup-
ply specifications without re-estimating the demand function, no impact from
possible supply model misspecification on the demand side results (Goldberg
and Verboven, 2001)12. The major drawback of this procedure is the loss in the
efficiency of the estimated parameters. In this paper step-by-step estimation
results are presented.
3.3 Instruments
Prices and market shares are endogenous, correlated with the error term ξj .
The prices will be collinear with the product characteristics that are not ob-
served (e.g., quality). The introduction of product fixed effects to control for
the unobserved characteristics can lead to an identification problem due to the
correlation between fixed effects and product characteristics.
The detailed discussion of the choice of the efficient instruments for differ-
entiated products models can be found in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995).
12Step-by-step estimations are also performed by Nevo (2001).
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The best candidates for the instruments in the differentiated product markets
are the model characteristics, which are usually treated to be exogenous, based
on the assumption that in the short run they cannot be quickly adjusted by
a firm. Thus, the matrix Z of instruments includes the product’s own charac-
teristics (which decreases the number of necessary additional instruments) and
other exogenous variables used in the estimations.
The car’s own price and demand will be correlated with the physical char-
acteristics of the other products, and depend on the degree and closeness of
competition that the firms face with the other competitors. The distance from
the nearest neighbouring product will determine the markup of each brand. The
functions of the exogenous physical characteristics (own and competitors’) can
be used as instruments (sums and averages).
Bresnahan et al. (1997) suggest the following groups of instruments: princi-
ples of differentiation (defined on a group-specific basis), ownership (defined on
a firm-specific basis, making use of the economics of the multiproduct pricing)
and ownership with principles of differentiation (combination of a group-specific
and a firm-specific basis).
The set of instrumental variables can be expanded by including the prices
of products in the other markets, suggested by Nevo (2000), following Hausman
et al. (1984) and Hausman (1996).
Another important set of instruments comes from the supply side. Supply-
side intruments will be not related to the car demand: these are the variables
that enter the cost and do not enter the demand equation.
4 Measurement of private incentives to inno-
vate: an empirical approach
The previously described empirical framework allows studying the research ques-
tions in the following way: look at the impact of a premium brand and a new
product on the market shares, study different principles of differentiation to
make inferences about competition patterns (in particular, concerning new prod-
ucts), investigate substitution patterns and compare markups for new and old
products.
4.1 Principles of differentiation for the car market: new
vs. old models classes and premium vs. volume mar-
ket segments
The car market can be characterized by different principles of differentiation.
The most obvious one is by market segment. Another principle of differentiation
such as new vs. old model may appear at the first sight not so obvious, but still
it could be an important principle of differentiation, taking also into account a
recent increased emphasis on the introduction of new models and growing model
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proliferation by the car manufacturers. This principle of differentiation will be
discussed in more detail in Section 6.2.
Two issues have to be taken into account here: the definition of a premium
brand and the definition of a new product, or model. This will allow defining
new and old car models classes as well as premium and volume car market
segments.
The estimation of the nested logit, or PD GEV model with the above prin-
ciples of differentiation appears to be suitable for studying the consumer pref-
erences within the market segment, however, the grouping choice matters for
inference. Segment correlation coefficients can be interpreted in terms of prod-
ucts substitutability and competition patterns.
The idea behind this approach is to see whether and to what extent the
premium products are insulated from competition from the volume products.
The same is for the new vs. old products, i.e., to see whether the new and old
products compete with each other, or the new products enter a separate market
niche. The answers to these questions depend on the degree of heterogeneity
of consumers in their willingness to pay for a new and/or premium product13 .
Counterfactuals (introduction of a hypothetical new product into a particular
group, or a model discontinuation) can be conducted to get some idea whether
the products in various groups are protected from competition as it is reflected
by the substitution parameters.
The application of this approach will help to get some inferences about com-
petition behaviour in each market segment and the interaction of competition
between the market segments as well as allow to study the simultaneous im-
pact of a brand-name reputation and a new model on market power (namely,
one could expect that new and branded products will have the highest market
power).
4.2 Impact of a premium brand and a new product on
market shares
The coefficient on the premium brand preference can be interpreted as for
whether the consumers prefer premium products over volume ones, whether
they place greater value on the premium products. Similar interpretation will
hold for the new model coefficient. Many people prefer (e.g., because of individ-
uality, fashion, desire to have a sports car version, or a more powerful car) new
car model specifications despite the availability of old, or existing in the market
car model specifications. Individual brand dummies can be included into the
demand equations to investigate the difference in the impact between premium
and volume brands.
This approach will help to answer whether there is a reward for innovation,
and will allow to study the simultaneous impact of a brand-name reputation
and a new model on the market shares (whether they help to maintain/increase
market shares).
13This has been first suggested by Bresnahan et al. (1997) for a personal computer industry.
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4.3 Investigation of substitution patterns and estimation
of markups for new and old products
On the basis of the estimated demand parameters, the matrix of own- and
cross-price elasticities can be constructed and markups can be calculated.
High values of own-price elasticities could be interpreted as a sign of intense
price competition. The cross-price elasticity is an appropriate measure of the
distance between the two goods, a measure of how close the consumers find both
goods to be substitutes. The high cross-price elasticities can be interpreted as
consumers viewing the products to be close substitutes and also as a sign of
intense price competition. To sum up, when the segment own- and cross-price
elasticities are found to be large and significant, that may be interpreted as a
sign of significant competition, or ”cannibalization” between the brands within
a particular market segment.
One could compare the cross-price elasticities of products with respect to
the cars from the same sugbroup (e.g., the sugbroup is premium vs. volume
model14) within a market segment, with respect to the cars from a different
subgroup within the same market segment, and with respect to the cars from
different market segments. In the volume car segment, the products are closer
substitutes, so that higher cross-price elasticities will be expected. In the pre-
mium car segment, the products are more differentiated, so that lower cross-price
elasticities should be observed. The cross-price elasticities with respect to a dif-
ferent subgroup or market segment could be interpreted concerning the compe-
tition pattern in the given market segment (i.e., cross-price elasticities between
volume and premium cars, or e.g., between small and medium cars (compare
elasticities between any two premium (volume) cars and cross-price elasticities
between premium and volume cars)). The cross-price elasticities for the pre-
mium/volume products should be higher within the subgroup as compared to
the cross-price elasticities of the premium/volume products with respect to vol-
ume/premium products outside of the subgroup. This could be interpreted as
isolation of competition. The cross-price elasticities with respect to the cars
from different market segments should be lower.
Similar analysis could be done for new vs. old products. The new products
may have lower price elasticities (within-group) as compared to the existing
products (within-group) because they may face less price competition. The
fact how close substitutes the new and existing products are will determine the
consumer and producer surplus.
The estimation of the structural model for differentiated products allows
to recover the marginal costs. Thus, markups (and price-cost margins) for
new premium and volume products can be estimated to see whether there is a
premium for a brand, and to compare how they differ to the ones on the existing
products. Models with similar vehicles characteristics, which differ mainly in
the brand name, could be compared to see, whether there is a price premium
for a brand (estimation of the rents attributable to brand name). If there are
14The examples of the nesting order in this case could be: 1) segment, premium vs. volume,
or 2) segment, premium vs. volume, new vs. old.
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price differentials between new and old models, usually the question is whether
the higher prices are caused by marginal costs, or by higher markups15.
This method will allow to quantify a reward for innovation, study the simul-
taneous impact of a brand-name reputation and a new model as well as help
to investigate the competition patterns within and across car market segments
and sub-segments.
For the investigation of the effects from the introduction of completely new
models, which could probably be a closer approximation to the quantification
of the rents from innovation and could provide basis for a richer analysis (in-
cluding in particular the investigation of static and dynamic effects, also direct
comparison of producer profits from new products introduction and product
development costs), one would need to have a much longer dataset (including
pre- and post-introduction new model period16). In this case the methodology
will be similar to the one by Petrin (2002), which is described below.
Petrin (2002) assesses the economic effects of the minivan introduction (Dodge
Caravan by Chrysler). He measures the change in the consumer welfare as well
as changes in the producer surplus through evaluating the extent of the first-
mover advantage and profit cannibalization by innovator (his profits were found
to be higher than development costs) and imitators (their variable profits were
falling each year). He finds that the consumer welfare was raised as well as
the innovator’s profits increased at the expense of the other car producers who
could not respond quickly to the minivan introduction. He estimates both the
demand and cost side, after which these estimates are used to recompute the
equilibrium prices and quantities when the new minivan is not included into the
choice set. The simulated and observed prices and quantities are summarized
into the welfare. The author argues that the new products that are substantially
differentiated from the existing products can bring large profits to the innova-
tor and considerable gains to the consumer. The author finds that competition
leads to the improvement of the consumer welfare because the firms tend to
cannibalize each other’s profits when they search for new goods that would give
them some temporary market power.
Because the data on the cost of new product development is not available
and I have got only one cross-section of data, I am using the described above in
15The change in the producer variable profits from a new product introduction could be
calculated.
16To investigate the difference in the rents to innovation attributable to a brand, one could
then investigate whether a premium car producer gets a higher return to each euro invested
in innovation (development of a new model) than a volume car producer. One could also then
study the impact of the introduced new models on the prices of the existing products. The
estimation of the consumer welfare will also make sense in such a situation.
The estimated welfare gains from new products, or services introduction vary in different
papers. The welfare gains are likely to be small when the new products are similar to the
products that are already in the market (e.g., different brands of cereals (Hausman, 1994)).
Considerable consumer gains have been found by Hausman (1997) from a cellular phone
introduction, Hausman et al. (1997) from the introduction of new services in telecommu-
nications, by Cleanthous (2004) from pharmaceutical innovations in the US antidepressant
market. Rather low welfare gains have been found by Goolsbee and Petrin (2002) from the
introduction of direct broadcast satellites as an alternative to cable television.
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this Section approaches to answer my research questions (mainly following the
approach by Bresnahan et al., 1997).
5 Data description
The dataset for the German automobile industry in 2003 has been constructed
on the basis of two data sources: Federal Bureau of Motor Vehicles and Drivers
(Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt (KBA)), which collects information on new car registra-
tions by car model, registrations across state, age, gender, and corporate sta-
tus17, and car evaluation company Eurotax Schwacke, which provides informa-
tion on prices and quality vehicles characteristics. These two datasets have been
merged together. The data on registrations, prices and quality vehicles charac-
teristics are very disaggregate and are at the level of model/type/variant/version.
The dataset has been further enriched by the data on advertising expendi-
tures, environmental statistics, reputation ranking, loss in value, and the number
of defects. The data sources for these variables and a more detailed description
are discussed below. These data are, however, mostly available for the higher
levels of aggregation, not at the variant, or version level.
The data on advertising expenditures is available from the publication "Der
ADAC18-AutoMarxX im Dezember 2003" issued by the Center of Automotive
Research, Fachhochschule Gelsenkirchen, for 33 brands. The reputation ranking
has been also taken from this publication19. This publication contains also the
data on a value loss.
The data on environmental and ecological statistics (e.g., fuel consumption
in litres/100 km, ecotest overall points), available at a rather disaggregate level,
to measure economic and ecological efficiency are provided by the ADAC and are
available in the publication "Der ADAC EcoTest: 300 Automodelle im Umwel-
tranking".
The data on defects statistics are taken from the publication by the ADAC
"Die ADAC-Pannenstatistic 2003". The available series is the number of tech-
nical defects per 1000 automobiles. The level of disaggregation is a model
17The available dataset contains the data on sales for both physical and corporate persons.
Among the five market segments, small and lower middle car markets are the largest ones for
physical buyers, while for corporate persons lower middle and middle car segments are the
most important ones. The estimation results are based on the total industry sales (except
for age differentiation case), not distinguishing between the sales for physical persons and
fleet sales. The purchasing decisions could be quite different for physical persons and for
institutional buyers. All other automobile market studies are also done for the total sales,
so that for the better comparison of the results it seems worthwile to proceed as it is. It
should be, however, acknowledged that the corporate car sales may not be that important for
the other car markets as they are for the German car market. The sensitivity of the results
has been performed with respect to the sales for physical persons only, and no significant
differences in the results have been found.
18ADAC stands for the General German Automobile Club (Allgemeiner Deutscher
Automobil-Club). This is one of the largest German transport clubs.
19According to this ranking, the top ten brands are Mercedes, BMW, Audi, Volkswagen,
Porsche, Volvo, Opel, Jaguar, Renault, and Toyota. The brands with the lowest reputation
are Lancia, Rover, Subaru, Daihatsu, and Suzuki.
21
level (e.g., BMW Mini, Mitsubishi Colt, Toyota Yaris, Audi A4/S4, etc). An-
other source is "Der ADAC-AutoMarxX im Dezember 2003", where the results
of the TÜV (Technischer Überwachungs-Verein stands for Technical Inspec-
tion/Control Association in Germany) report are published (number of signifi-
cant defects per 1000 vehicles), available at a brand level.
The potential market is approximated by the number of households, which
is taken from the German Ministry of Statistics (Statistisches Bundesamt).
Given a large set of technical and other vehicles characteristics, I have faced
a problem of what ones to include into my model specification. Finally, the
choice of variables for my specifications has been driven by two factors: a trade-
off between characteristics that consumers care about while purchasing a car20
and availability of the data on technical characteristics as well as addressing the
problem of multicollinearity among the technical characteristics21.
The descriptive statistics for the chosen variables can be found in Table
3. There could be several alternatives to represent various groups of factors
behind the consumer car purchasing decision. The idea was to choose a variable
with the least correlation with the other variables in the model specification,
although for some variables the correlation levels remain pretty high. As a
result, the following variables have been selected (whose descriptive statistics
are given in the Table below): number of doors (basic characteristics), engine
power (car’s performance), diesel dummy (economic and ecological efficiency),
ABS and transmission-slip control (safety), dummy for luxurious, e.g., wood
interior decoration, navigation system, and leather seats (convenience/amenity,
comfort, entertainment), and number of technical defects per 1000 automobiles
(reliability).
Table 3. German automobile market: descriptive statistics, 2003
20The survey conducted by the German magazine Stern (Stern, 2006) has found the follow-
ing purchasing criteria to be important: reliability, safety, price-quality relationship, driving
comfort, technologically advanced, good customer service, fuel consumption, suitable for me,
costs of maintaining a car, has a good reputation, dealer rebate, internal equipment, a lot
of space, service network, resale value, base equipment, styling/outlook, ecological efficiency,
speed acceleration, new model/version, financing possibilities, low price, free time and hobby,
city wagon, convertible, driving gears. According to this study, about 27% of the interviewed
people consider the presence of a new model or version to be an important purchasing criterion
(compare, e.g., to 76% by a reliability criterion).
21The estimations results in general are very sensitive to the choice and scaling of variables.
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Variable Meaning Mean/share Std.dev Min Max
price 25020.3 10806.4 6150 133516
sales 1896.3 4293.7 10 50818
kw3 Kilowatts of 97.2 40.0 30 368
engine power
tuer Number of doors 4.4 0.9 2 5
abs Dummy for ABS 0.98 0.2 0 1
innendekor Dummy for 0.5 0.5 0 1
decorative
wood interior
navi Dummy for a 0.03 0.2 0 1
navigation system
dieseldum Dummy for a 0.3 0.5 0 1
diesel engine
defect Number of defects 15.0 4.5 0 26
per 1000 vehicles
mediapercar Advertising 457.0 1289.9 107.9 16525.3
expenditures per car
leder Dummy for 0.4 0.5 0 1
leather seats
asr Dummy for 0.5 0.5 0 1
transmission-
slip control
modelyear Dummy if a 0.2 0.4 0 1
model is
introduced in 2003
Source: Federal Bureau of Motor Vehicles and Drivers (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt
(KBA)), Eurotax-Schwacke
Note: descriptive statistics are given for the following market segments: mini,
small, lower middle, middle, and upper middle.
The models in the dataset are distinguished by the year of introduction into
the German car market on the basis of the Federal Bureau of Motor Vehicles and
Drivers (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt (KBA)) data. A new model is introduced into
the model specification as a dummy variable for a model being introduced in
2003. Some descriptive statistics for the new car models within different market
segments can be found in Table 4.
Table 4. German automobile market: descriptive statistics for new models
by market segment, 2003
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Variable No.obs. Mean Std.dev. Min Max
Total
price 188 26968.9 8999.9 9500 85000
sales 188 1966.8 3128.9 14 22639
engine power 188 105.2 36.4 44 265
Mini
price 4 13592.5 3433.8 9500 17895
sales 4 3158.8 3923.7 143 8486
engine power 4 55 11.0 44 70
Small
price 29 15042.9 2205.0 11390 19900
sales 29 2543.5 2886.2 124 11359
engine power 29 63.6 16.6 44 120
Lower middle
price 31 22086.2 3838.6 16550 34800
sales 31 1632.5 3138.8 14 13303
engine power 31 93.5 27.7 60 177
Middle
price 101 30129.8 6990.6 22500 85000
sales 101 2039.0 3363.7 15 22639
engine power 101 115.2 30.7 66 265
Upper middle
price 23 37032.9 5753.4 27690 54150
sales 23 1165.7 2024.5 38 7858
engine power 23 138.1 32.7 96 220
Source: Federal Bureau for Motor Vehicles and Drivers (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt
(KBA)), Eurotax-Schwacke, own calculations
Another important question has been how to define a premium brand. In this
paper a premium brand including Mercedes, BMW, Audi is defined22, and all the
models of these premium brands are grouped together to constitute the premium
car market. A premium brand dummy variable has been constructed, which is
equal to 1 if a car is from Audi, BMW, and Mercedes, and zero otherwise. Some
examples for volume and premium brands across different market segments can
be found in Table 5.
Table 5. German automobile market: premium vs. volume manufacturers
across market segments
22 In general, the definition of a premium brand is rather a subjective issue. According
to the survey conducted by the Automotive News (Automotive News Europe, 2005), the
premium vehicles should possess the following features: some appropriate brand image, which
would form the basis of premium pricing, about 15% transaction price markup as compared
to a comparable volume brand vehicle, higher residual values, greater consumer loyalty, older
buyers, global market presence, low volumes, and a lot of electronics. As for the last two points,
there has been no common agreement among the experts. A premium brand definition will
also be different for Europe and the US.
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Segment Major selling brands Market shares, %
Mini Renault Twingo 22.8
Smart 18.2
VW Lupo 16.6
Small VW Polo 17.7
Opel Corsa 11.3
Ford Fiesta 7.2
Skoda Fabia 7.2
Low middle VW Golf, Bora 27.9
Opel Astra 10.7
Ford Focus 9.9
Middle BMW 3er 17.9
VW Passat 15.9
Mercedes C-Klasse 15.2
Audi A4, S4 14.4
Upper middle Mercedes E-klasse 41.8
BMW 5er 21.3
Audi A6, S6 17.9
Luxury Mercedes S-klasse 26.3
BMW 7er 21.0
Audi A8, S8 18.6
Source: Federal Bureau of Motor Vehicles and Drivers (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt
(KBA)), own calculations
Car market segmentation that is used in this paper is the one developed
by the Federal Bureau of Motor Vehicles and Drivers (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt
(KBA)). This classification is defined on the basis of optic, technical and market-
oriented factors, which have been approved by the industry representatives. The
market is divided into the following segments: mini, small, lower middle, middle,
upper middle, luxury, SUVs, cabriolets (including roadster), vans, and utilities.
This is a broad definition of a light vehicles market.
The current analysis concentrates on the five market segments: mini, small
cars, lower middle, middle and upper middle. There are several arguments for
this decision. These car segments constitute the traditional car segment (with
the exception of luxury and sports cars). They also represent about 80% of the
total light vehicles sales in Germany in 2003. Second, luxury and sports cars
may be driven by somewhat different supply and demand factors, thus, there
could be problems with the model specifications and the choice of instruments.
Third, most new models seem to be concentrated in the above-mentioned five
segments in my dataset. The new models sales in these five segments make up
about 74% of the total new light vehicles sales in Germany in 2003.
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6 Principal findings
6.1 Estimation results of one-level nested logit (nest is
market segment)
The estimation of the one-level nested logit allows studying the impact of brand-
name reputation and a new model on market shares as well as to obtain the
estimates of the correlation parameters within the market segments in order to
get inferences about competition patterns.
Demand estimation
The following demand specifications have been estimated: base (Specifica-
tion A), with a new model dummy and a premium brand dummy (Specification
B), and with a new model dummy and brand dummies (Specification C) (see
Table 6).
Table 6. German automobile market: estimations results of one-level nested
logit
Nest is market segment
Variable Spec.A Spec.B Spec.C
α -0.00004 -0.0001*** -0.0001***
σg 0.28*** 0.32*** 0.43***
asr 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.26***
engine power 0.001 0.01 0.01**
doors 0.10** 0.16*** 0.16***
abs 0.54** 0.47* 0.41**
decoration -0.02 0.12 0.01
leather seats -0.08 0.28*** 0.25***
navigation -0.28 0.40 0.23
diesel 0.27** 0.38*** 0.28***
defect -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.003
const -8.87*** -8.61*** -8.69
new model 0.32*** 0.28***
premium brand 1.26***
mercedes 1.68***
bmw 1.42***
audi 1.01***
jaguar 0.88**
vw 0.55*
honda 0.48*
daihatsu -0.62*
Hansen J-
statistic
Chi-sq(1) p-
val=0.62
Chi-sq(1) p-
val=0.78
Chi-sq(4) p-
val=0.37
Source: own estimations
Note: ***, **, * mean significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Spec.
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A: without a new model and premium brand dummies. Spec. B: with a new model
dummy and a premium brand dummy. Spec. C: with a new model dummy and brand
(manufacturer) dummies. For brand dummies only statistically significant variables
are presented. Kia is used as a reference group.
The table shows that the parameters of most characteristics are of expected
sign and statistically significant. Engine power, presence of transmission-slip
control (ASR) and ABS system, the number of doors, some fancy decoration
and being a diesel model positively impact the mean valuation of consumers,
while the number of defects has negative impact. The engine power appears to
be not always significant23 . The coefficients for specifications B and C appear
to be quite similar in magnitudes. The price coefficient is of similar magnitude
in all specifications24 .
The magnitude of the segment correlation parameter is less than 1, and, thus,
it is consistent with random utility maximization assumption. The magnitude
of the correlation coefficient can be interpreted as some evidence for the rather
low correlation of consumer preferences, or low degree of substitution among
the products within the segments, so that the products within the market seg-
ment are not perfect substitutes. This can be interpreted as rather not isolated
competition in the market segments. However, the preferences are, still, more
correlated for the cars of the same market segment than for the cars of different
market segments (because 0.28-0.43 is significantly different from zero).
The impact of the premium brand and new model on the market shares is
positive and statistically significant in Specification B. The brand dummies for
premium producers, Mercedes, BMW, and Audi, as well as a new model dummy
are also statistically significant and positive in Specification C. This implies that
German premium producers have a competitive advantage over other domestic
and foreign volume producers. Besides, consumers value ”newness”, or ”fashion”
of a car as indicated by the significance of the new model dummy coefficient.
The new model variable may also capture the positive effect of a broader choice
of products as well as improved/increased quality of the existing products.
Based on the estimation results, Mercedes enjoys the highest market power,
followed by BMW and Audi. This estimated ranking of premium brands seems
to be consistent with the tastes of German customers. This ranking also reflects
the reputation ranking constructed by the ADAC25. This may say in favour
23A similar problem has been also encountered in other studies (e.g., Verboven, 1996).
24Fershtman and Gandal (1998) have also found a rather lower price coefficient: α =
2.1x10−6 and σ = 0.70 in the one-level nested logit. The low price coefficient, of a simi-
lar magnitude, has been found by Bresnahan et al. (1997). I have found the price coefficient
of a similar magnitude in my panel data estimations of the one-level nested logit for the US
automobile market (Leheyda, 2007). The magnitude may be, however, not so surprising. This
is not the direct measure of the price elasticity of demand. The coefficient rather gives the
constant proportional, or relative change in the market share ratio for a given absolute change
in the value of price. The magnitude of the variables can be also connected to the scaling of
variables.
25 In general, there exists a number of rankings on brand loyalty and reputation. According
to the ADAC ranking, the brands with the highest reputation are Mercedes, BMW, Audi,
VW, Porsche and Volvo. The ranking of cars is also available from Auto Motor and Sport
magazine (Auto Motor and Sport, 2006). According to this publication, Mercedes, BMW,
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of the correctness of my model specification. The other statistically significant
positive coefficients are for Jaguar, VW, and Honda. Jaguar and VW are also
among the top 10 brands in Germany. There is also a statistically significant
negative coefficient for Daihatsu.
To sum up, brand-name reputation and new models allow the car produc-
ers to get higher market shares. Competition is not localized within market
segments.
Supply estimation
The pricing and marginal cost equations can be found in Table 7. The supply
side is estimated under three assumptions concerning the firms’ equilibrium
interactions: competitive, single-product, and multi-product. The coefficients
of the attributes in the hedonic price regression can be interpreted as average
marginal implicit prices for each attribute. ABS and a diesel motor contribute
most to the price of a car among the technical characteristics in the specification.
In the marginal cost equations, the higher the value of a car model characteristic,
the larger is its impact on the marginal cost. As it can be seen, ABS and a diesel
motor contribute most to the marginal cost of a car. In general, the technical
characteristics contribute significantly to the prices and marginal costs. The
brand dummies could be viewed as the relative price markup that a customer
is willing to accept for the brand of his car as compared to what he would be
willing to pay for an equally equipped reference car (in my estimations this is
Kia).
Table 7. German automobile market: pricing/marginal cost equations esti-
mations
Porsche and Audi have enjoyed the highest rankings in 2003.
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Variable Competitive Single-product Multi-product
engine power 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
doors 0.01*** 0.02* 0.02***
asr 0.07*** 0.11*** 0.10***
abs 0.17*** 0.39*** 0.37***
decoration 0.12*** 0.17*** 0.18***
leather seats 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.10***
navigation 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.12***
diesel 0.13*** 0.19*** 0.19***
mercedes 0.52*** 0.74*** 0.68***
mitsubishi 0.36*** 0.56*** 0.56***
audi 0.34*** 0.49*** 0.52***
subaru 0.34*** 0.56*** 0.53***
jaguar 0.33*** 0.46*** 0.40***
vw 0.32*** 0.48*** 0.45***
bmw 0.32*** 0.48*** 0.45***
volvo 0.31*** 0.47*** 0.44***
saab 0.31*** 0.47*** 0.44***
honda 0.30*** 0.48*** 0.47***
nissan 0.26*** 0.41*** 0.41***
renault 0.25*** 0.39*** 0.38***
mazda 0.25*** 0.40*** 0.39***
mgrover 0.23*** 0.37*** 0.35***
fiat 0.21*** 0.34*** 0.33***
opel 0.21*** 0.34*** 0.32***
peugeot 0.21*** 0.32*** 0.31***
ford 0.20*** 0.32*** 0.29***
skoda 0.19*** 0.28*** 0.28***
citroen 0.18*** 0.28*** 0.27***
toyota 0.17*** 0.29*** 0.28***
chrysler 0.15* 0.27** 0.25***
seat 0.14*** 0.25*** 0.25***
hyundai 0.13** 0.21*** 0.22***
suzuki 0.10* 0.16 0.17***
daihatsu 0.09 0.09 0.09
daewoo -0.02 -0.07 -0.06
smart -0.02 -0.27** -0.31***
const 8.80*** 7.87*** 7.79***
R-2 0.87 0.90 0.90
Source: own estimations
Note: ***, **, * - mean significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respec-
tively. Kia is used as a reference group.
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6.2 Estimation results of two-level nested logit (two nests:
market segment and new vs. old model)
The estimation of the two-level nested logit allows me to study the impact
of brand-name reputation and new model on the market shares as well as to
obtain the estimates of the correlation parameters within market segments and
the classes of new and old products in oder to get inferences about competition
patterns.
The clustering of products is used to incorporate consumer heterogeneity into
the nested logit model. Two principles of differentiation in the automobile mar-
kets are explicitly incorporated in the two-level nested logit: differences among
market segments26 and the distinction of being a new product (i.e., a car model
specification is introduced into the German car market in 2003). Therefore, the
consumer heterogeneity associated with the tastes for a particular market seg-
ment and the taste for a new model are explicitly parameterized in the model.
Such a principle of differentiation as a new model seems to be quite reasonable.
As it has been mentioned, 27% of the interviewed consumers consider being a
new model to be an important car purchasing criterion. Another factor used by
the construction of image rankings (e.g., the one used by ADAC27) is the fact
of being a leader in the automobile research, or product development.
Each car is, therefore, evaluated by consumers along three principal dimen-
sions. The first dimension is a market segment (the segmentation is based upon
prices, content, etc.). The cars from the same market segment share features
such as size and prestige. Second, there are differences between new and old car
model specifications. Many people prefer (e.g., because of individuality, or fash-
ion, or desire to have a new sports car version, some additional features) new
car model specifications despite the availability of old, or existing in the market
car model specifications. The cars from the same subgroup share additional
features, e.g., newness, or style. Finally, the individual demand is affected by
price and technical characteristics.
The results of the estimations of the two-level nested logit can be found in
Table 8. As in case of one-level nested logit, three model specifications have
been estimated: base (Specification A), with a new model dummy and a pre-
mium brand dummy (Specification B), and with a new model dummy and brand
dummies (Specification C).
Table 8. German automobile market: estimations results of two-level nested
logit: market segment and new vs. old model
Nests are market segment and new vs. old model
26 Instead of a premium vs. volume market segment, the market segmentation principle
could be used as a more natural way for nests in the consumer purchasing decision. In any
case, mini, small and lower middle car segments can be treated as volume car segments as
they are dominated by volume brands, and middle and upper middle market segments can be
viewed as premium market segments as they are dominated by premium brand sales.
27The top 10 brands in this ranking are Mercedes, BMW, Audi, VW, Porsche, Volvo,
Renault, Toyota, Opel, and Ford.
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Variable Spec.A Spec.B Spec.C
α -0.000049* -0.00005*** -0.00007***
σhg 0.34 0.33*** 0.35***
σg 0.09*** 0.18 0.20*
asr 0.31*** 0.37*** 0.30***
engine power 0.003 0.005 0.005
doors 0.10*** 0.15*** 0.16***
abs 0.54** 0.50** 0.36
decoration 0.03 0.14 -0.02
navigation -0.16 0.28 0.16
diesel 0.27* 0.34** 0.20*
defect -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.005
const -8.59*** -8.81*** -9.06***
premium brand 1.10***
mercedes 1.42***
bmw 1.29***
audi 0.88***
daihatsu -0.77*
Hansen J-
statistic
Chi-sq(2) P-
val=0.29
Chi-sq(2) P-
val=0.11
Chi-sq(2) P-
val=0.13
Source: own estimations
Note: ***, **, * - mean significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, re-
spectively. Spec. A: without a new model and premium brand dummies. Spec. B:
with a new model dummy and a premium brand dummy. Spec. C: with a new model
dummy and brand (manufacturer) dummies. For brand dummies (Specification C)
only statistically significant variables are included. Kia is used as a reference group.
The magnitude and ranking of the correlation parameters are consistent with
random utility maximization assumptions. The correlation of the consumer
preferences within the subgroup (new, or old car model specifications class) is
higher that the correlation of the consumer preferences in the group (market
segment). Competition between new cars and old cars is relatively weak as there
is some difference between the correlation parameters σhg and σg. Consumer
preferences are more correlated for the cars of the same subgroup (0.35) than for
the cars from the same market segment but a different subgroup (Specification
C). This means that consumers have more homogenous valuations concerning
the cars that come from the same subgroup (new vs. old) than for the cars
just from the same market segment. Thus, there appears to be some additional
segmentation or differentiation between new and old models. The preferences
are more correlated for the cars of the same market segment than for the cars
from different market segments since 0.20 is significantly different from zero
(Specification C). Similar to the one-level nested logit results, there is some
evidence for not isolated competition in the market segments.
The premium brand dummy has a positive statistically significant impact on
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the market shares. Similar to the estimations results of the one-level nested logit,
Mercedes, BMW and Audi enjoy considerable brand-name reputation power as
compared to all other car manufacturers.
To sum up, as in case of one-level nested logit, brand-name reputation and
new model lead to the higher market shares. In addition, there appears to be
some additional differentiation around new/old products, which may allow the
automotive firms to get some market power to recoup their investments.
6.3 Estimation results of nested logit with age differenti-
ation
As I have mentioned above, I estimate age-specific nested logits for each age
group. In such a way I interact consumer heterogeneity with product character-
istics to get more flexible substitution patterns. Each age group has a different
price sensitivity that is averaged to a mean price sensitivity using the age-group
specific probabilities of purchase as weights.
Taking into account age differentiation (for more discussion, see Section
3.1.1), the demand equation is estimated separately for each age group un-
der three specifications similar to the above estimations: base (Specification A),
with a premium brand and a new model dummies (Specification B), and with
a new model dummy and brand dummies (Specification C). The same set of
instruments is used for each age group. I differentiate between five different age
groups: car customers aged up to 29, customers between 29 and 39, customers
between 39 and 49, customers between 49 and 59, and customers older than
60 years. The estimation results of the one-level nested logit with age differ-
entiation for base specification A (without a new model and premium brand
dummies) can be found in Table 928 .
The most important for me are the estimates of the price and correlation
parameter coefficients that are further used in the calculation of substitution
patterns and markups. The higher absolute values of price and segment correla-
tion coefficients imply higher elasticities of substitution. Lower price sensitivity
for premium products should drive down their elasticities. It has been found
that price sensitivity coefficient, in accord with a priori expectations, decreases
with the age of customers. Price sensitivity is the largest for the youngest age
group. Price age sensitivity is to a great extent linked to price income sensi-
tivity as there will be a positive relationship between the age of customer and
his income up to a certain age. The preferences of customers older than 60 and
young customers up to 29, are least correlated (0.19 and 0.27, respectively), so
that the products are perceived to be the least substitutes by these customer
groups. The lower estimated price coefficient and correlation parameter for
the age group of people older than 60 could be attributed to especially large
consumer heterogeneity in the old age market segment29 . This large consumer
28As for the two-level nested logit estimation with age differentiation, where the two nests
are the market segment and new vs. old model, it has been difficult to get the results,
consistent with random utility maximization.
29Marketing studies show that older customers have other demand preferences towards car
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heterogeneity could be explained by the higher incomes of older people, their
higher valuation of brand, and their ability to afford themselves some different
from others model due to e.g., the previously saved incomes. The lower segment
correlation coefficient for the customers up to 29 may be also reasonable to ex-
pect: young customers, although mostly with low incomes, are likely to strive
for individuality. The preferences are most correlated for the customers of 29-39
and 39-49 age groups (0.33 and 0.34, respectively). In general, the pattern of
the correlation parameters is consistent with apriori expectations.
Table 9. German automobile market: estimation results of age-specific mod-
els (one-level nested logit, nest is market segment)
Specification A: base (without premium brand and new model dummy)
Variables up to 29 29-39 39-49 49-59 older
than 60
α -
0.00013***
-
0.00007***
-
0.00006***
-
0.00005**
0.000008
σg 0.27*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.31*** 0.19**
asr 0.25*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.33*** 0.40***
engine
power
0.01*** 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.02**
doors -0.02 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.08*
abs 0.44** 0.47** 0.43** 0.55*** 0.65**
decoration -0.02 -0.06 -0.08 -0.00 0.06
leather
seats
-0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04
navigation -0.63*** -1.09*** -0.47** -0.41* -0.41*
diesel 0.62*** 0.34*** 0.23*** 0.02 -0.69***
defect -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.07
media -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
const -10.43*** -9.58*** -8.92*** -9.04*** -9.98***
Adj. R2 0.50 0.57 0.60 0.56 0.44
Source: own estimations
Note: These are the GMM estimation results with robust standard errors. ***,
**, * - mean significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
Table 10 presents the results of the estimations for Specification B when both
premium brand and new model dummies are included into the estimated model
specification. The pattern of the correlation parameters and price sensitivity is
similar to the one estimated on the basis of Specification A.
The coefficients for a new model are the highest for 49-59 and older than 60
groups of customers. They are very low for the customers up to 29 years old.
The young customers may also tend to buy used cars, the market for which is,
however, not modelled in this paper.
There is a substantial price premium paid for premium cars. Brand dummy
coefficient is the highest for the older than 60 customers, followed by the younger
design and equipment and that they are more brand-loyal as compared to younger car customer
groups (Autohaus, 2006). The car comfort is very important for them.
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customers (up to 29). The high premium brand coefficient for the young cus-
tomers could be somewhat rather unexpected, but it may be attributed to high
preferences towards BMW and Audi as it could be inferred from the high shares
of those cars in the total sales of this age group. Mercedes cars make up a lower
share in the sales of this age group as compared to the older age groups. But
it can be seen that older car customers have strong preferences for new and
premium car models.
Table 10. German automobile market: estimation results of age-specific mod-
els (one-level nested logit, nest is market segment)
Specification B: with premium brand and new model dummies
Variables up to 29 29-39 39-49 49-59 older than
60
α -0.0002*** -0.00012*** -0.00011*** -0.00009*** -0.00005
σg 0.24*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.30*** 0.15
new model 0.08 0.21** 0.23*** 0.30*** 0.35***
premium
brand
1.14*** 1.02*** 1.00*** 1.05*** 1.21***
asr 0.29*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.35*** 0.44***
engine
power
0.02*** 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01
doors 0.05 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.16***
abs 0.31 0.45* 0.34 0.43* 0.46
decoration 0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.07 0.14
leather
seats
0.23*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.26*** 0.25***
navigation -0.23 -0.95*** -0.17 -0.06 0.11
diesel 0.70*** 0.36*** 0.27*** 0.06 -0.68***
defect -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.06***
media -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00**
const -10.62*** -9.71*** -9.08*** -9.16*** -10.17***
Adj. R2 0.45 0.56 0.57 0.54 0.41
Source: own estimations
Note: These are the GMM estimation results with robust standard errors. ***,
**, * - mean significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
The estimation results for specification C when brand dummies and a new
model dummy are included can be found in Table 11. The expected ranking of
Mercedes, BMW and Audi has been found as above. The highest preferences
for Audi are by up to 29 customers. The car customers between 29 and 39
value BMW and Mercedes most among all customer groups. Each age group
values Mercedes cars most of all. VW is most valued by youngest car customers.
Peugeot and Renault coefficients are both highly significant and positive for the
youngest car customers, the same is true for Skoda and Seat. As for consumer
preferences towards Japanese car brands, the German car customers seem not
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to value them as much as domestic brands. Nissan coefficient has been found
not to be significant at all. Toyota has been found positively significant by 39-49
and 49-59 age customers. Only Honda has been found to be quite highly valued
by the German car customers. Domestic and Japanese cars may, therefore, have
different images by the German car customers.
Table 11. German automobile market: estimation results of age-specific mod-
els (one-level nested logit, nest is market segment)
Specification C: with brand dummies and a new model dummy
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Variable up to 29 29-39 39-49 49-59 older than
60
α -
0.00021***
-
0.00017***
-
0.00014***
-
0.00012***
-
0.000079***
σg 0.35*** 0.40*** 0.45*** 0.42*** 0.30***
new model 0.17* 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.27*** 0.29***
asr 0.18* 0.16* 0.23*** 0.28*** 0.35***
engine
power
0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01** 0.00
doors 0.07* 0.18*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.12***
abs 0.33* 0.40** 0.45*** 0.44** 0.61***
decoration 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.11
leather
seats
0.29*** 0.30*** 0.24*** 0.26*** 0.30***
navigation -0.01 0.04 0.26 0.31 0.29
diesel 0.65*** 0.48*** 0.31*** 0.16 -0.46***
defect -0.09*** -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.06**
media 0.00** 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00
const -9.40*** -9.54*** -9.19*** -9.37*** 0.49***
audi 1.37*** 1.26*** 0.91*** 1.00*** 0.81***
bmw 1.64*** 1.73*** 1.27*** 1.32*** 1.02***
citroen 0.92* 0.56 0.05 0.07 0.00
daewoo -0.46 -0.47 -0.51 -0.65* -0.85*
daihatsu -0.96** -0.64 -0.47 -0.48 -1.25***
mercedes 1.87*** 1.92*** 1.81*** 1.91*** 1.26***
chrysler -1.25* -0.70 -0.69 -1.15* -0.24
fiat 0.77* 0.30 -0.07 -0.10 -0.43
ford 0.64 0.41 0.20 0.31 0.24
honda 0.76** 0.69** 0.62** 0.60* 0.30
hyundai -0.20 -0.23 -0.26 -0.22 -0.21
mazda 0.32 1.03* 1.28** 1.29** 0.14
mgrover 0.26 0.60 0.64 0.63 -0.76
mitsubishi 0.54 -0.47* -0.90*** -0.83 -0.12
nissan 0.01 0.63 0.59 0.55 -0.25
opel 0.73* 0.05 0.15 0.32 0.19
peugeot 1.25*** 0.45 0.19 0.24 0.26
renault 1.04** 0.73 0.29 0.26 0.15
saab -0.19 0.57 0.12 0.18 -0.85***
seat 1.13** -0.26 -0.20 -0.01 -0.29
skoda 1.13*** 0.10* -0.25 0.37 -0.11
smart -1.02** 0.72 0.38 0.33 -1.65***
subaru -0.47 0.14 0.16 0.42 -0.35
suzuki -0.65* -0.26 -0.09 0.10 -0.15
toyota -0.17 0.30 0.42* 0.53** -0.29
vw 1.23*** 0.94*** 0.59* 0.54* 0.23
volvo 0.11 0.03 -0.07 -0.10 -0.52
Adj. R2 0.60 0.62 0.68 0.67 0.61
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Source: own estimations
Note: These are the GMM estimation results with robust standard errors. ***,
**, * - mean significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
To sum up, the qualitative conclusions concerning brand-name reputation
and new products are similar as in case of more restricted nested logits. Some
additional inferences have been obtained about the role of brand-name repu-
tation and new car models for different types of customers depending on their
age. The estimated price and correlation parameters coefficients are further
used in the construction of the matrix of own- and cross-price elasticities and
calculation of markups, which is discussed in the next section.
6.4 Analysis of substitution patterns and markups
The results of the estimated own-price elasticities on the basis of the age-specific
nested logits can be found in Table 12. They are first calculated separately
for each age consumer group (up to 29, between 29 and 39, between 39 and
49, between 49 and 59, and older than 60) and then the weighted averages
are calculated (the weights are determined by the share of the population of
the given age in the total population). It has been found that the own-price
elasticities are the lowest for the older car customers, which could be already
inferred from the pattern of the above discussed price and correlation parameters
estimates of demand. The youngest car customers are most price-sensitive.
Table 12. German automobile market: comparison of own-price elasticities
at market segment level for age groups (one-level nested logit with age differen-
tiation)
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up to 29 29-39 39-49 49-59 older weighted nested
than 60 logit
total 8.30 7.21 6.26 5.37 2.83 6.14 4.30
new 8.94 7.78 6.75 5.79 3.05 6.62 3.94
old 8.18 7.11 6.17 5.29 2.79 6.05 4.26
mini 3.89 3.38 2.93 2.52 1.33 2.88 2.01
new 4.49 3.90 3.38 2.90 1.53 3.32 2.32
old 3.83 3.32 2.88 2.47 1.31 2.83 1.98
small 4.92 4.28 3.72 3.19 1.68 3.65 2.55
new 4.99 4.34 3.76 3.23 1.70 3.69 2.59
old 4.91 4.27 3.71 3.18 1.68 3.64 2.55
lower middle 7.04 6.13 5.32 4.56 2.41 5.22 3.65
new 7.32 6.37 5.53 4.74 2.50 5.42 3.80
old 7.02 6.10 5.30 4.55 2.40 5.20 3.64
middle 9.58 8.33 7.23 6.20 3.27 7.09 4.97
new 9.99 8.69 7.54 6.47 3.41 7.40 5.18
old 9.44 8.21 7.13 6.12 3.22 6.99 4.90
upper middle 13.35 11.61 10.08 8.65 4.56 9.89 6.92
new 12.28 10.67 9.26 7.94 4.19 9.09 6.36
old 13.53 11.76 10.21 8.76 4.62 10.02 7.01
Source: own estimations
Note: Under ’nested logit’ the estimates of the own-price elasticities from one-level
nested logit (nest is market segment) are presented.
The average own-price elasticities for age groups go down in magnitudes
for all market segments as one goes to the older age groups. But within the
age group, one gets higher own-price elasticities as one moves to the larger car
segments. This could be, on the one hand, a limitation of a nested logit estima-
tion30. On the other hand, these results might be true, e.g., one could expect
higher elasticities in the middle car segment, which is overcrowded with prod-
ucts and where fierce competition could be expected. The alternative explana-
tion could be that including consumer heterogeneity into the demand equation
does not always help to get the substitution patterns that one would expect
a priori (here individual-level data could be then rather preferred). It should
be also mentioned that the empirical studies do not give a one-way answer on
the magnitude of the elasticities and markups. In particular, Jaumandreu and
Moral (2006) also find higher elasticities and markups for the larger car mar-
30Namely, higher prices imply higher own-price elasticities. The problem of cross-price
elasticities is solved with respect to the car models in the other market segments, but not
within the same market segment. The independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property
implies that the customers will tend to substitute away, say from Mercedes, to the other
popular cars as measured by the market shares, and not to the other similar products.
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ket segments on the basis of the BLP random coefficients demand estimation
(following Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995). The range of their own-price
elasticities ranges from 2.72 for the small cars to 3.84 for the cars in the luxury
car segment. The range of the price-cost margins is from 64% for the small cars
to 38% for the luxury cars. Mariuzzo (2005) also finds lower price elasticities in
the small car segments on the basis of the random coefficients model estimation,
which he interprets as the higher market power in those market segments.
Higher own-price elasticities for the new models than for the old models have
been found in the mini, small, lower middle, and middle car market segments.
Only in the upper middle car market segment the own-price elasticities for
the new car models are lower than those for the old car models. This market
segment is dominated by the premium class models. The best-selling models
in this segment are Mercedes E-Class, BMW 5er, and Audi A6/S6. Therefore,
it could be an indication that the new and branded models are protected from
competition from the old and volume car models, so that the competition in the
new models subgroup of the upper middle market segment is rather limited as
it could be inferred from the estimated elasticities.
As compared to the own-price elasticities estimated on the basis of the re-
stricted one-level nested logit, I have got somewhat higher own-price elasticities
on the basis of the estimated age-specific nested logits. But the pattern of the
own-price elasticities for the new and old car models has remained the same,
except for the average own-price elasticities for new and old models in the total
German car market.
The pattern of markups for different market segments, also calculated on the
basis of the age-specific nested logits, can be found in Table 13. The markups
(under single-product Bertrand-Nash assumption) are calculated separately for
each age group and then the weighted averages are calculated using the shares
of the car sales of each particular age group in the total car market sales (for
private persons only).
The pattern of markups for new and old models varies across customer
groups and across market segments. The markups are higher for the larger
car market segments. They are higher for the new products in the mini and
middle car market segments. The best selling cars in the mini car segment are
Renault Twingo, Smart and VW Lupo, while in the middle class these are BMW
3er, VW Passat, and Mercedes C-class. The middle car segment is character-
ized by the highest number of introduced new models and new models sales in
the total segment car sales. High competition may be expected in this market
segment so that the new products introduction may somehow allow the firms
to get some market power to recoup their investments, notwithstanding high
competition in this market segment.
Table 13. German automobile market: comparison of markups at market
segment level for new and old models (one-level nested logit with age differenti-
ation)
39
weighted std.dev. min max nested
mean logit mean
total 5262.54 882.23 3463.50 8823.35 5817.26
new 5226.81 893.57 3694.94 7327.63 5816.63
old 5269.20 880.39 3463.50 8823.35 5817.23
mini 4737.59 510.30 3795.44 5982.14 5868.52
new 4785.62 339.22 4454.95 5256.32 5867.29
old 4732.25 529.16 3795.44 5982.14 5868.65
small 4892.80 622.63 3631.25 7201.16 5818.12
new 4665.88 463.18 4023.61 5663.12 5818.09
old 4928.18 637.68 3631.25 7201.16 5818.13
lower middle 5215.28 949.13 3493.49 8823.35 5813.93
new 4844.63 938.25 3694.94 7323.50 5812.85
old 5249.79 944.13 3493.49 8823.35 5814.03
middle 5434.46 882.99 3463.50 7988.76 5813.10
new 5456.82 902.41 4034.45 7327.63 5814.74
old 5427.24 877.98 3463.50 7988.76 5812.57
upper middle 5546.23 865.46 4023.38 7795.33 5821.59
new 5515.84 781.05 4486.07 6908.14 5819.00
old 5551.19 880.93 4023.38 7795.33 5822.01
Source: own estimations
Note: Under ’nested logit mean’ the markups calculated on the basis of the re-
stricted one-level nested logit are presented.
As compared to the markups calculated on the basis of the restricted one-
level nested logit, there is more variety in the markups calculated on the basis
of the age-specific nested logits.
To sum up, it has been difficult to get a full comprehensive analysis of the
pattern of the elasticities and markups on the basis of the above estimates, which
has been initially planned. The IIA property appears not to have been solved
completely within the nests. The results might be improved through extending
the time dimension of the dataset and introducing more consumer heterogeneity
within random coefficients framework. The numder of markets and other sources
of identification are very important in such type of estimations.
7 Conclusions
The automobile industry is one of the most innovative sectors in the economy
and has become also very competitive in spite of its oligopolistic market struc-
ture. The automobile industry is characterized by a lot of new products intro-
ductions and considerable product proliferation. Besides, the triad traditional
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automotive markets (Japan, USA, and Western Europe) are very satiated mar-
kets and are mostly driven by car replacement purchases. Thus, there should
be some market power enjoyed by the automobile manufacturers to be able to
pay for costly (and often risky) innovations and new products introductions.
The major approach pursued in this paper to study the effects of new prod-
ucts introduction has been to evaluate the competition pattern in the new and
old models classes and look at the interaction in the competition between them
as well as to study the impact of new models and premium brand on market
shares.
I have found that in general both new products and brand-name reputation
allow the automobile manufacturers to increase market shares. My results are
similar to the results by Bresnahan et al. (1997), which is the closest study
for the comparison of the results. It should be emphasized that the focus of
the paper, as compared to the above and other studies, has been not on dras-
tic innovations, or drastic changes in the quality of the existing products, but
rather on incremental ones. The methodology has allowed me to draw some
implications whether the proliferation strategy by the automotive manufactur-
ers pays off, and what the effect of additional product variety is. The approach
pursued in this paper appears to be the most suitable one to study the role of
brand-name reputation and new models in the German car market given the
data restrictions that I have got.
I have found that both premium brand, and new products may increase de-
mand market shares. This is in line with an already rather standardized fact
that premium car producers are drivers of modern technology. This could sup-
port the fact that the two sources of market power may be quite interlinked
in the automobile industry: continuous innovation, which is embodied in the
introduction of new products, leads to higher brand-name reputation in the au-
tomobile industry, while the protective umbrella of a brand may be extended
over the new products. Brand-name reputation is very important in the auto-
mobile industry. Brand differentiation may limit the intensity of competition in
the automobile industry.
When a new principle of differentiation such as new vs. old model is added to
the market segment differentiation, there appears to be some additional market
fragmentation with respect to new vs. old model. Competition is not isolated
in the new or old models segments. Presence of substantial heterogeneity of
consumer preferences implies that new and premium products can be protected
from competition from old and volume products. The groups of old and new
products coexist, neither eliminating each other. Premium brand allows the
firms to get higher markups in general and on new products. Therefore, the
automotive firms might have enough incentives for new product development.
Rather low correlation of consumer preferences has been found, which can
be interpreted as a sign of rather not isolated competition between the products
within the market segments. This may bear implications for the use of mar-
ket segment definitions by industry and authorities representatives. Consumer
tastes are quite differentiated. The product space is quite overcrowded with
different models. Products overcrowdedness may contribute to the higher prod-
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ucts rivalry and lower rents than otherwise obtained. The firms may cannibilize
each other’s profits by introducing a lot of similar products. To study this issue
more profoundly, the estimation of more reliable substitution patterns could be
worthwile. The analysis of own- and cross-price elasticities has been somewhat
limited in this paper.
To sum up, a new model and brand-name reputation may allow the inno-
vative firms to get some market power and recoup their investments, so that
there is some reward for a new model specification. Competition is, however,
not localized within a market segment and the class of new, or old models, i.e.,
consumers are rather heterogenous based on these principles of differentiation.
The differentiated products demand in this paper has been derived from
the discrete choice framework. The use of the multinominal nested logit model
in this paper, except for its computational tractability, can be justified by the
dependence of the substitution effects between the cars on the predetermined
classes of products in the automobile industry as well as an attractive way to
address the posed issues within this research project.
Some consumer heterogeneity has been introduced into the model through
incorporating consumer age differentiation that allows for more flexible substitu-
tion patterns without adding up any computational burden (I use the informa-
tion on sales for different age groups and federal territories in Germany for this
purpose). The estimation of age-specific nested logits has allowed me to study
the demand for cars across age groups and differentiate between the impact of a
premium brand and a new model on different types of customers. Youngest and
oldest car customers appear to care most about a premium brand. Older car
customers have been found to have strongest preferences for new and premium
products.
Product characteristics are treated to be exogenous in this model. The ques-
tions are addressed within a static framework. The discounted value of rents in
each period will determine the private incentives to innovate. The measurement
of transitory market power in each period can contribute to understanding in-
novative investment in dynamic markets (Bresnahan et al., 1997). The decision
where a firm should put a car in the product space is not modelled in this paper.
However, the static models could be estimated for separate years and could be
viewed as a proxy for optimal dynamic decisions. New goods introduction and
termination of old models should be viewed as a joint decision. Simulations
could be performed in the future for all models in 2003 dataset and all models
in 2003 dataset plus models that have been terminated in the previous years
if the data become available. The change in producer variable profits could be
then investigated in an intertemporal context. This could allow getting better
approximation of the rents from innovative investment.
Usually empirical studies find low general welfare effects, in particular effects
on the consumer welfare, when the new products do not differ significantly from
the existing products. The evaluation of the consumer welfare (whether the new
models lead to the improvements in the consumers’ standard of living) could
be, however, a possible research extension of this paper to verify the findings of
the previous studies.
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A new product introduction, especially the introduction of a product very
different in quality from the existing products may have dynamic effects, e.g., it
may evolve the creation of a whole new market segment (involving subsequent
’me-too’ introductions). The car manufacturers may immitate/follow each other
in the introduction of models (e.g., by size, or characteristics). As I have got only
one cross-section of data, this in the first turn has prevented me from studying
these effects. Petrin (2002) has studied the effects of new models introduction
for the US car market on the basis of the static models (minivan introduction,
evaluating innovators’ and immitators’ payoffs). The author estimated that
the profits from the minivan introduction exceeded the reported costs of its
development by far. The effects of the similar, or other ”me-too” strategies
could be evaluated in the future studies on the basis of entry and profitability
models for the car industry. This research paper has been rather limited in
terms of the data available to study such effects.
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1 Summary of conclusions
In my dissertation I have focused on competition trends and new products
developments in the automobile markets. In the first essay I have investigated
the mutual forbearance hypothesis and firm equilibrium interactions in the US
automobile market. In the second essay I have focused on the impact of the
degree of geographical and multiproduct market linkages on the firm behaviour
in the European car market. In the third essay I have looked at the innovation
and competition patterns in the German automobile market. In this section I
present the overview of the major conclusions from these three papers.
The study of the extent of the competition in any industry has both academic
and policy interest. In the first two essays some inferences have been derived
about the firm behaviour and equilibrium pattern in the US and European car
markets.
I have found that multimarket contact may influence competition in the US
automobile markets and may increase the firms’ strategic interdependence. This
effect is, however, difficult to disentangle from the effect of the market concen-
tration in the US automobile market (dominance of the market by the American
Big Three) on the firm behaviour. In other words, it is difficult to argue whether
coordination is due to market concentration, or due to multimarket contact, or
it can be attributed to both. Concentration is argued to foster the slack, which
is transferred through the multimarket contact.
A major difference of this study to the other papers on the US automobile
market is that I study the behaviour of different coalitions of firms in the US car
market on the basis of the multimarket contact differentiation and try to derive
some more complex picture of the firm interrelationships rather than just as-
suming oligopolistic interactions in the form of single-product, or multi-product
Bertrand Nash equilibrium (and not considering at all other possible market
equilibria). In particular, the previous automotive studies have not considered
the possibility of collusive behaviour, except for the early studies by Bresnahan
(1981, 1987). These early studies have found support for collusive behaviour in
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the US automobile industry for separate years. Feenstra and Levinsohn (1985)
and Bresnahan (1987) seem to be the only studies that have applied the sta-
tistical tests to choose the equilibrium competition pattern to best describe the
firm behaviour in the US car market.
The second paper investigates the link between multimarket contact and firm
performance in the European car market. As compared to the first paper on the
relevance of the mutual forbearance hypothesis for the US light vehicles market,
in this paper the longer period of time and a greater number of markets allow
me to study a richer number of the research objectives (including the strategic
effects of the multimarket contact) and apply other approaches to study the
multimarket contact (as well as concentration) effects on the firm behaviour.
Geographical aspect of the multimarket contact is added to the multi-product
context of the automotive industry, which increases the number of markets,
across which the automotive firms interact.
The results of the study on the multimarket contact effects in the Euro-
pean car market reveal some weak quantitative effect of multimarket contact
on competition in the European car market as well as provide some evidence
on the redistribution of the market power from the more collusive to the more
competitive markets. In this study, as compared to the other existing studies
on the mutual forbearance hypothesis, I use both ’menu’ and ’conjectural vari-
ation’ approaches to identify the firm behaviour pattern in the European car
market. I have tried to study the impact of internal (e.g., concentration) and
external (e.g., multimarket contact) factors on the prices and market conduct
parameters. To the best of my knowledge, it has been done for the first time in
case of differentiated products models. Possible coalitions of multimarket con-
tact firms have been pointed out and tested. As compared to the European car
market papers (e.g., Verboven, 1996, Goldberg and Verboven, 2001, Brenkers
and Verboven, 2006 a,b), I have tried to investigate more complex firm equilib-
rium interactions in the European car market and develop further the methods
of the identification of the firm behaviour in the European car market.
A puzzle concerning firms’ interactions in the automobile industry still re-
mains given the weak (although statistically significant) economic effect of the
multimarket contact on the firm behaviour. It seems to remain unclear whether
the multimarket contact plays a large role but other methods are required to
identify this effect, or whether it is so extensive that the firms do not care about
it at all, thus, it has no implications for the firms’ equilibrium interactions. The
argument of extensive multimarket contact may hold true for other industries
as well, where, however, a stronger quantitative effect of multimarket contact
on the firm behaviour has been found.
Market conduct studies have been quite limited due to the rather unsatisfac-
tory performance of statistical tests to choose the pattern of the firm behaviour
given the absence of real industry markups. The performance of the statisti-
cal tests is problematic since several hypotheses can be accepted or rejected as
I could see from my experience, and one has to choose some subjective crite-
rion to pick up the model specification that best describes the data at the end.
Notwithstanding all the weaknesses, the market conduct studies appear to be
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interesting from the academic point of view. Their conclusions could be useful
for antitrust authorities.
Economics of new goods is another interesting subject that I have pursued in
the third essay of my dissertation. The automobile industry has been recently
characterized by a lot of product variation and proliferation. The effects of the
new products introduction have been investigated on the basis of the German
car market, which is a very innovative market and which is clearly segmented
into premium and volume car brands. The investigation of the introduction of
new products usually involves the evaluation of producer and consumer welfare.
In this paper I have focused on the private incentives to innovate and linked it
to the role of brand-name reputation. The question here involved whether the
new products compete with the existing products, or they form a new market
niche, and, thus, face less competition from the existing products. This could
allow the firms to get some market power to recoup their investments.
As compared to the papers by Petrin (2002) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes
(2004), who study the introduction of new products in the US automobile indus-
try, the focus of this study has been not on drastic but rather on incremental
innovations/changes in the quality of the existing products, and on the pri-
vate incentives to innovate. This is also the major difference to the other new
products papers (e.g., Bresnahan et al., 1997). As compared to Petrin (2002)
and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (2004), other empirical approaches are used to
investigate the effects from new products introduction in the automobile indus-
try. The role of brand loyalty in the ability of the automotive firms to maintain
and/or increase their market shares has been also addressed in the paper.
It has been found that both a new model and brand-name reputation may
allow the innovative firms to get some market power and recoup their invest-
ments. Competition is, however, not localized within a market segment and
the class of new, or old models, i.e., products from different market segments,
new and old products compete with each other and do not constitute separate
market niches. On the other hand, new (old) models are perceived to be closer
substitutes than old (new) models. Consumers appear to value the broader
choice of new products as well as improved/increased quality of the existing car
models. They also value premium brands (Mercedes, Audi, BMW) more than
volume ones. Domestic car brands are more highly valued by the German car
customers than foreign car brands.
The results of my study show also different attitude of consumers towards
brand, new products and product characteristics depending on their age. These
inferences could be useful for the OEMs in their product development policy.
Population ageing in Germany may play an even higher role in the new car
development in the future.
The methodology that has been applied in my paper proves to be useful to
study the private incentives to innovate and could be pursued in other studies,
for other industries. I have found the results similar to Bresnahan et al. (1997)
that both a new model and brand name influence market shares. This could
be interpreted as the reason for why the premium/branded producers are the
leaders in innovation and technology: they rely on continuous innovation to
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build up and maintain their brand-name reputation, on the other hand, they
can extend premium brand umbrella over their new products. The existing
literature on the new products in general and for the automotive industry in
particular is in the infancy stage. There are some more interesting topics that
could be pursued in the future (they are discussed below).
Finally, the estimation of the discrete choice models on the demand side in
all three essays of my dissertation has allowed me to derive some implications
about consumer preferences. In the German car market the consumers are
rather heterogenous within a market segment (on the basis of a separate study
for the German car market in 2003). The consumer preferences in the US (data
for 2001-2003) and European (data for 1970-1999) car markets are strongly
correlated within a market segment. The higher the correlation of consumer
preferences within a market segment is, the closer substitutes the products are
perceived to be in that market segment, the more competitive behaviour within
the market segments could be expected.
Consumer heterogeneity is important in the estimation of discrete choice
models in order to get reasonable substitution patterns. An important source
of consumer heterogeneity is income. Higher-income consumers are less price-
sensitive and are more willing to buy high-quality premium cars. The informa-
tion on the income distribution has been used to identify the demand pattern
in the US and European car markets. Age heterogeneity is another important
source of consumer heterogeneity in the automobile markets: depending on their
age, consumers have different preferences towards car models and their charac-
teristics. This source has been exploited to identify the substitution patterns in
the German car market. This approach has allowed me to introduce consumer
heterogeneity and its interactions with product characteristics into the model
in a flexible way.
2 Future research
More generally (in addition to the more concrete suggestions to extend the cur-
rent papers that have been pointed out in the main text of my dissertation),
there are several groups of topics that could be pursued in the future in the direc-
tion of the further investigation of the automobile industry and the estimation
of the structural oligopoly models with product differentiation.
With respect to the market conduct studies, the firm behaviour during re-
cessions and booms in the European car market could be investigated in more
detail. The long period of time covered by the dataset could allow identifying
the periods of more collusive and more competitive behaviour and linking it
to the existing theories of the pricing behaviour during booms and recessions.
Some references in this respect are Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), Haltiwanger
and Harrington (1991), Knittel and Lepore (2006), etc.
The second group of topics is related to the further investigation of new prod-
ucts effects. Here two areas could be looked at in more detail for the European
car market: the introduction of new products on the basis of static models and
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entry and profitability of firms on the basis of dynamic models. The new prod-
ucts are here implied rather in the sense of entirely new car models that have
been introduced into the European car market during 1970-1999. My present
paper concentrates on the introduction of new model variants and versions, i.e.,
more incremental changes in the quality of the existing products. In addition to
the private incentives to innovate (first-mover advantage and profit dissipation
for followers), social welfare could be measured, which is expected to be high in
case of entirely new products.
The impact of brand-name reputation across countries and affiliation of do-
mestic buyers towards domestic brands and attitude towards foreign brands (in-
vestigation of the liability of foreigners across the European car market) could
be investigated. In addition, the dataset allows differentiating between model
predecessors and successors, so that customers’ expectations might be inves-
tigated, in particular, whether they postpone a car purchasing decision while
awaiting model changeovers.
As for the entry and profitability models, one could start with two-stage
entry models (e.g., Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991, Berry, 1992) and move to the
development of the more advanced two-stage entry models (e.g., Mazzeo, 2002,
Seim, 2004) and/or more complex dynamic models (e.g., Pakes, Porter and
Wolfram, 2003, Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry, 2005). Brand as a dynamic con-
cept could be investigated in those models. The development of the dynamic
models remains a very challenging but promising in terms of possible important
academic contributions field.
Modeling manufacturer-retailer relationships could be also another interest-
ing topic for future research, as well geographical product differentiation in the
car market (on the basis of the available data on sales across federal territories
(Bundesländer) for the German car market).
Further investigation of the interfirm relationships and their impact on the
firm behaviour in the automobile markets (possibly, comparison in these effects
importance between the US and European car markets), which has been briefly
discussed in the current papers, could be investigated in more detail in the
future research.
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